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Abstract 
Using the BHPS data, we have carried out three empirical studies to investigate 
household risky asset choice in the UK. In the first study we follow appropriate 
econometric procedures to identify household specific factors that can be observed to 
influence a household‟s asset choice through parameters of their objective function, 
such as risk aversion and habit. In the second and third study, we use techniques to 
explain the specific influence of various factors rather than finding what lies behind the 
interactions observed. Specifically, the second study is about examining the effect of 
retirement on household risky asset choice and investigating whether this effect would 
be different when house ownership is taken into account. In fact, we do find that 
retirement has a positive effect on risky asset shares for house owners while it has no 
effect on non-house owners. In the third study, we carry out an empirical study on the 
impact of taxation on household risky asset choice, and we find in the short run paying 
income tax has negative impact on individual‟s risky asset shares and in the long run 
paying capital gain tax has positive effect on individual‟s risky asset shares. Hence a 
possible policy implication is to increase the income tax allowance in order to provide 
incentives for people on low incomes to save, and to save in a balanced portfolio of low 
and high risk assets. 
       
 
 
 
 
  
 
Acknowledgements 
I am very grateful to my core supervisor, Professor David Dickinson, for his 
continuous support, encouragement, and guidance. I am deeply indebted to the time and 
intellectual effort he has given to me. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor, Dr. 
Frank Strobel, for his valuable comments and kindness. Without them, the completion 
of this thesis would not be possible. I am also thankful to Professor Karen Rowlingson, 
Professor Andy Mullineux, Professor Andy Lymer, Professor Stephen McKay, 
Professor John Doling for their academic advice and their precious suggestions. Thanks 
to Department of Economics for the financial support, for organizing seminars and for 
the research training. Finally, I would like to thank my dear parents, Mr. Linqi Kong 
and Mrs. Baofen Shen, and my friends, for their love and emotional support.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                   
 
Table of Content 
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS .......................................................................................................................... 2 
1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................................................... 3 
1.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS ....................................................................................................................... 4 
1.5 THESIS STRUCTURE .................................................................................................................................. 6 
2: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................... 9 
2.1 ONE-PERIOD CONSUMPTION/PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION MODEL ....................................................................... 10 
2.1.1 Basic assumptions for the market............................................................................................. 10 
2.1.2 Additional assumptions for the one period consumption/portfolio allocation model .............. 11 
2.1.3 The one period consumption/portfolio allocation model ......................................................... 12 
2.2 INTER-TEMPORAL CONSUMPTION/PORTFOLIO CHOICE MODELS (SAMUELSON, 1969 AND MERTON, 1969) ........... 14 
2.2.1 Samuelson’s model (1969) ........................................................................................................ 14 
2.2.2 Merton’s model (1969) ............................................................................................................. 16 
2.3 THE LIMITATIONS IN MERTON’S PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION MODEL .................................................................... 20 
2.3.1 Limited closed-form solution to Merton’s portfolio allocation ................................................. 20 
2.3.2 The failure of Merton model in explaining empirical observations .......................................... 21 
2.3.3 Brief summary of the Merton model and its limitation ............................................................ 25 
2.4 CONSUMPTION/PORTFOLIO MODEL WITH TIME VARYING LABOUR INCOME (CARROLL, 2011) .............................. 26 
2.4.1 The model and the assumptions ............................................................................................... 26 
2.4.2 Normalization ........................................................................................................................... 29 
2.4.3 Simulation ................................................................................................................................. 30 
2.5 STRATEGIC ASSET ALLOCATION .................................................................................................................. 35 
2.6 THE CONSUMPTION/PORTFOLIO MODELS WITH HABIT FORMATION.................................................................. 36 
2.6.1 A two time period’s consumption/portfolio model with internal habit formation ................... 37 
2.6.2 Discrete life cycle model with internal habit formation (Lax, 2002) ......................................... 41 
2.6.3 Continuous lifecycle model with internal habit formation (Gupta, 2009) ................................ 42 
2.6.4 Current literature on examining the habit formation effect on portfolio choices ..................... 49 
2.7 RECENT DEVELOPMENT ON THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR PORTFOLIO BEHAVIOUR ......................................... 53 
  
2.7.1 Theoretical consideration of housing effect .............................................................................. 54 
2.7.1.1 Negative investment asset effect ...................................................................................................... 54 
2.7.1.2 Negative “consumption commitments” effect .................................................................................. 57 
2.7.1.3 Positive housing wealth effect or positive “consumption commitments” effect .............................. 60 
2.7.1.4 the overall effect of housing on household asset allocation ............................................................. 61 
2.7.2 The effect of transaction cost ................................................................................................... 62 
2.7.2.1 Definition of transaction costs ........................................................................................................... 62 
2.7.2.2 Explaining slow portfolio adjustment ................................................................................................ 62 
2.7.2.3 Explaining low participation rate ....................................................................................................... 65 
2.7.3 The effect of taxation ................................................................................................................ 67 
3. HOUSEHOLD-SPECIFIC FACTORS AND RISKY ASSET CHOICE .............................................................. 73 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 73 
3.2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS ................................................................................................................... 75 
3.3 DATA, EMPIRICAL MODEL AND METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 78 
3.3.1 Data .......................................................................................................................................... 78 
3.3.2 Definition of variables ............................................................................................................... 79 
3.3.3 Data descriptions ...................................................................................................................... 82 
3.3.4 Empirical model and methodology ........................................................................................... 94 
3.3.5 Standard Tobit Results .............................................................................................................. 99 
3.3.6 Diagnostic tests and heteroscedastic Tobit regression results ............................................... 104 
3.3.7 CQR model and results ............................................................................................................ 108 
3.3.8 Marginal effects and Robustness ............................................................................................ 120 
3.4 INTERPRETATION AND CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 133 
4. THE IMPACT OF RETIREMENT AND HOUSING ON HOUSEHOLD RISKY ASSET CHOICE ..................... 139 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 139 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................................ 143 
4.3 DATA ................................................................................................................................................ 148 
4.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 149 
4.4.1: Cross sectional studies for 1995 and 2000 respectively ......................................................... 149 
4.4.2: Control and treatment groups (Difference-in-Difference (DD) estimation) ........................... 150 
4.4.2.1: Definition of control and treatment groups under DD methods .................................................... 150 
4.4.2.2: Descriptive statistics for each group ............................................................................................... 152 
4.4.2.3: fundamental concept behind the difference-in-difference (DD) estimation .................................. 164 
4.4.3 Short panel study on the joint impact of retirement and housing ownership ........................ 168 
4.5 ESTIMATION RESULTS ........................................................................................................................... 170 
4.5.1 CROSS-SECTIONAL ESTIMATIONS FOR 1995 AND 2000 RESPECTIVELY ....................................... 170 
4.5.2 Simple DD estimation .............................................................................................................. 199 
4.5.3 Regression-adjusted DD estimation ........................................................................................ 204 
4.5.4 Short panel study on the joint impact of retirement and housing ownership ........................ 218 
  
4.6 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 225 
APPENDIX: ............................................................................................................................................... 230 
Table (A): .......................................................................................................................................... 230 
Table (B): .......................................................................................................................................... 231 
Table (C): .......................................................................................................................................... 232 
Table (D): models with interaction terms and marginal effect for 2000 ......................................... 234 
Table (E): Table (D) continued .......................................................................................................... 236 
5:THE IMPACT OF TAXATION ON THE HOUSEHOLD RISKY ASSET CHOICE ........................................... 239 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 239 
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................................ 241 
5.3 TAX REFORM IN THE UK DURING 1999 AND 2001 .................................................................................... 247 
5.4 IMPACT OF TAXATION ON INDIVIDUAL’S RISKY ASSET CHOICE: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ............................. 253 
5.5 DATA AND METHODS ........................................................................................................................... 258 
5.5.1 Control and treatment groups (Difference-in-Differences (DD) estimation) ........................... 258 
5.5.1.1: Definition of control and treatment groups under DD methods .................................................... 258 
5.5.1.1.1: Definition of control and treatment groups when estimating the effect of income tax......... 259 
5.5.1.1.2: Definition of control and treatment groups when estimating the effect of capital gain tax .. 265 
5.5.1.2: The fundamental concept of DD estimation ................................................................................... 272 
5.5.1.3 Regression-adjusted DD estimation ................................................................................................ 273 
5.5.2 Standard Tobit estimation with additional variable of marginal tax rate .............................. 276 
5.6 ESTIMATION RESULTS ........................................................................................................................... 280 
5.6.1 Effect of income tax on individual’s asset allocation .............................................................. 280 
5.6.1.1 Simple DD estimations for effect of income tax on risky asset shares ............................................ 280 
5.6.1.2 Regression-adjusted DD estimation: The effect of paying income tax and the effect of reduced 
marginal income tax due to the income tax reform in year 1999-2000 ...................................................... 283 
5.6.2 Effect of capital gain tax cut on individual’s asset allocation ................................................. 291 
5.6.2.1 Simple DD estimation ...................................................................................................................... 291 
5.6.2.2 Regression-adjusted DD estimation: The effect of paying capital gain tax and the effect of reduced 
marginal capital gain tax due to the tax reform in tax year 2000-2001....................................................... 294 
5.6.3 Standard Tobit estimation with additional variable of marginal tax rate .............................. 302 
5.7 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 314 
APPENDIX: ............................................................................................................................................... 316 
Table (A): robustness tests for the negative impact of paying income tax in the short run ............ 316 
Table (B): robustness tests for the positive impact of paying capital gain tax in the long run ........ 317 
Table (C): Additional robustness tests for the null effect of marginal tax rate ................................ 318 
6.CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................. 321 
6.1 SUMMARY OF RESULTS ......................................................................................................................... 321 
6.2 POLICY IMPLICATION ............................................................................................................................ 324 
  
6.2.1 financial education and ensure low income households have a minimum safety net ............ 325 
6.2.2 Income tax personal allowances matter for household portfolio choice ................................ 326 
6.3 LIMITATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH ........................................................................................................ 328 
BIBLIOGRAPHY: .................................................................................................................................. 330 
 
 
  
List of Tables 
Table2. 1: Merton-Samuelson Asset Allocation for 9 Countries ............................ 22 
Table2. 2: a summary on recent literature which study the optimal 
consumption/portfolio model with habit in consumption ............................... 50 
Table2. 3:Some US studies on the effect of taxation .............................................. 70 
Table2. 4:Some Non-US studies on the effect of taxation ...................................... 72 
   
Table 3. 1The Distribution of Liquid Wealth in 2000 ............................................ 84 
Table 3. 2The Composition of Liquid Wealth ........................................................ 84 
Table 3. 3: Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................. 87 
Table 3. 4: The distribution of risky asset shares in 2000 (α2000) ......................... 89 
Table 3. 5: The distribution of risky asset shares in 2000 (α2000) ......................... 91 
Table 3. 6: Changes in individual's Risky Asset Share from 1995 to 2000 ............ 93 
Table 3. 7: The results of Tobit regression for our sample ..................................... 99 
Table 3. 8: Homoscedastic Tobit model and heteroscedastic Tobit model ........... 106 
Table 3. 9: Estimation results for standard Tobit model and CQR models .......... 110 
Table 3. 10: Estimation results for standard Tobit model and CQR models ........ 112 
Table 3. 11: Marginal effects and robustness tests for the main specification...... 124 
Table 3. 12: Robustness tests for other specifications which include number of kids 
and health status ............................................................................................ 130 
 
Table 4. 1: Number of Observations for Treatment Group and Control Group in 
Different Sample ........................................................................................... 151 
Table 4. 2:Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................ 159 
Table 4. 3:Simple illustration for DD methods ..................................................... 164 
Table 4. 4: The standard Tobit estimations for the whole sample and two 
subsamples for 1995 BHPS data ................................................................... 173 
  
Table 4. 5: The standard Tobit estimations for the whole sample and two 
subsamples for 2000 BHPS data ................................................................... 175 
Table 4. 6:The standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit estimations 
for the whole sample in 1995 of BHPS data ................................................. 177 
Table 4. 7:The standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit estimations 
for the house-owner subsample in 1995 of BHPS data ................................. 179 
Table 4. 8:The standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit estimations 
for the non house-owner subsample in 1995 of BHPS data .......................... 181 
Table 4. 9:The standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit estimations 
for the whole sample in 2000 of BHPS data ................................................. 183 
Table 4. 10:The standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit 
estimations for the house-owner subsample in 2000 of BHPS data ............. 185 
Table 4. 11:The standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit 
estimations for the non house-owner subsample in 2000 of BHPS data ...... 187 
Table 4. 12: Models with interaction terms, marginal effects and robustness test 
(1995) ............................................................................................................ 191 
Table 4. 13: Table 4.12 continued ......................................................................... 196 
Table 4. 14: Simple DD illustration for the whole sample.................................... 200 
Table 4. 15:Simple DD illustration for house owner subsample .......................... 200 
Table 4. 16:Simple DD illustration for non house owner subsample ................... 200 
Table 4. 17:Simple DD estimation for different samples by OLS ........................ 201 
Table 4. 18:Simple DD estimation in tobit for different samples ......................... 202 
Table 4. 19:Results for regression-adjusted DD estimation using 1995 and 2000 of 
BHPS data ..................................................................................................... 208 
Table 4. 20:Results for Homoscedastic Tobit and Heteroscedastic Tobit 
regression-adjusted DD estimation, the whole sample ................................. 210 
Table 4. 21:Results for Homoscedastic Tobit and Heteroscedastic Tobit 
regression-adjusted DD estimation, the house-owner subsample ................. 212 
Table4. 22:Results for Homoscedastic Tobit and Heteroscedastic Tobit 
regression-adjusted DD estimation, the non house-owner subsample .......... 214 
  
Table 4. 23: Earlier research results for regression-adjusted DD estimation using 
1995 and 2000 of BHPS data ........................................................................ 216 
Table 4. 24: Results for short panel study on the joint impact of retirement and 
housing ownership......................................................................................... 222 
 
Table 5. 1:Income tax rates and capital gain tax rates before, during and after the 
1999-2001 tax reform .................................................................................... 249 
Table 5. 2: The overall effect of the fall in tax ...................................................... 256 
Table 5. 3:Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of paying income tax, 1995-2000) ...................................................... 260 
Table 5. 4: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of reduced marginal income tax, 1995-2000) ..................................... 262 
Table 5. 5: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of paying income tax, 1995-2005) ...................................................... 263 
Table 5. 6: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of reduced marginal income tax, 1995-2005) ..................................... 265 
Table 5. 7: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of paying capital gains tax, 1995-2000) .............................................. 267 
Table 5. 8: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of reduced marginal capital gains tax, 1995-2000) ............................. 269 
Table 5. 9: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of paying capital gains tax, 1995-2005) .............................................. 270 
Table 5. 10: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for 
the effect of reduced marginal capital gains tax, 1995-2005) ....................... 272 
Table 5. 11: Simple illlustration for DD methods ................................................. 273 
Table 5. 12:The simple DD estimation in tobit for the effect of paying income tax 
and for the effect of reduced marginal income tax (1995-2000)................... 281 
Table 5. 13: The simple DD estimation in tobit for the effect of paying income tax 
and for the effect of reduced marginal income tax (1995-2005)................... 282 
Table 5. 14: The DD estimation for the effect of paying income tax and for the 
effect of reduced marginal income tax (1995-2000) ..................................... 287 
  
Table 5. 15: The DD estimation for the effect of paying income tax and for the 
effect of reduced income tax (1995-2005) .................................................... 289 
Table 5. 16: The simple DD estimation in tobit for the effect of paying capital gain 
tax and for the effect of reduced marginal capital gain tax (1995-2000) ...... 292 
Table 5. 17: The simple DD estimation in tobit for the effect of paying capital gain 
tax and for the effect of reduced marginal capital gain tax (1995-2005) ...... 293 
Table 5. 18: The DD estimation for the effect of paying capital gain tax and for the 
effect of reduced marginal capital gain tax (1995-2000) .............................. 298 
Table 5. 19: The DD estimation for the effect of paying capital gain tax and for the 
effect of reduced marginal capital gain tax (1995-2005) .............................. 300 
Table 5. 20: Results for Tobit estimation with additional variable of marginal tax 
rate ................................................................................................................. 305 
Table 5. 21: Marginal effect of income taxation on risky asset shares ................. 307 
Table 5. 22: Robustness tests for the null effect of marginal tax rate on risky asset 
holdings in 2000 ............................................................................................ 311 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
List of Figures 
Figure 2. 1:Stochastic Optimal Portfolio Share in Risky Assets in Different Periods
 ......................................................................................................................... 32 
Figure 2. 2:Dynamic Stochastic Optimal Portfolio Share in Risk Assets for 
Different γ When Normalized Total Assets=2.5 ............................................. 33 
Figure 2. 3:Dynamic Stochastic Optimal Portfolio Share in Risk Assets when γ=6, 
γ=8, γ=10 ......................................................................................................... 34 
 
Figure 3. 1Spike plot of risky asset shares in 1995 (α1995) ................................... 85 
Figure 3. 2:Spike plot of risky asset shares in 2000 (α2000) .................................. 86 
Figure 3. 3: Standard Tobit and Censored Quantile Regression Estimates for risky 
asset allocation .............................................................................................. 114 
Figure 3. 4:Standard Tobit and Censored Quantile Regression Estimates for risky 
asset allocation .............................................................................................. 115 
Figure 3. 5:Standard Tobit and Censored Quantile Regression Estimates for risky 
asset allocation .............................................................................................. 116 
Figure 3. 6:Standard Tobit and Censored Quantile Regression Estimates for risky 
asset allocation .............................................................................................. 117 
 
Figure 5. 1:Impact of taxation on individual's risky asset choice ......................... 257 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Research background 
Suppose we have an individual who has a certain amount of initial wealth. 
Typically, this individual needs to make two important decisions. As a consumer, he/she 
needs to decide how much of his/her wealth and income should be spent on current 
consumption and how much should be saved for future consumption. As an investor, 
he/she needs to determine the allocations of his/her savings among different assets. 
These two decisions are called the consumption-saving decision and the portfolio 
allocation decision respectively (Constantinides and Malliaris, 1995). 
Empirically, we observe cross-sectional variation in household
1
 portfolio 
allocations. If we want to explain this heterogeneity in household portfolio allocations 
in a classical “utility maximizing framework”, we “must” refer to “heterogeneity in 
circumstances, heterogeneity in preferences or a combination of the two” (Curcuru et al. 
2004, p2). The “heterogeneity in circumstances” means each household has his/her own 
circumstance that differs from others in terms of demographics (eg: age, employment 
status, wealth, education), “non-diversifiable background risks” ( eg: labour income risk, 
entrepreneurial income risk, house price risk), information asymmetries and transaction 
costs (eg: brokerage fees and psychic cost) (Curcuru et al. 2004, p2). This 
“heterogeneity in circumstances” could lead to the cross-sectional variation in 
                                                          
1
 In my thesis, the term of households and individuals are interchangeable, and both of them refer to 
individuals. 
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household portfolio allocations. On the other hand, many scholars work on 
preference-based theories to solve the optimal intertemporal consumption /portfolio 
allocation problem, for example, the early work introduced by Merton (1969), and 
Samuelson (1969, 1970), habit formation related model developed by Gomes and 
Michaelides (2003), Munk (2008), Polkovnichenko (2007), Gupta (2009), Lax (2002), 
and stochastic hyperbolic preferences based model developed by Palacios-Huerta and 
Pérez-Kakabadse (2011). 
1.2 Research motivations 
In this section, we provide our motivation of why we decide to study household‟s 
risky asset choice in the UK and focus on why the UK is an interesting case study. 
The motivation for the thesis is that portfolio allocation generally and risky-asset 
selection more specifically is an important topic for research. The thesis is particularly 
focussed on factors that influence portfolio selection which might be described as 
reflecting social and behavioural as well as economic influences. Hence the thesis adds 
to our understanding of what are the important determinants of portfolio choice beyond 
those found in standard models (where risk, return and (exogenous) attitude to risk) are 
the crucial determining variables. 
There are a number of implications which make the research in the thesis 
interesting. Firstly the assets that individuals hold in their wealth will influence the 
structure of financial markets and institutions and of the returns that are generated. 
Secondly understanding the factors that influence the structure of individual portfolios 
will give us insight into what determines the demand for financial assets. Thirdly 
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examining how various government policy variables, such as income tax and capital 
gains tax on portfolio choice will help us to understand the impact of policy.  
The focus on the UK recognises that we have the most developed financial sector 
of any European Economy and that there is a much greater emphasis placed on stock 
markets as a source of finance for industry. Hence analysing the demand for risky assets, 
which is mainly shares, is of particular significance. 
1.3 Research aim and research questions 
The aim of this research is to provide an explanation for the cross-sectional 
variation in household risk asset choice by using the British Household Panel Survey 
data (BHPS). We follow appropriate econometric procedures to identify factors that 
influence household risk asset choices and explain the results in the context of risk 
aversion and habit.  
The economic analysis of portfolio choice identifies that risk aversion, the 
subjective distribution of asset returns, and the stochastic relationship of returns to 
labour income are central to households‟ asset choices. When transaction costs and 
taxes are taken into consideration, these two factors will also have effects on asset 
choice. There are a number of issues which can be analysed by applying this general 
analytical framework to the UK Household Survey dataset. In this thesis, we work on 
the British Household Panel Survey, and will draw some valuable conclusions. 
Specifically, we have the following research questions: 
1) Are household social and economic demographics able to explain the 
cross-sectional variation in household risk asset choice?  Under certain 
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assumptions, can we interpret the household characteristics effects in the context 
of risk aversion and habit?  
2) Does retirement have an impact on households‟ risky asset allocation? When we 
answer this question, does home ownership need to be taken into account? 
3) Does taxation have an impact on the households‟ risky asset allocation? If so, 
what policy conclusion can we draw?  
1.4 Research contributions 
Partly due to the limitation of datasets on households‟ asset holdings, limited work 
has been undertaken on household asset choices, especially in the UK. In this thesis, we 
will carry out an analysis on British households‟ risky asset choices by using the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data, in particular, survey data for the years 1995, 
2000 and 2005. As far as we know, the BHPS is the most appropriate
2
 secondary 
dataset which provides detailed information on households‟ social and economic 
demographics, and this dataset has not been used to examine the household risky asset 
choice yet.  
We use data from 1995 and 2000 for all of studies. We also use 2005 for the third 
study. We do not use 2010 since this data only became available after the bulk of the 
research was completed. The choice of data is determined by the type of work we wish 
to undertake. Thus when we are looking at household specific determinants of portfolio 
choice we prefer to use a limited data set to allow us to focus at the household level and 
not get involved too much in controlling for factors which change over time. For the 
                                                          
2
 Except Wealth and Assets Survey which became available last year. We propose to use this new 
dataset for future research.  
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impact of tax changes we do use 2005 data since the difference in difference estimation 
method allows us to control for time effects relatively easily. 
We also contribute the existing literature by applying two econometric methods, 
namely, censored quantile regression (CQR) and Difference-in-Difference estimation 
(DD). The CQR method is a recent econometric method. Unlike OLS or Tobit 
estimation, which considers the conditional mean, CQR estimates the effect of 
explanatory variables at different quantiles of the distribution of the error term. This 
estimator “is consistent and asymptotically normal for a wide class of error distributions, 
and it is robust to heteroscedasticity”(Powell, 1986; cited in Billett and Xue, 2007, 
p1841). Although CQR have received much attention both in the theoretical and 
empirical studies, it has not been used in the research topic of households‟ risky asset 
choice. Therefore, we carry out further analysis by using CQR and contribute to the 
existing literature. 
 Although Stephens and Ward-Batts (2004) used DD estimation method to 
examine how British couples responded to the tax system changes from joint to 
independent in the UK in 1990. Alan et al. (2010) used DD estimation method to 
examine how Canadian couples responded to the tax system changes from joint to 
independent in Canada in 1988, they focused on the reallocation of asset ownership 
within couples rather than focusing on the effect of taxation on individual‟s risky asset 
allocation. In addition, we not only use the DD method to examine the marginal tax rate 
effect but also the income allowance effect, which is novel to the existing literature. 
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1.5 Thesis structure 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. 
In Chapter Two, we provide a literature review on households‟ consumption/ 
portfolio choice models. We start from a one period consumption/portfolio allocation 
model, followed by inter-temporal models. After that we examine whether the 
proportion of these models are consistent with the empirical observations. Then we 
follow Carroll‟s (2011) approach, introduce stochastic labour income into the model 
and carry out a simulation. However, the simulation results still could not explain the 
empirical observations. In contrast, incorporating habit formation in consumption into 
the model can improve the explanatory power of the theoretical model significantly. 
Finally, we review the recent studies which examine the effect of housing, transaction 
cost and taxation on household asset allocation.  
In Chapter Three, we analyse empirically household-specific factors that influence 
the extent to which household hold risky assets. Assuming zero transaction costs and 
taxes and that subjective expectations are homogenous across households or the 
difference is random implies that risk aversion is the main driver behind different 
portfolio choices across households. Using a typical model of asset choice, our 
empirical specification identifies variables that can be observed to influence a 
households‟ asset choice through parameters of their objective function such as risk 
aversion and habit. We interpret the results in this context. Net liquid wealth, personal 
debt, housing wealth, outstanding mortgage, the ratio of income to net liquid wealth, 
age and employment status are observed to influence a household‟s risk aversion. 
Factors such as education, pension, gender, marital status, number of children and 
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location are found to be insignificant variables. Furthermore, when we look at 
household level data an important feature is that a significant proportion of households 
hold no risky assets (specifically equity). This implies particular econometric 
procedures to undertake research on risky asset choice. In this chapter, we use Tobit 
estimation methods and censored quantile regression (CQR) which are supposed to be 
the most appropriate econometric procedures.   
In Chapter Four, we investigate how the portfolios of British households evolve 
leading up to and beyond retirement. Using data from the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS), we examine the impact of retirement and housing ownership on the 
share of a household‟s total assets held in risky assets. By carrying out cross-sectional 
analysis, we find that house owners increase their risky asset portfolio as they just 
entered their retirement stage or as they are in the early stage of their retirement. 
However, no effect of retirement on risky asset shares could be found for non-house 
owners. By running Difference-in- Differences (DD) regression, we also find a positive 
impact of retirement on risky asset shares. Furthermore, by implementing a short panel 
study on the joint impact of retirement and housing ownership, we find that on average, 
retired house owners hold the highest proportion of risky assets among the four 
categories of households defined in the paper, followed by employed house owners who 
hold the second highest proportion of risky assets. The average risky asset shares of the 
other two categories of households, namely, retired non-house owners and employed 
non-house owners are relatively the same and are the lowest among all. These results 
are statistically significant.    
In Chapter Five, the impact of taxation is considered in detail using household 
level datasets. We examine the impact of tax allowances and marginal tax rates on 
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portfolio shares in risky assets by using the Difference-in-Difference method. After 
controlling for demographic factors, we find in the short run paying income tax has 
negative impact on individual‟s risky asset shares, which is significantly different from 
zero at 1 percentage level. We also find in the long run paying capital gain tax has 
positive effect on individual‟s risky asset shares, which is also significantly different 
from zero at 1 percentage level. In contrast, by using DD estimation methods, we find 
neither marginal income tax rate nor marginal capital gain tax has effect on risky asset 
shares. Furthermore, this null effect of marginal tax on risky asset shares has also been 
found in the standard Tobit regression for 2000 when we followed Poterba and 
Samwick‟s (2003) method and calculated the marginal tax rate for each individual.    
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2: Theoretical Considerations and Literature 
Review  
Early work on portfolio theory was set in a static one period setting (Markowitz, 
1952, Tobin, 1958) and involved maximising a utility function of wealth. The principles 
established in that work were incorporated into dynamic specifications (Samuelson 
(1969) and Merton (1969, 1971)). Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969, 1971) 
determined the optimal policies for portfolio allocation in a discrete-time setting and a 
continuous-time setting respectively.  
In this chapter, we first look at a one-period consumption/portfolio allocation 
model followed by inter-temporal consumption/portfolio choice models. In particular, 
we look at the models developed by Samuelson (1969) Merton (1969). Then we 
examine whether the propositions of these models are consistent with the empirical 
observations.  In section 2.4, we study a consumption/portfolio model with time varying 
labour income. We set up the model following Carroll‟s (2011) approach, and present the 
simulation results in section 2.4.3. Later, we review recent development in portfolio 
theory, for example, models incorporating habit formation in consumption. We hope to 
see that introducing habit formation into the model could explain the empirical 
observations of low levels of risky assets shares. Similarly, a two-period model with 
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habit formation is examined in the first place followed by a discrete life-cycle model 
and a continuous life-cycle model with habit formation. The explanatory power of these 
models is also investigated. The last section of this chapter review the recent studies 
which examine the effect of housing, transaction cost and taxation on household asset 
allocation.  
2.1 One-period consumption/portfolio allocation model 
2.1.1 Basic assumptions for the market  
 Before we set up the one-period consumption/portfolio allocation model, we 
present the basic assumptions for the financial market first.  The following four 
assumptions have been assumed in the early models, both in the static one-period model 
or inter-temporal consumption/portfolio choice models, such as Samuelson (1969) and 
Merton‟s (1969) models: 
Assumption 1: Complete market 
Short sales are allowed for all assets. There are no borrowing constraints on riskfree 
asset and the borrowing rate is equal to the lending rate. 
Assumption 2: No market frictions  
No participation cost, transaction cost and/or taxes in this basic model.  
Assumption 3: Price taker 
The representative agent is a price taker and his/her investment decision does not affect 
the assets‟ prices and returns.  His/her optimal portfolio allocation is only determined 
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by his/her utility function. It is independent from the demand for and supply of the 
assets in the market.  
Assumption 4: No-arbitrage opportunities 
All the risk-free assets and risk-free portfolio generate a common and constant return 
which is denoted as R
F
. 
2.1.2 Additional assumptions for the one period 
consumption/portfolio allocation model 
 In addition to the above basic assumption for the market, we also assume that the 
representative agent only receives income from investment and receives no labour 
income. There are two assets in the market, namely a risk-free asset and a risky asset. 
The former has a constant one-period gross return which is denoted as R
F
. The one 
period gross return on the latter asset is random and is denoted as     . We define a 
portfolio as any linear combination of these two assets which provides a positive market 
value. In the one-period model, the individual needs to decide the optimal consumption 
level and optimal risky asset share at the beginning of the period, which is denoted as 
time t, and consume all the remaining wealth at the end of the period, which is denoted 
as time t+1, in order to maximize his expected utility from consumption over time t and 
time t+1. The utility function is denoted as U(Ct) and U(Ct+1). Furthermore, the utility 
function is assumed to be “an increasing strictly concave function on the range of 
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feasible values” for Ct and Ct+1 and “it is twice continuously differentiable” 
3
(Merton, 
1999, p17).  
 
2.1.3 The one period consumption/portfolio allocation model 
The objective function for the one-period portfolio allocation model is as follows
4
: 
          
                   
subject to   
       
    
               
  
where Wt is the initial wealth, in other words the total wealth owned by the investor at 
the beginning of a period (ie: at time t);    is the consumption level at time t, and    
is the proportion of liquid wealth invested in the risky asset. The individual needs to 
decide    and    simultaneously.      is the total remaining wealth at time t+1, 
which will all be consumed at time t+1. There is no bequest motive in this model.  
Hence we can rewrite our objective function as follows: 
                        
                       
Taking partial derivative of this objective function with respect to    and    
respectively, we will have the first-order conditions: 
                                                          
3
 The assumption of strict concave utility function implies that the investor is everywhere risk averse 
(Merton, 1999, p17).  
4
 We follow Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969) to develop this one period model. 
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 where         stands for the probability density function of variable      .  
 In the case of isoelastic utility case,         
          , we solve these FOCs 
simultaneously, and derive the optimal consumption and portfolio allocation decisions 
for time t, namely,   
  and   
 , as follows: 
  
  
  
     
   
where            
       
                
   
   
 
  
 
 
 
and 
  
  is a solution to  
         
       
       
   
 
       
          ,  
where         is the probability density function of variable      .  
 As we can see, this result suggests that in the one-period optimal 
consumption/portfolio model, the optimal portfolio allocation rule is independent of 
consumption decisions and it is also independent of wealth.  
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2.2 Inter-temporal consumption/portfolio choice models 
(Samuelson, 1969 and Merton, 1969)  
 After deriving the optimal consumption rule and optimal asset allocation rule for 
the one period model, in this section, we review the inter-temporal 
consumption/portfolio choice models, specifically, Samuelson‟s discrete time model 
(Samuelson, 1969) and Merton‟s continuous time model (Merton, 1969). 
2.2.1 Samuelson’s model (1969) 
 In Samuelson‟s model (1969), an individual needs to decide his/her optimal 
consumption rule and optimal portfolio allocation rule in a finite discrete time setting. 
The assumptions for Samuelson (1969) are similar to the one-period 
consumption/portfolio choice model we set up in the above section 2.1. In the two-asset 
case, the objective function is as follows: 
    
 
 
   
      
         
subject to  
       
    
               
  
 In this dynamic programming problem, Samuelson (1969) started with the last 
period and then applied recursive methods. The value function for time T-1 is as follows: 
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                                                                    (1)          
Taking the partial derivative of this value function with respect to CT-1 and αT-1 
respectively, and solving FOCs simultaneously, he derived the optimal consumption and 
portfolio allocation decisions for time T-1, namely,     
  and     
 . Substitute     
  
and     
  into equation (1) and get           . By applying envelop theorem: 
             
        and knowing           , he wrote out the value function 
for one period earlier:  
                                                
               
           . 
       Then take the partial derivatives, set up the FOCs, derive the functions for     
  
and     
  and determine           . By using this recursive method and working 
backwards in time, the optimal consumption and portfolio allocation rules can be solved.  
 In the case of the isoelastic utility case,         
          , the optimal 
consumption rule is in the form of     
       5, and the optimal portfolio allocation 
rule,   
  is constant, and it is a solution to  
         
       
      
   
 
       
          , 
where         is the probability density function of variable      .  
      As we can see, the results of Samuelson‟s (1969) model not only suggests that the 
optimal portfolio allocation rule is independent of consumption decisions and 
                                                          
5
 For details about the optimal consumption rules, please see Samuelson’s 1969 paper on page 244. 
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independent of wealth, but also suggests that the optimal portfolio allocation rule is 
independent of the investment time horizon. 
2.2.2 Merton’s model (1969) 
Different from the discrete time settings in Samuelson‟s (1969) model, in Merton‟s 
(1969) model an individual needs to decide his/her optimal consumption rule and 
optimal portfolio allocation rule in a continuous time setting.  
 The assumptions are similar to the assumptions in Samuelson (1969) except the 
followings. The returns of those risky assets are stochastic which follow the “Wiener 
Brownian-motion process” (Merton, 1969, p247). In particular, he sets up a two-asset 
model in which the agent is allowed to invest, namely, a risk-free asset with “a constant 
rate of return” and a stochastically-risky asset with “a constant equity risk premium” 
(McCarthy, 2004, p10). The representative agent‟s objective is to maximize his/her 
expected value of discounted lifetime utility from consumption and discounted terminal 
wealth. The objective function is as follows: 
           
 
 
         
                                                      (2) 
subject to budget constraint        
        
                     ,  
                   ; 
where 
 : subjective discount rate 
Ct:  level of consumption at time t 
U(Ct ): utility of consumption at time t 
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WT: level of wealth at terminal time T 
U(WT ): utility of terminal wealth 
Wt:  level of wealth at time t 
R
F
: gross return on the risk-free asset which is constant overtime  
R: expected gross return on the risky asset which is constant overtime 
σ: standard deviation of the gross return on the risky asset which is constant overtime 
  : the proportion of the portfolio invested in the risky asset between time t and t+1 
   : the increment of the Wiener process 
 Additionally, the representative agent in this model is assumed to have a utility 
function with CRRA,         
          and         
          and γ 
refers to coefficient of relative risk aversion. As we can see from Merton‟s model, given 
a constant value of R
F
, R and σ, the investment opportunities are not time-varying. This 
assumption was relaxed in later models (Merton, 1971, 1973).  
 Now, by using the Bellman equation we rewrite the model as follows: 
            
           
 
 
      
              
and it is subject to all the constraints listed above. In general, we can write it as: 
               
           
 
        
                                       (3) 
In particular, we can write: 
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If        and “the third partial derivatives” of          are bounded, we can use 
“Taylor‟s theorem and the mean value theorem for integrals” to rewrite (3) as 
              
                  
           
  
 
           
  
              
    
 
 
  
            
   
        
 
                                             (4) 
where       . 
On the right-hand side of equation (4), if we take the    operator into each term, then 
         on the left-hand side and             on the right-hand side can cancel each 
other out. Since                      
                   
    and  
            
 
     
    
          , if we substitute these two equations into 
equation (4) and then divide both sides of the equation by Δ, and take the limit of this 
derived equation as    , we will get the following equation: 
             
         
  
 
         
  
        
                 
     
 
 
 
          
   
  
   
                                                      (5) 
where      . 
So if we define                       
         
  
 
         
  
        
   
          
 
 
          
   
  
   
    , then equation (5) becomes as follows: 
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   . 
Hence we can write out the optimality conditions (Merton, 1969): 
 
 
 
 
 
              
    
           
    
           
                                          
                                  
                                    
  
Under the additional assumption of having a utility function with CRRA, an explicit 
solution can be obtained. If we assume         
          and       
  
         , the optimal consumption and portfolio allocation rules in the two-asset 
case are as follows (Merton, 1969):   
  
  
    
   
                                                           (6) 
and   
  
 
 
    
 
 
     
 
 
 
     
     , for 
 
 
  ; 
  
             , for 
 
 
  , where      . 
If no bequests are introduced in the model (ie:    ), then the optimal portfolio 
allocation rule remains the same as equation (6) and the optimal consumption rule 
becomes: 
  
  
 
 
        
 
 
 
     
     , for 
 
 
  ; 
  
           , for 
 
 
  . 
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If a logarithmic utility function is assumed (ie:               and       
        ), then the optimal portfolio allocation rule still remains unchanged as 
equation (6) and the optimal consumption rule becomes: 
  
                         . 
As we can see, under the assumptions of constant investment opportunities and a 
utility function with CRRA, the optimal portfolio allocation rule is independent of his/her 
consumption choice, the investment time horizon or age and the investor‟s wealth 
(Merton, 1969). The representative agent invests a constant proportion of wealth in risky 
asset over his/her life time. These results are consistent with the findings in the 
Samuelson‟s model with discrete time settings which we presented in the above section 
2.2.1. 
 
2.3 The limitations in Merton’s portfolio allocation model 
2.3.1 Limited closed-form solution to Merton’s portfolio 
allocation 
There is a limited closed-form solution to Merton‟s portfolio allocation problem. 
Merton (1971) stated that due to the “basic nonlinearity of the equations and the large 
number of state variables” (Merton, 1971, p384), the optimum consumption and 
portfolio rules in a continuous-time model cannot be solved completely unless “when 
asset prices satisfy the „geometric‟ Brownian motion hypothesis and the individual‟s 
utility function is a member of the HARA family, the consumption-portfolio problem is 
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completely solved” (Merton, 1971, p394) or “for a particular member of the HARA 
family, namely the Bernoulli logarithmic utility function, the optimal rules can be 
solved explicitly for general price mechanism” (Merton, 1971, p403).  
However, if we assume log utility function for the representative agent, then 
“different assumptions about price behaviour have no effect on the decision rules” 
(Merton, 1971, p403). In other words, this agent will not “be concerned about hedging 
against shifts in the future investment opportunity set (changes in expected returns or 
covariances)” (Brennan et al.,1997, p1378), because “for the special case of Bernoulli 
logarithmic utility (γ = 1)”, not only “the portfolio-selection decision is independent of 
the consumption decision”, but also “the consumption decision is independent of the 
financial parameters and is only dependent upon the level of wealth” (Merton, 1969, 
p253). Therefore, if that is the case, the dynamic portfolio problem will become a static 
one which would seem not to solve the problem addressed originally (Campbell et al. 
2003).  
2.3.2 The failure of Merton model in explaining empirical 
observations 
The following Table 2.1 presents the optimal asset allocation rules for 9 countries, 
under the assumption that the investment opportunities are constant over time and the 
investor has a CRRA utility function with γ = 1 ( the log utility case),  γ = 3 and γ = 5. 
Then the equity portfolio share is constant and equals to 
    
   
, which follows the 
portfolio rule derived by Merton (1969, 1971). The real returns and volatilities that we 
used here were calculated by Jorion and Goetzmann (1999).  
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As we can see, the predicted optimal equity portfolio shares for those 9 countries in 
Table 2.1 seem to be too high when we compared them with the empirical observations 
(Guiso et al., 2002; McCarthy, 2004;  Iwaisako, 2009), except for Italy. Table 2.1 
shows that the real return from risky investment in Italy is about 3.2 % which is lower 
than 5.5% in the US, whereas in Italy the volatility of equity returns which is measured 
by variance is nearly two times higher than that in the US. Hence, with relatively low 
real return and high volatility, the predicted risky portfolio share in Italy is just 16% if γ 
= 3 and 10% if γ = 5. The results in this table, thus, partially demonstrate that the 
traditional Merton-Samuelson model (1969) predicts a much higher households‟ risky 
asset allocation. In addition, these results also present the equity premium puzzle from 
the portfolio perspective, in other words, why the actual risky portfolio shares is much 
lower than the predicted optimal one giving the realistic values on risk and return as 
well as reasonable assumptions on an individual‟s preference (McCarthy, 2004).  
Table2. 1: Merton-Samuelson Asset Allocation for 9 Countries 
Source:  McCarthy (2004) and author’s own calculations, using the values of real 
return and volatility derived by Jorion and Goetzmann (2000). 
The real returns and volatilities are measured in local currency and in real terms 
(Jorion and Goetzmann, 2000). 
 
The classical Merton-Samuelson model not only fail to explain the relatively low 
proportion of households‟ wealth invested in risky assets, which can be seen from Table 
  US Japan UK Canada Australia Germany Switzerland Netherland Italy 
Period 1/1921- 4/1949- 1/1921- 1/1921- 1/1931- 1/1950- 1/1926- 1/1921- 12/1928- 
  12/1996 12/1996 12/1996 12/1996 12/1996 12/1996 12/1996 12/1996 12/1996 
Real return 5.5% 7.2% 3.6% 4.5% 2.6% 7.6% 4.3% 2.8% 3.2% 
Volatility 2.5% 3.6% 2.5% 2.8% 1.9% 2.4% 2.2% 2.2% 6.6% 
Equity portfolio share 
(γ=1) 220.0% 200.0% 144.0% 160.7% 132.3% 316.7% 197.3% 127.3% 48.5% 
Equity portfolio share 
(γ=3) 73% 67% 49% 54% 44% 104% 66% 42% 16% 
Equity portfolio share 
(γ=5) 44% 40% 29% 32% 26% 62% 39% 25% 10% 
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2.1, but also fail to explain the “age–portfolio profile” that have been widely observed 
in the real world. Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) predicted that the optimal risky 
portfolio share should be constant for the finite as well as the infinite investment 
horizon under certain assumptions including individual preference with CRRA, constant 
investment opportunities or the individual with log utility function, and no labour 
income is generated. This implies that in theory age and wealth have no impact on the 
optimal risky portfolio share. However, in general, an inverse-U shape of age effect on 
individual‟s risky asset allocation has been found in a wide range of empirical studies. 
For example, Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) investigated the household asset allocation 
behaviour in the US and find that unconditional risky portfolio shares have “a 
hump-shaped relationship to age” by using the Surveys of Consumer Finances data 
from 1989 to 1998. Similar patterns have also been found in the European countries 
such as the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy (Guiso et al., 2002) and in Japan 
(Iwaisako, 2009). On the contrary, the investment specialists typically would give a 
suggestion that is different from the classical portfolio theory. They suggested investors 
who are at the early stage of their lifecycle should invest a large proportion of their 
wealth, mainly labour income, in risky assets, in order to take advantage of the equity 
risk premium. As the investment time horizon shrinks, the middle-aged investors would 
be suggested to hold a portfolio with modest risk and not surprisingly, older investors 
would be advised to invest most of their wealth in risk-free assets (Bali et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, Malkiel (1999), a financial specialist, has established an easy way to 
calculate the individual‟s optimal risky portfolio share, which has been commonly 
regarded as rule of thumb in the Wall Street. He proposes that the investors should hold 
the risky portfolio share which is equals to “100 minus the investor‟s age” (Malkiel, 
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1999, p418).  In other words, in the real financial world, the optimal risky portfolio 
shares are suggested to decline with age, which implies a downward sloping pattern for 
“the age–portfolio profile” (Canner et al., 1997, cited in Iwaisako, 2009). 
As been mentioned above, Merton (1969) predicted wealth has no impact on the 
optimal risky portfolio share under certain assumptions. However, research has 
generally revealed a positive correlation between the proportion of wealth invested in 
risky assets and households‟ wealth (Wachter and Yogo, 2010). Guiso et al. (2002, 
Table I.7) has documented this fact for five countries, namely the US, the UK, 
Netherland, Germany and Italy, based on various household surveys, including the 1998 
Survey of Consumer Finances for the US, the 1997-98 Financial Research Survey for 
the UK, the 1997 Center Saving Survey for Netherlands, the 1993 Income and 
Expenditure Survey for Germany, the 1998 Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
for Italy. A similar correlation has also been found in early household surveys, for 
example, for the US, the 1962 and 1963 Federal Reserve Board Surveys of the Financial 
Characteristics of Consumers and Changes in Family Finances (Blume and Friend, 1975; 
Friend and Blume, 1975; cited in Wachter and Yogo, 2010, p3). In general, wealth does 
not only have an impact on the stock market participation but also the share of risky 
assets in a portfolio. The probability for the poor to invest in a risky asset is much 
smaller than the probability for the rich, and even conditional upon participation, the 
poor tend to invest less in risky assets. As also has been suggested in many empirical 
studies, after controlling for level of education and other demographic variables, wealth 
is still found to have positive effect on risky portfolio share (Wachter and Yogo, 2010).  
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  2.3.3 Brief summary of the Merton model and its limitation  
In conclusion, as we present on section 2.2.2, in Merton‟s model, an individual 
needs to decide his/her optimal consumption rule optimal portfolio allocation rule in a 
continuous time setting. The individual‟s objective is to maximize his/her expected 
value of discounted lifetime utility from consumption and discounted terminal wealth
6
. 
In particular, if we assume a two-asset model where a risk-free asset with “a constant 
rate of return” and a stochastically-risky asset with “a constant equity risk premium” 
(McCarthy, 2004, p10), an individual with CRRA or logarithmic utility function has the 
following optimal portfolio allocation rule:   
  
    
   
    . In other words, under the 
assumptions of constant investment opportunities and a utility function with CRRA, the 
optimal portfolio allocation rule is independent of his/her consumption choice, the 
investment time horizon or age and the investor‟s wealth (Merton, 1969). The 
representative agent invests a constant proportion of wealth in risky asset over his/her 
life time. 
However, the optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time 
model cannot be solved completely unless “when asset prices satisfy the „geometric‟ 
Brownian motion hypothesis and the individual‟s utility function is a member of the 
HARA family, the consumption-portfolio problem is completely solved” (Merton, 1971, 
p394). Hence, this lack of a closed-form solution to the Merton model is one limitation.  
In addition, as we discuss in section 2.3.2, the classical Merton model not only fails to 
explain the relatively low risky portfolio share of the investors, but also fail to explain 
why older individuals have a higher risky portfolio share. Due to the huge mismatch 
                                                          
6
The terminal wealth can be zero which means there is no bequest. The standard optimal portfolio 
allocation rule is still valid in this scenario.  
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between the empirical observations of the asset allocation and the prediction of the 
model under certain assumptions, the Merton model has not been widely applied and 
regarded as “a usable empirical paradigm” (Campbell et al., 2003, p42).   
 
 
2.4 Consumption/Portfolio model with time varying 
labour income (Carroll, 2011) 
In this section, we look at a Consumption/Portfolio model with time varying labour 
income. We hope to see that introducing labour income risk into the model could explain 
the empirical observations of low stock market participation rates and low levels of risky 
assets shares. We set up the model following Carroll‟s (2011) approach, and present the 
simulation results in section 2.4.3.   
2.4.1 The model and the assumptions  
The representative agent‟s objective is to maximize his/her expected value of 
discounted lifetime utility from consumption: 
        
 
 
   
       
subject to the following dynamic budget constraints: 
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At=Mt-Ct, 
Yt+1=Pt+1θt+1
7
 
           
       
where 
  : subjective discount factor 
U(Ct ): utility of consumption at time t 
At: financial assets at time t 
Mt: “cash on hand” at time t 
Ct:  level of consumption at time t 
Yt+1:  labour income at time t 
Pt+1:  permanent labour income at time t+1 
    
 : overall gross return on the representative agent‟s asset portfolio between time t 
and t+1 
Assumption 1: Only two assets are available in the market, namely, a risk-free asset 
and a risky asset. The gross return on the risk-free asset is constant overtime and is 
denoted as R
F
 . The gross return on the risky asset between time t and t+1 is denoted as 
Rt+1, which is assumed to be log-normally distributed. The representative agent can 
choose to invest in these two assets and the proportion of the portfolio invested in the 
                                                          
7
 The property of θ is presented in Assumption 3 on the next page. 
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risky asset between time t and t+1 is denoted as αt. Hence, the overall gross return on 
the representative agent’s asset portfolio between time t and t+1 is as follows: 
                             
                  
Since we assume short sales are not allowed in the model, αt should satisfy the following 
condition: 
                                       
Assumption 2: we assume the average permanent labour income grows at rate φt+1  
from time t to time t+1, so Pt+1 =Pt φt+1   
Assumption 3: we assume θ is log-normally distributed, log θ~N(-  
 /2,   
 ). This 
assumption ensures log E(θ)=0, and hence E(θ)=1. In other words, the expected value 
of the transitory labour income shock is 1. 
Assumption 4: we assume the representative agent in our model has a utility function 
with CRRA, U(C)=C
1-γ
 /(1-γ), where γ refers to coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Now, we rewrite the model in terms of a Bellman equation as follows: 
                                           
    
subject to all the dynamic budget constraints listed above.  
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2.4.2 Normalization 
In this section, we will use the permanent labour income Pt to normalize 
variables in order to reduce the number of state variables in the above value function. If 
we define mt=Mt /Pt, and the representative agent consumes everything at the last period 
time T to maximize utility, then           
  
  γ
  γ
   
  γ   
  γ
  γ
   
  γ
      .  
       If we define ct  =Ct  /Pt , and   
 is the optimal ratio of consumption to 
permanent income, then we can derive  
                      
                    
 
     
    γ
  γ
         
  γ   
  γ
  γ
] 
=    
        
    γ
  γ
       
     
        (
  
  γ
  γ
) 
     
         
       
      
                
     
   
{       
      
               } 
If we define  
                  
                        
   
  
Then 
                    
  γ
          . 
Analogously, we can derive: 
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  γ
          . 
Hence, we can rewrite the previous Bellman equation and the maximization problem is 
reduced to one state variable as follows: 
                  
                        
   
  
subject to: 
     
                  
            
    
 
 
   
 θ   8 
       
2.4.3 Simulation 
Since there is no analytical solution to this consumption/portfolio model, we will 
solve the optimization problem numerically using dynamic programming methods. We 
apply the code developed by Carroll (2011) and for the details about the numerical 
methods please refer to Carroll‟s paper (2011). Basically, we start from the last period 
and solve the model recursively backward. In the last period, the policy function is not 
important, because the individual consumes all his wealth and his/her value function is 
          
  
  γ
  γ
   
  γ
      , as in section 2.4.2. For each period before the last 
period, a grid search method is used to find the optimal risky asset share and the optimal 
                                                          
8
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consumption which maximize the value function. Once the value function is obtained 
for time t, we can use it and “continue the backwards recursion to period t-1 and so on 
back to the beginning of life” (Carroll, 2011, p32).  
In the following three figures, we let   =0.02, risk premium=0.04, annual 
standard deviation in equity return is 15% and the individual‟s lifetime has been equally 
divided into 20 periods. In Figure 2.1, the x-axis is the normalized total assets, at , 
where at  =At /Pt and  Pt  is permanent labour income. The y-axis is portfolio shares in 
risky assets, measured in percentage. γ =6 for all time periods. As we can see, the 
investment time horizon has a positive effect on risky asset share. Given the same level 
of financial wealth, at, if the investment time horizon is long, in other words, if the 
representative agent is at the early stage of his/her life, for example t=1or t=5, then in 
theory, the optimal risky asset share for him/her will be relatively high, compared with 
the case of a short investment time horizon. In addition, the model predicts that for the 
young it is optimal to invest all of his/her wealth in risky assets when his/her financial 
wealth is less than twice his/her annual permanent labour income. Whereas for the older  
person, it is optimal to invest all of his/her wealth in a risky asset when his/her financial 
wealth is less than or equal to his/her annual permanent labour income. Interestingly, as 
the ratio of financial wealth to permanent labour income increases, the representative 
agent is more willing to hold less proportion of wealth in risky assets. Figure 2.1 shows 
that the poor who have a low ratio of financial wealth to labour income need to invest 
all of his/her wealth in risky assets, while the rich who have a high ratio of financial 
wealth to labour income should hold much less. Carroll (2011, p37) provides an 
explanation to this “bizarre prediction”. In the model labour income risk is assumed to 
be uncorrelated with risk in stock market returns, so future consumption of the poor, 
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mainly financed by future labour income, will be less correlated with future stock 
market returns. Hence, the poor will be more willing to hold a portfolio heavily tilted 
toward a risky asset. In contrast, future consumption of the rich, mainly financed by the 
financial wealth, will be highly correlated with stock market returns. Hence for the rich 
there will be a tilt in the portfolio toward the risk-free asset.  
Figure 2. 1:Stochastic Optimal Portfolio Share in Risky Assets in Different Periods 
 
The following two figures are used to illustrate the impact of risk aversion on 
households‟ risky asset shares. As we can see in Figure 2.2, if we keep the normalized 
total asset constant and set it equals to 2.5 (ie the ratio of financial wealth to permanent 
labour income is 2.5), the higher is the degree of risk aversion, the lower is the optimal 
portfolio share in risky assets, which is consistent with the empirical observations.  
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Figure 2. 2: Dynamic Stochastic Optimal Portfolio Share in Risky Assets for Different γ 
When Normalized Total Assets=2.5 
 
Figure 2.3 is three dimensional diagram which shows how households‟ risky asset 
share evolve due to the changes in investment horizon, the ratio of financial wealth to 
permanent labour income and the level of risk aversion. Similar to what we have found 
in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, in Figure 2.3, we observe a high level of portfolio share in 
risky assets and also observe that the households‟ portfolio share in risky assets 
decreases as investment horizon shrinks; it decreases as the ratio of financial wealth to 
permanent labour income increases; it decreases if the household becomes more risk 
averse. However, in the real world, we observe relatively low level of portfolio share in 
risky assets and also observe that the households‟ portfolio share in risky assets 
increases as the investment horizon shrinks and/or the ratio of financial wealth to 
permanent labour income increases. Hence, this consumption/portfolio model with 
labour income risk is still not able to explain the empirical observations. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
time period t
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
 s
h
a
re
 i
n
 r
is
k
 a
s
s
e
ts
Dynamic Stochastic Optimal Portfolio Share in Risk Assets for different  When Normalized Total Assets=2.5 
 
 
=6
=8
=10
34 
 
Figure 2. 3:Dynamic Stochastic Optimal Portfolio Share in Risky Assets when γ=6, γ=8, 
γ=10 
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2.5 strategic asset allocation  
In conclusion, all the above models are found to contain propositions that are not 
empirically justified, predicting too high a proportion of risky assets in portfolios and 
failing to explain the age profile of the risky asset holding. Under restrictive 
assumptions, including constant relative risk aversion and constant investment 
opportunities, the risky asset allocation decision is independent of the investment time 
horizon, the investor‟s wealth and the investor‟s optimal consumption decision 
(Merton,1969). The predications from the consumption/ portfolio model with labour 
income risk also contradict empirical observations (Carroll, 2011; Bodie et al., 1992). 
However, if investment opportunities vary over time, multi-period investors will also be 
concerned about hedging consumption against shocks due to time-varying expected 
returns and/or covariances. As a consequence portfolio models, where consumption is 
the key driver of utility, are developed to handle the possibility of intertemporal hedging 
which arise naturally from time-varying returns (Campbell et al., 2003; Chacko and 
Viceira, 2005). Such models are observed to describe what is called „„strategic asset 
allocation‟‟ (Brennan et al., 1997, p1377). Cochrane (2007, p40) provided the optimal 
portfolio rule in a two-asset model which allows “mean returns, return volatility and 
labour income to vary overtime”.  
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2.6 The consumption/portfolio models with habit 
formation 
The portfolio allocation puzzle, which is commonly used to describe the puzzle 
that theoretical predication is contrary to the empirical observation, is “primarily a 
partial equilibrium manifestation of the equity premium puzzle” (Gupta, 2009, p2). Due 
to the relative success of habit formation models in solving “asset pricing puzzles”9 and 
“aggregate consumption dynamics”10 (Gomes and Michaelides, 2003, p731) in general 
equilibrium settings, habit formation has been introduced in households‟ portfolio 
allocation (partial equilibrium) models and the impact of habit formation  has been 
examined in recent years. In the current literature, there are two forms of habit 
persistence in preferences for consumption, namely, external habit formation or 
“keeping up with the Joneses” type of habit in consumption, and internal habit 
formation, which depends on past consumption levels.  
    In section 2.6.1, we first look at a two-period model with a simple definition of 
internal habit formation in consumption. Later in section 2.6.2 we explore a continuous 
life-cycle model with a more realistic definition of internal habit formation.  
 
 
                                                          
9
 Please see Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Chan and Kogan (2002). 
10
 Please see Carroll et al. (2000), Fuhrer (2000). 
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2.6.1 A two time period’s consumption/portfolio model with 
internal habit formation 
In this section we follow Lax‟s (2002) method and set up a two time period 
consumption/portfolio allocation model with internal habit formation. The habit level in 
time period (t) is a fixed proportion of consumption consumed in the last period (t-1). 
This assumption of habit level is made for simplicity and it generates a time-varying 
internal habit level in each time period. We find that even this simple model with habit 
formation can help partially to explain the empirical observations of low levels of risky 
assets shares. 
     In this discrete time framework we will continue to look at the two-asset case.  
We assume the risk-free asset has a constant gross return, R
F
, and the gross return on the 
risky asset is i.i.d. lognormally distributed where            
  . Again, since we 
assume R
F
,    and   are constant overtime, investment opportunities are constant 
overtime in this model.  
 In order to derive an explicit solution to the optimal portfolio problem, a power 
utility function is assumed again in the model. The objective function is as follows: 
   
          
   
   
             
             
   
   
  
subject to                
              
The habit level, H, in next time period t+1 is a fixed proportion of consumption 
consumed in the current period t:          where      
 . Similarly, we can 
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get          where      
 . The parameter h determines the extent to which 
habit in consumption persists. The parameter γ measures the curvature of the utility 
function. When h=0, γ represents the individual‟s relative risk aversion. When h>0, the 
relative risk aversion equals to 
γ 
   
, which suggests that the risk aversion is “a 
state-dependent multiple of  ” (Lax, p12). Lastly, the parameter   is the subjective 
discount factor in this two-period model.  
     In addition, we have the following constraints: 
               ;                             ;γ   ; 
and short sale is not allowed in this model:  
  α   . 
     If we assume the individual will consume all of his wealth at time period t+1, 
then we can write out the value function: 
          
       
   
   
     
          
                     
   
                    
   
    (7) 
     In order to make sure admissible   ,     , α  exist and to make sure       , 
         , the ratio of wealth to habit level at time t, should satisfy:  
   
  
  
   
 
  
   . 
     The reason is that at current time t, the individual needs to invest amount of 
wealth which equals to the present value of the future habit levels, PVt(FHL), in the 
-free asset, so that he/she can maintain his/her standard living in the remaining time 
periods. Since this is a two- period model, so the present value of the future habit levels, 
PVt(FHL), equals to: 
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. 
     If the individual invests an amount of wealth less than 
   
  
 in the risk-free asset, 
then there is a strictly positive probability he/she will not be able to consume at the 
habit level and will have a negative infinity in his/her expected utility.  
    Therefore, the requirement for the individual‟s current wealth to be able to finance 
the current habit level and the discounted future habit level is that: 
                     
   
  
       
   
  
       
      
  
. 
     Rearrange and we get: 
 
  
  
   
 
  
    (the constraint on the ratio of wealth to habit level) 
     Now we will solve the optimization problem under all the assumptions and 
constraints we listed above. The optimization problem is as follows: 
       
   
   
     
          
                     
   
                    
   
  
or 
      α           
   . 
    Hence we can write out the optimality conditions in the form: 
 
 
 
     α          
    
  α          
 α  
  α          
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We know      α          , now we take the partial derivative of 
    α       with respect to C and with respect to α respectively and set them equal 
to zero: 
       
                 
                    
            
                                                                   (8) 
             
                     
         
      
      The first-order condition (8) implies that the optimal consumption is achieved 
when the marginal utility of consumption equals the marginal utility of wealth. The left- 
hand side refers to the marginal utility of consumption by consuming one extra unit of 
goods, which equals        
  . The right hand side refers to marginal utility of 
wealth by increasing one extra unit of wealth.   
     The optimal portfolio allocation at current time t in this two-asset and two-period 
case is as follows: 
  
       
   
 
        
  
                                                   (9) 
where   
 
  is the optimal consumption and    is the optimal risky asset share without 
habit formation and it is a solution to the following equation: 
                    
         
      
The optimal consumption at current time t is: 
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where         
 
  
   
 
 
  
and        
               
   ] 
     As we can see, the optimal risky asset allocation (9) has two parts. The first 
part,   , is the standard myopic mean-variance portfolio, and the second part is attributed 
to the habit formation in consumption. The value of the second part depends on “how 
close the wealth at time t+1 is to the minimum level of wealth required to sustain habit 
at time t+1” and it is “always less than 1” (Gupta, 2009, p17). 
     This suggests that even in this simplest two-period case the individual with habit 
formation in preferences will hold a more conservative portfolio than the individual 
without habit in preferences. In other words, introducing habit formation into the 
portfolio allocation model helps to explain the empirical observations where households 
are found to invest a relatively low proportion of wealth in risky assets. 
2.6.2 Discrete life cycle model with internal habit formation 
(Lax, 2002) 
If we extend our two-period model to a discrete life-cycle model and keep all the 
assumptions the same, then the optimal consumption rule 
11
and risky asset allocation 
rule is as follows (Lax, 2002): 
  
             , 
and 
                                                          
11
 Please see Lax (2001) for details on the optimal consumption rules. 
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where                                                           (10) 
      Now if we assume time t and time s, where t>s. For time t and time s, the 
individual has the same level of wealth,      , and he/she has the same level of 
optimal consumption,   
    
 
. Then based on equation (10),we can get   
    
 . 
This suggests that in a portfolio allocation problem with habit formation in preferences, 
the older individuals are supposed to have a higher proportion of wealth invested in 
risky assets than the younger individuals are supposed while the elder and the younger 
have the same level of wealth and choose the same optimal consumption level. This 
finding is similar to the one suggested in Gupta‟s (2009) portfolio allocation model, 
which has a more realistic definition for internal habit formation and it is a continuous 
time model. We will discuss it in the next section.  
2.6.3 Continuous life-cycle model with internal habit formation 
(Gupta, 2009) 
Now we will look at a life-cycle consumption/portfolio allocation model with a 
more realistic definition of internal habit formation. The habit level is a weighted 
average of previous consumption and the level of consumption consumed today will 
have a positive impact on the future habit levels and hence on the future utilities. 
Therefore, the individual will not consume excessively today because he knows such 
behaviour will lead to a big increase in his/her standard of living in the following time 
periods. In order to ensure the individual‟s future consumption level is at or above the 
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habit level, the individual with habit in preferences needs to hold a relatively 
conservative portfolio compared with an individual without habit in preferences. The 
relatively conservative portfolio could finance the individual to maintain his/her 
standard of living when the stock market goes down (Gupta, 2009).  
     We have a continuous time framework and continue to study the two-asset case.  
We assume the risk-free asset has a gross return, R
F
, for an infinitesimal time period dt, 
and the return on the risky asset follows Brownian motion and equals            
where   is average return on this risky asset,   is the standard deviation of the risky 
asset‟s return, and       denotes a Brownian motion. Since we assume RF,    and   
are constant overtime, so investment opportunities are constant overtime in this model.  
 In order to derive an explicit solution to the optimal portfolio problem, a power 
utility function is assumed in the model. The objective function is as follows: 
     
   
       
   
   
  
 
 
      
    
where,   , the coefficient of relative risk aversion, is set to be greater than 1. When   
is close to 1, the “period utility function can be approximated by the natural logarithm” 
(Gupta, 2009). 
The habit level, H, is a weighted average of previous consumptions: 
    
         
          
 
 
 , 
where parameter a and parameter b determines “how much past habit is discounted” and 
“ how much current consumption affects current habit” respectively (Gupta, 2009,p10).  
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The following process describes how the habit level evolves: 
                 
On the right-hand side, the first part represents an instantaneous discounted value of the 
habit level, and the second part represents the change in habit level attributed to current 
consumption.  
The wealth of the individual is defined as follows: 
     
        
        
 
     α     
           , 
and the budget constraint is: 
       
  α     
            α        , 
which is similar to the budget constraint in Merton (1969) as we discuss above in 
section 2.2.2.1. On the right-hand side of the equation, the first part is a deterministic 
term and the second part is a stochastic term. The stochastic term is generated by the 
volatility of the return on the risky asset and it follows a Brownian motion process. 
In addition, we have the following constraints: 
               ;  
and short sale is not allowed in this model: 
  α   . 
Now, we will write out the value function: 
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In order to make sure admissible   and α  exist for all       and       for 
all      , the ratio of wealth to habit level at time t, where      , should 
satisfy:  
   
  
  
 
 
      
       
               . 
     As we can see that    will decrease as t increases, so this time variation will 
generate the life-cycle or age effect on portfolio allocation and the optimal risky asset 
allocation will depend on the difference between the ratio of wealth to habit level and 
the lower bound of this ratio, in other words, the difference between     and     
     Furthermore, we need to assume          , so that   will be greater than 
0, and also assume   
    
   
  , so that the optimal risky asset allocation satisfies: 
  α   . 
Now we will solve the optimization problem under all the constraints we listed above. 
We first write out the Hamilton-Bellman-Jacobi (HBJ) equation which the value 
function must satisfy: 
      
        
   
 
        
  
 
        
  
     α               
    
 
 
  
          
   
       
         
  
          
so if we define 
    α            
        
   
 
        
  
 
        
  
     α               
    
 
 
  
         
   
       
        
  
         , then the HBJ equation becomes as 
follows: 
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      α           
   . 
Hence we can write out the optimality conditions in the form: 
 
 
 
     α          
    
  α          
 α  
  α          
                             
  
We know      α          , which is the HBJ equation, now we take the partial 
derivative of     α       with respect to C and with respect to α respectively and 
set them equal to zero: 
            
        
  
  
        
  
=0 
         
  
        
          
   
        
If we rearrange the first equation which is the first-order condition for consumption, 
then we obtain the following equation: 
             
        
  
=
        
  
 
    This rearranged condition implies that the optimal consumption is achieved when 
the total marginal utility of consumption equals the marginal utility of wealth. Since we 
have habit formation in this case, the total marginal utility of consumption consists of 
two parts. The first part refers to the marginal utility of consumption by consuming one 
extra unit of goods, which equals            . The other part refers to disutility 
which is equal to 
        
  
 . The reason why we name it disutility is because 
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consuming one extra unit of goods will increase the habit level, hence reduces the 
utility.  
    The first-order condition for the risky asset allocation implies that “the proportion 
of wealth invested in risky assets depends on the curvature of the value function, which 
is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to wealth” (Gupta, 2009, p13). 
     The optimal portfolio allocation rule
12
 in this two-asset case has been presented by 
Gupta (2009) as follows: 
  
  
    
   
   
   
 
                                                    (11) 
     The optimal risky asset allocation rule has two parts. The first part, 
    
   
 , is the 
standard myopic mean-variance portfolio, and the second part is attributed to the habit 
formation in consumption. The value of the second part depends on “how close wealth 
is to the minimum level of wealth required to sustain habit” and it is “always less than 1” 
(Gupta, 2009, p17). 
    This suggests that the individual with habit formation in preferences will hold a 
more conservative portfolio than the individual without habit in preferences. Hence, 
introducing habit formation into the portfolio allocation model helps to explain the 
empirical observations where households are found to invest a relatively low proportion 
of wealth in risky assets.  
                                                          
12
 For details about the optimal consumption rules, please see Gupta (2009, p15) .  
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      Now if we assume time t and time s, where t>s. For time t and time s, the 
individual has the same level of wealth, W(t)=W(s), and he/she has the same level of 
habit, H(t)=H(s).  
Then based on equation (12):
 
      
       
                where      , 
we can infer that    <  . Hence, equation (11),    
  
    
   
   
   
 
  , implies that 
  
    
 . 
      This leads to another finding which could be regarded as an important 
contribution by introducing habit formation in preferences into the portfolio allocation 
problem. During the life cycle, the level of individual‟s risk aversion will vary and it 
“depends on how much wealth individuals have in excess of the minimum required 
level of wealth to sustain habits in the future” (Gupta, p39). If current wealth is close to 
the minimum level of wealth required to sustain habit in the future, the individual will 
be more risk averse. Compared with younger individuals, the older individuals have 
shorter time horizon for which they need to maintain their standard of living. In other 
words, the minimum required level of wealth to sustain habits in the future is less for 
the older individuals than for the younger individuals. Therefore, if we assume older 
individuals have same current level of wealth as the younger individuals, the older 
individuals‟ current level of wealth is not that close to minimum level of wealth 
required to sustain habits in the future. This means the older individuals are less risk 
averse than the younger individuals. The older individuals are less concerned about 
sustaining their habits in the future and they don‟t need to invest a higher proportion of 
wealth in risk-free assets which can provide finance for maintaining their consumption 
49 
 
habit.  Hence, in order to maximize utility over the lifecycle, the older individuals are 
supposed to invest a higher proportion of wealth in risky assets than the younger 
individuals are supposed to. This finding is consistent with the empirical observations. 
 
2.6.4 Current literature on examining the habit formation effect 
on portfolio choices 
Table 2.2 provides a summary of the recent literature which studies the optimal 
consumption/portfolio model with habit in consumption. As we can see, except Gomes 
and Michaelides (2003), other authors (Munk, 2008; Polkovnichenko, 2007; Gupta, 
2009) found introducing habit into the model can help to explain the empirical 
observations, for example, the younger should hold more conservative portfolios, 
compared with the older.  
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Table2. 2: a summary on recent literature which study the optimal consumption/portfolio model with habit in consumption 
 
Authors Methodology Findings Journal Habit 
Gomes and Michaelides 
(2003) 
introduce internal habit 
formation preferences in a 
life-cycle portfolio choice 
model with uninsurable 
labour income risk and 
stock market participation 
costs (in a finite horizon 
discrete time settings). 
They find that introducing 
habit formation 
preferences in a life-cycle 
asset allocation model 
could not explain the 
empirical observations.  
With habit, individuals 
start to save early in life 
in order to smooth 
consumption over a long 
period of time and are 
more willing to pay the 
stock market participation 
cost. Imposing small or 
modest value of risk 
aversion, nearly all of 
their wealth will be 
invested in risky assets.  
 
 
Review of Economic 
Dynamics 
Both ratio and additive 
internal habit preferences 
are considered. 
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Polkovnichenko (2007) work on additive and 
internal habit formation 
preferences in a life-cycle 
model with stochastic 
uninsurable labour 
income risk (in a finite 
horizon discrete time 
settings). 
 With habit formation, 
the younger will hold 
more conservative 
portfolio than the elder.   
“The effects of habits on 
portfolio choice are robust 
to income smoothing 
through borrowing or 
flexible labour supply” 
(Polkovnichenko,2007, 
p83). 
 
Review of Financial 
studies 
additive internal habit 
preferences is considered 
Munk (2008) derive optimal 
consumption and 
investment policies for 
investors with habit 
persistence in preferences 
for consumption when the 
financial market provides 
time-varying investment 
opportunities, but is 
dynamically complete (in 
finite continous time 
settings). 
With habit formation, 
individuals would like to 
invest in safe assets, such 
as bonds and cash, 
compared with other 
risky assets. The reason is 
that holding bonds and 
cash would leave 
households with a low 
probability of 
consumption falling close 
to habit level.   
Journal of economic 
dynamic and control 
additive internal habit 
preferences is considered 
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Gupta (2009) Solve the optimal 
consumption and portfolio 
choice life cycle problem 
analytically in the context 
of for investors with 
internal habit formation in 
a continuous time finite 
horizon model. 
He find with this additive 
and internal habit 
formation, the young 
households will hold less 
risky portfolios compared 
with the middle-aged 
households, because the 
young households need to 
maintain their 
consumption level above 
habit for a longer horizon, 
whereas the older 
households have shorter 
time horizon.   
 
PhD thesis additive and internal 
habit formation 
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2.7 Recent development on theoretical explanations for 
portfolio behaviour 
In recent years, much effort has gone into exploring the potential of Merton‟s 
portfolio allocation theory. They took different approaches. Some of the economists 
solved Merton‟s problem by introducing certain assumptions. For example, by 
assuming mean reverting asset returns and a complete market, Wachter (2002) solved 
the problem in a closed form if the investor had a power utility function over terminal 
wealth or consumption. Some of them, like Campbell and Viceira (2001, 2002), they 
derived an approximate analytical solution by assuming the investor had Epstein and 
Zin preference and setting intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to one. Other 
academics solved the problem numerically by taking advantage of development in 
computer technology and dynamic programming, such as Balduzzi and Lynch (1999), 
Barberis (2000), Brennan et al. (1997), Cocco et al. (2005), and Lynch (2001) (cited in 
Campbell et al., 2003, p43).  
Meanwhile, during this recent development, a number of factors, which are likely 
to influence portfolio selection, have been analysed theoretically. Among them we note 
transactions costs and borrowing constraints (Constantinides, 1986; Davis and Norman, 
1990; Heaton and Lucas,1997), life-cycle considerations (Gomes and Michaelides, 2003; 
Polkovnichenko, 2007; Cocco et al., 2005), taxation (Alan et al. 2010; Poterba and 
Samwick 2003 ) and the variation in background risk exposure from sources such as 
labour and entrepreneurial income or real estate holdings (Cocco et al.,2005; Viciera, 
2001). As a consequence cross-sectional variation in asset allocation has been more 
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fully explained, although differences between the theory and empirical observation still 
remains (Cauley et al., 2007).   
 
2.7.1 Theoretical consideration of housing effect 
Does housing have an impact on households‟ asset allocation? Can housing be 
used to explain the cross-sectional variation in asset allocation? From a theoretical 
perspective, housing could affect households‟ asset allocation in three different ways, 
namely, the investment asset effect, the “consumption commitment” effect, and the 
housing wealth effect. 
2.7.1.1 Negative investment asset effect 
    Housing, typically, is regarded as consumption good as well as an investment asset. 
Brueckner (1997) acknowledged this property of housing. When he examined the asset 
allocations of homeowners, he imposed an investment constraint in a mean-variance 
portfolio model.  This constraint was introduced by Henderson and Ioannides (1983) 
and required that the quantity of housing investment should be equal to or larger than 
the quantity of housing consumption. Brueckner (1997) also assumed the homeowner 
can choose to invest in one risk-free asset and a number of risky assets in order to 
maximize his/her utility of housing consumption and non-housing consumption at the 
end of the period. After considering the vector of expected returns and the covariance 
matrix for housing and other assets, Brueckner (1997) derived analytical solutions to the 
portfolio choice model. He showed that under the investment constraint and other 
assumptions, “the homeowner‟s optimal portfolio is inefficient in a mean-variance sense” 
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(Brueckner, 1997, p159). The homeowner over invested in housing and under invested 
in risky assets.  
     Similar “crowding out” effects of housing on risky assets were found by Flavin 
and Yamashita (2002) who carried out mean-variance analysis. On the one hand, they 
considered housing as a consumption good, and households were allowed to mortgage 
and borrow up to the 100 percent of the house value. On the other hand, they treated 
housing as a risky investment asset and allowed the households to invest in housing as 
well as other risky assets. Without short selling in other risky assets and by using the 
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Flavin and Yamashita (2002) 
estimated a vector of expected returns and the covariance matrix for housing and other 
risky assets, solved the constrained efficient frontiers for different values of the 
households‟ ratio of housing to net worth, and determined the optimal portfolio 
numerically, given the addition information on degree of risk aversion. 
They found that “the inclusion of housing has the effect of altering the risk and 
return trade-off in such a way that most households are at a corner with respect to 
T-bills” (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002, p346). This is consistent with the findings in 
Brueckner‟s (1997) paper that when the house price risk is taken into account, 
investment in housing would generate a negative impact on risky asset holdings. Flavin 
and Yamashita (2002) also found that the ratio of housing to net wealth had a large 
impact on households‟ asset allocation. Compared with young households, middle-aged 
households are normally less leveraged and will not have large holdings of housing 
relative to net worth. Hence, the risk facing by the middle aged households is relatively 
lower than the risk facing by the young households. In order to maximize utilities, the 
middle-aged households will be willing to take more risk by investing a higher 
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proportion of their wealth in risky assets, whereas the young households will be willing 
to take less risk by either paying down their mortgage or investing in relatively less 
risky assets.  
     As we can see from above, Brueckner (1997) and Flavin and Yamashita (2002) 
explored the negative investment asset effect of housing on risky asset shares by setting 
up a mean-variance portfolio model. In comparison, Cocco (2005) also found a similar 
effect but by setting up a lifecycle portfolio model. In his model, the individual derived 
utility from housing consumption and non-durable goods, and there was a bequest 
motive. The fluctuations in house prices were assumed to be correlated with labour 
income shocks. He also assumed a minimum house size in the model and in each time 
period the individual was forced to move to another house with probability, π. There 
was transaction cost when the house sale took place and there was a maintenance costs 
in the model. Both transaction cost and maintenance costs were proportional to the 
house value. Since no analytical solution could be found, he solved the optimization 
problem numerically. He showed that “housing can reduce stock market participation 
rates from 76% to 33% in a calibrated life-cycle model” (Chetty and Szeidl, 2010, p1). 
Although Cocco (2005) did not state explicitly that this housing effect comes from three 
channels, namely, the investment asset aspect (or house price risk aspect), the 
“consumption commitments” aspect, and the housing wealth aspect, he did suggest that 
this housing effect comes from two sources. Firstly, house price risk can have a 
negative impact on stock market participation. Secondly, the minimum house size 
requirement forced the individual to invest in house and this housing investment kept 
individual‟s liquid assets at a relatively low level, so he/she chose not to participate in 
the stock market (Cocco, 2005, p555). The larger of the minimum house size, the lower 
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was the stock market participation rate.  As we can see in the next section 2.7.1.2, this 
second source of housing effect, suggested by Cocco (2005) actually can be classified as 
the negative “consumption commitments” effect. Notably, although Cocco (2005) did 
not mention the housing wealth effect, he did find older individuals hold a higher 
proportion of wealth in risky assets than younger individuals do. He explained this in 
the way that as individual ages, “liquid assets become less important relative to other 
asset holdings (human capital and housing) for future consumption” (Cocco, 2005, 
p552). Hence the individual is more willing to take risky position in asset holdings. This 
argument is similar to the housing wealth effect. Housing could act as a big financial 
security and create a motive for the individual to invest a higher proportion of wealth in 
risky assets. In other words, the individual will be less risk averse and be willing to 
invest in risky assets (ie take large-payoff gambles) if he/she has large wealth in 
housing and is facing a big negative wealth shock (Chetty and Szeidl, 2007). He/she 
knows he/she can downgrade to a smaller house and use the extra money to keep his/her 
habit in consumption and maintain the standard of living. We discuss this housing 
wealth effect in more detail in the following section 2.7.1.3.  
2.7.1.2 Negative “consumption commitments” effect 
Housing could also affect households‟ asset allocations by another channel, the 
“consumption commitments” effect. The consumption commitments normally come 
from some durable goods, such as house and vehicles, and services like insurance. 
These goods and services involve transaction costs and are not frequently adjusted 
(Chetty and Szeidl, 2007). The “consumption commitments” effect of housing was 
studied by Grossman and Laroque (1990). In their theoretical model, an individual 
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needed to decide his/her optimal consumption rule and optimal portfolio allocation rule 
where the utility of consumption only comed from holding a durable good which was 
housing. When the house was sold, the individual was entitled to a transaction fee. The 
individual was allowed to invest in a risk-free asset and a number of risky financial 
assets. At each time, the individual needed to decide optimally whether he/she should 
change house or not and decided what the optimal proportions of remaining wealth 
he/she should invest in the risk-free and risky financial assets. Grossman and Laroque 
(1990, p25) suggested that the optimal consumption of housing was not “a smooth 
function of wealth”. In order to maximize utilities, the individual had to wait until 
his/her wealth increased significantly before he/she increased the consumption of 
housing; or he/she had to wait until his/her wealth dropped dramatically before he/she 
reduced the consumption of housing. This “consumption commitments” would lead the 
individual to be more risk averse and to invest a smaller proportion of wealth in risky 
asset than he/she would invest if there is no transaction cost and he/she was free to 
adjust housing continuously (Grossman and Laroque, 1990). 
     The impact of “consumption commitments” of housing on asset allocation was 
also studied by Fratantoni (2001). Compared with the model in Grossman and Laroque‟ 
paper (1990), Fratantoni (2001) assumed during the individual‟s life time, there was 
only one house that could be bought with mortgage and when he/she bought and sold 
the house there was no transaction cost. In his theoretical model, there were seven 
periods and each period contained ten years. The individual maximized his utility from 
nonhousing consumption and housing services over the finite horizon and no bequest 
was left. His “consumption commitments” of housing comed from the committed 
housing expenditure, both in renting periods and in house owner periods. He was 
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assumed to rent a house in the first two periods, so that he could save enough money to 
make a down payment on a house at the end of the second period.  Then from the third 
period to fifth periods, the individual needed to pay off his/her mortgage in fixed 
payments, and he/she also needed to pay for maintenance costs, which was proportional 
to the house size. During the sixth period, although there was no mortgage payment, 
he/she still needed to pay for maintenance costs. In the last period, he/she sold the house 
and became a renter again and consumed all the remaining wealth. Although analytical 
solution could not be found, based on simulation results, Fratantoni (2001) concluded 
that the individuals with a larger mortgage commitment invest a smaller proportion of 
wealth in risky assets after controlling for the labour income risk. This negative impact 
of housing “consumption commitments” on risky asset shares is consistent with the 
findings in previous research (eg: Grossman and Laroque, 1990). 
     We could also understand this negative housing “consumption commitments” 
effect by using the concept of habit in consumption. Remember that habit allows risk 
aversion to vary significantly, particularly for consumption levels close to the habit 
level, and hence with mortgage commitment, we expect lower participation rates and 
less risky assets shares. 
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2.7.1.3 Positive housing wealth effects or positive “consumption 
commitments” effects 
The issue of how consumption commitments would have an impact on households‟ 
risk preferences was studied by Chetty and Szeidl (2007). They set up a theoretical 
model which assumed the individual needed to maximize his/her utility of consuming 
food and consuming housing services over a finite time period. The transaction cost or 
adjustment cost was proportion to the house value. And after characterizing “the risk 
preferences in an expected utility model with commitments”, they found that the effect 
of “consumption commitments” on individual‟s level of risk aversion depended on the 
scale of the risk. Due to consumption commitments, the individual would become less 
risk averse if he/she faced a large shock and the individual would become more risk 
averse if he/she faced a small or moderate shock. The reason was that when the 
individual experienced a large negative shock, instead of cutting food expenditure 
dramatically to maintain the commitment in housing, he/she would be better off if 
he/she chose to pay an adjustment fee and moved to a smaller house. When the 
individual experienced a large positive shock, it would be optimal for him/her to pay an 
adjustment fee and moved to a large house rather than spending all the extra income on 
food consumption.  In contrast, when the individual experienced a small shock, no 
matter if it was a negative one or positive one, “the utility gain from fully reoptimizing 
the consumption bundle was insufficient to offset the transaction cost”, he/she should 
keep his/her housing consumption level unchanged and “there was an (S, s) band where 
the agent does not move” (Chetty and Szeidl, 2007, p844). In order to maximize utility, 
the individual had to cut his/her spending on food when facing a small negative shock 
and increased his/her spending on food when facing a small positive shock. Hence, 
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Chetty and Szeidl (2007, p832) concluded that with consumption commitment in the 
model, the transaction cost in housing “amplify risk aversion” by forcing the individual 
to concentrate volatility in wealth on non-housing goods, such as food, when the 
individuals were facing small and moderate risks. Later 2010, Chetty and Szeidl (2010, 
p1) suggested that this “consumption commitment” effect can decrease the optimal 
risky asset share, However, they did not indicate that this negative impact of housing on 
risky asset share only occurred when the individual was facing small and moderate risks. 
When the individual was facing large risk, housing could be regarded as self-insurance 
and provided financial security to maintain the living standard, for example, 
maintaining the habit level of food consumption, if the individual moved to a smaller 
house or sold the house. This was why Chetty and Szeidl (2007, p831) suggested that 
with housing the individual became less risk averse and was willing to “take 
large-payoff gambles” when “the value function over wealth for the individual with 
commitment”… … is “at the edge of the (S,s) band”.  From this perspective, we can 
see that housing could act as a big financial security and create a motive for the 
individual to invest a higher proportion of wealth in risky assets. This positive effect of 
housing on the risky asset share is named the housing wealth effect in this thesis.  
2.7.1.4 The overall effect of housing on household asset allocation 
In conclusion, we suggest that the overall effect of housing on household asset 
allocation is determined by three forces, namely, the investment asset effect, the 
“consumption commitment” effect, and the housing wealth effect. The investment asset 
effect and the “consumption commitment” effect of housing crowd out risky asset 
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holdings, whereas the housing wealth effect provides financial security and increases 
individual‟s willingness to take a risky position in asset holdings.  
2.7.2 The effect of transaction cost 
Will a transaction cost have an impact on households‟ asset allocations? How well 
will the transaction costs explain the cross-sectional variation in asset allocation? 
Recent studies suggest that transaction costs can explain slow adjustment speed in the 
portfolio rebalancing process and, together with the life-cycle considerations, 
transaction costs “appear necessary to explain the lack of stock market participation” 
( Curcuru, 2004, p1). 
2.7.2.1 Definition of transaction costs 
The transactions costs have a broad definition. They do not only include tangible 
costs, such as brokerage fees, fixed and variable costs of trading in financial markets, 
information cost but also include intangible costs, such as the time costs of 
understanding financial markets, analysing the data and psychic cost of investing in 
risky assets (Curcuru, et al., 2004, p2; Dumas and Luciano, 1991, p577).  
2.7.2.2 Explaining slow portfolio adjustment 
There are a number of papers examining how transaction costs could have an 
impact on households‟ asset allocation decisions. Constantinides (1979, 1986) set up a 
consumption/portfolio choice model with proportional transaction cost in an infinite 
horizon framework. The household was assumed to maximize his/her discounted utility 
of consumption overtime. The risky asset allocation rule was a (S,s) type rule. If the 
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ratio of risky asset holdings to risk free asset holdings was between the upper barrier, S, 
and the lower barrier, s, then no transactions was needed between the risky asset and the 
risk-free asset. If the ratio of risky asset holdings to risk-free asset holdings fell below 
barrier s, then the household needed to sell a small amount of a risk-free asset and buy a 
risky asset. If the ratio of risky asset holdings to risk-free asset holdings exceeded upper 
barrier S, then household needed to sell a small amount of risky asset and buy a 
risk-free asset. Constantinides (1986) also found that introducing proportional 
transaction cost into the model leaded to a lower trading frequency, which implied that 
“portfolio shares fluctuate more than in a frictionless environment” (Curcuru, et al., 
2004, p14).  
Davis and Norman (1990) also studied optimal consumption/portfolio choices with 
proportional transactions costs and they showed that the optimal portfolio allocation 
under transaction costs was an interval as well. This interval‟s width depended on the 
size of the transaction costs. Increasing the size of transaction costs would result in a 
lager no-transaction region. As the size of transaction costs converged to zero, the 
no-transaction region would converge to the optimal risky asset share as in Merton‟s 
(1969) model.   
    Dumas and Luciano (1991) found similar results. They set up a two-asset portfolio 
model with transaction costs and assumed the individual maximizes terminal wealth and 
consume all that wealth at the terminal time. The terminal time was postponed to the 
future so that “a stationary portfolio rule” could be found (Dumas and Luciano, 1991, 
p578). The exact solution they derived also suggested that there was a (S,s) type rule in 
the risky asset allocation problem.  
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    Since the models in Constantinides (1986), Davis and Norman (1990), Dumas and 
Luciano (1991) are all set up in an infinite horizon framework, the optimal asset 
allocation rule were all found to be time independent ( Liu and Loewenstein, 2002, 
p807). In contrast, Liu and Loewenstein (2002) set up a two-asset portfolio model with 
transaction costs in a finite horizon framework. In order to highlight the impact of time 
horizon on portfolio choice, the utility of maximizing terminal wealth was assumed and 
no consumption was taking place during the lifetime. They found that “investor may 
optimally never buy the risky asset subject to transaction costs if the expected horizon is 
short” ( Liu and Loewenstein, 2002, p807). 
     To sum up, in the above papers, such as Constantinides (1986), Davis and 
Norman (1990), Dumas and Luciano (1991), and Liu and Loewenstein (2002), labour 
income were all not assumed in the models, so the investor only needed to rebalance 
his/her portfolio allocations between the risk-free asset and risky assets in order to 
maximize his/her utility. In all of these papers, a (S, s) type rule was found for the 
optimal portfolio allocation problem, this implied, in a friction environment, that there 
should be slower portfolio adjustment or lower frequency in asset trading and more 
fluctuations in portfolio shares than in a frictionless environment. For example, the 
model in Liu and Loewenstein‟ (2002, p829) paper predicted that with reasonably 
calibrated parameters, for a 1 percent transaction cost, it took about five years for an 
investor with expected 25 years ahead to sell his/her risky asset after a purchase, 
whereas in a frictionless environment, an investor needed to trade continuously.  
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2.7.2.3 Explaining low participation rate 
Since empirically a high rate of non-participation in the stock market has been 
commonly observed, short-sale constraints, transaction costs, together with lifecycle 
considerations, such as background risk, are introduced to explain this phenomenon 
(Curcuru, 2004). However, background risk alone cannot explain the large number of 
non-participation in the stock market, because it can only change the optimal risky asset 
share. Even if the returns of risky assets are assumed to be highly correlated with large 
background risks, the investors may possibly not buy the risky assets or even short sell 
risky assets but their demand for risky assets is “exactly zero is negligible” (Curcuru, 
2004, p17). Therefore, typically when a portfolio model is set up, short sales constraints 
would be imposed. By imposing this constraint, the demand for a risky asset would be 
left censored at zero which is consistent with the empirical observation that a large 
number of individuals do not invest in risky assets. Transaction costs, however, which 
are only be found in research to explain a slow adjustment speed in the portfolio 
rebalancing process, also, together be found that together with life-cycle considerations 
transaction costs, “appear necessary to explain the lack of stock market participation by 
young and less affluent households” ( Curcuru, et al.,2004, p1). 
Gomes and Michaelides (2005) incorporated uninsurable labour income, 
transaction costs and Epstein–Zin preferences into the consumption/portfolio choice 
model. Different from previous models which did not consider labour income risk and 
the primary reason to do the transaction was portfolio rebalancing, the model introduced 
by Gomes and Michaelides (2005) was to maximise consumption overtime. Gomes and 
Michaelides (2005) found that in a life-cycle model where young households 
anticipated a high growth rate in their future labour income and they were liquidity 
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constrained in terms of borrowing constraints and short-sale constraints, they prefer to 
consume rather than invest. If they invested, the potential investment income from their 
limited savings would not be able to offset the fixed participation cost and/or 
proportional transaction cost (Curcuru, 2004, p26). Hence, it would be better for the 
young households to accumulate enough wealth before they participated in the stock 
market (Gomes and Michaelides, 2005, p884). Analogically, the transaction cost can 
explain the low participation rate in the stock market by less affluent households 
( Curcuru, 2004, p1). In addition, Heaton and Lucas (1997) found that transaction costs 
could affect households‟ portfolio choice by inducing a tilt in the portfolio toward assets 
which had lower transaction costs (Curcuru, et al., 2004, p14). 
     Among recent studies, we also find that many researchers suggested that even a 
small participation cost could explain the low participation rate in the stock markets 
which were empirically observed.  For example, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002, p33) set up 
a dynamic sample selection model and showed that just $ 50 per period transaction cost 
could be sufficient to explain half of the non-participants. Similarly, by using the US 
Consumer Expenditure Survey, Paiella (2001, p1) found that after controlling for the 
wealth effect and demographic effect, an annual transaction cost of at least $70 could 
induce a rational representative agent with log utility not to participate in the stock 
market. More recently Polkovnichenko (2007) suggested that the fixed transaction cost 
that was needed to prevent households from participating in the stock market was not 
very high if “heterogeneous risk aversion and heterogeneous idiosyncratic income risk” 
were introduced into the model (Curcuru, et al., 2004, p29). 
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Some researchers, for example Jang et al. (2007) and Leirvik and Trojani (2010), 
looked at the issue of liquidity premium
13
 and transaction costs by setting up a 
consumption/portfolio model in a regime-switching framework with a time-varying 
investment opportunity set. Leirvik and Trojani (2010, p5,-p6) found that for a 
proportion transaction cost of one percent, the liquidity premium was large
14
 enough to 
conclude that “together with an incomplete market, transaction costs might be a possible 
solution of the equity premium puzzle”. This could partially explain the low 
participation rate in the stock market because with transaction cost the gains from 
investing in risky assets were much lower than the gains with zero transaction cost. 
Hence, transaction costs discouraged participation in the stock market.  
2.7.3 The effect of taxation 
Like labour income risk, housing, and transaction cost, taxation is also an 
important factor that can influence households‟ portfolio allocations. Here we follow 
King and Leape‟ (1998) idea and summarise that there are two approaches via which 
taxation can have an impact on portfolio choices. The first approach is that among 
different asset classes with different tax preference, individuals who have different 
effective tax rates can choose to invest on those assets which can maximise their 
post-tax income. For example, empirical studies carried out by King and Leape (1998, 
p176) suggest that individuals who have to pay a high marginal tax rate tend to hold 
tax-exempt assets and/or tax preferred assets, such as municipal bonds and corporate 
equity, whereas the holders of taxed assets, for example, the holders of “liquid and less 
                                                          
13
 Liquidity premium refers to the maximum expected return which a household is willing to give up for 
zero transaction costs (Constantinides, 1986).  
14
 For a proportion transaction cost of one percent, the lower bound and the upper bound of liquidity 
premium is 3.5 percent and 3.6 percent respectively (Leirvik and Trojani, 2010, p5). 
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liquid savings” are found to be the individuals who face low marginal tax rates. Some 
scholars, such as Shoven and Sialm (2003) and Dammon et al. (2004), set up theoretical 
models to investigate this issue and generally concluded that “placing relatively highly 
taxed investments in tax protected accounts is optimal” (Curcuru, et al., 2004, p15). 
Shoven and Sialm (2003, p23) suggested that for a risk averse individual who was in the 
high tax brackets, should put taxable bonds and stocks in tax-deferred accounts and put 
tax-exempt municipal bonds in taxable accounts. The numerical analysis in Dammon et 
al.(2004) also showed that due to the higher tax rate imposed on taxable bonds relative 
to stocks, individuals were more willing to allocate taxable bonds in tax-deferred 
accounts and allocate stocks in taxable accounts.   
     The second approach via which taxation can have an impact on portfolio choices 
is that the taxation could have an impact on the demand for risky assets, but this impact 
is theoretically ambiguous (King and Leape, 1998, p177). Tobin (1958, p81) explained 
that if an risk averse individual could only invest in two assets, a risk-free asset with no 
yield and a risky asset whose return is normally distributed, then introducing a tax on 
“interest income and capital gains alike, with complete loss offset provisions” would 
cause the individual to invest a higher proportion of wealth in a risky asset. Later, 
Mossin (1968) found that as long as the individual had a concave utility function and 
the risk-free asset had no yield, the impact of tax on risky asset allocations would be 
positive, no matter if the risky asset‟s return follows a normal distribution or not. 
However, the impact of the proportional taxation on risky asset allocation would be 
ambiguous if the assumption that risk-free asset had no yield does not hold (Feldstein, 
1976, p633). Therefore, if we want to examine the impact of taxation on portfolio 
allocations between risky assets and risk-free assets with a yield, we can follow the 
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two-effect approach which was introduced by Tobin (1958). In section 4 of Chapter 5, 
we present a theoretical framework in detail and show how the substitution effect and 
the wealth effect could work together to determine the overall impact of taxation on an 
individual‟s portfolio allocation.  We also carry out an empirical study using the BHPS 
data and a positive impact of marginal tax rates on individual‟s risky asset shares is 
found. Our findings are consistent with many other empirical work, which have been 
listed and summarised in the following Table 2.3 and Table 2.4.  
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Table2. 3: Some US studies on the effect of taxation 
Authors  Data Methodology Findings MTR 
Hubbard (1985) Uniquely 
collected by the 
US President's 
Commission on 
Pension Policy 
in  1979 and 
1980 
Probit 
Asset demand equations 
His work suggests that after 
controlling for income and 
wealth, the differences in 
households' marginal tax rates 
could explain the cross sectional 
variation in households' 
portfolio allocation. 
Estimate individual MTR 
using the NBER TAXSIM 
program 
Scholz (1994) Surveys of 
Consumer 
Finances 
conducted in  
1983 and 1989 
Intertemproal analysis It seems that the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 did not significantly 
affect household portfolio 
decisions even though the 
marginal tax rates facing many 
households were affected. 
Author's calculations 
King and Leape (1998) A special 
high-net-wealth 
survey 
conducted in 
1978 by the 
Stanford 
Research 
Institute (SRI) 
Probit  
Asset demand equations 
Taxation has significant impact 
on the ownership for different 
categories of assets.  
Conditional on the ownership, it 
has limited impact on the 
proportion of investment in 
different classes of assets. 
Using detailed survey data to 
calculate precisely the 
marginal tax rate facing each 
household. 
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Poterba and Samwick (2003) Surveys of 
Consumer 
Finances over 
1983, 1989, 
1992, 1995 and 
1998 
Probit and Tobit models Effect on ownership is 
substantial eg: the probability 
that a household owns 
tax-advantaged assets is 
positively related to its tax rate 
on ordinary income. They find 
the portfolio share invested in 
corporate stock is increasing in 
the tax rate. 
Develop a new algorithm 
for imputing federal MTR to 
households. 
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Table2. 4: Some Non-US studies on the effect of taxation 
Authors  Data Methodology Findings MTR 
Agell and Edin (1990) Annual Swedish 
Income Distribution 
Survey 
Probit 
Asset 
demand 
equations 
They find significant impact of 
taxation on portfolio decisions: an 
increase of one-percentage-point in the 
MRT could boost the proportion of net 
wealth invested in common stocks by 
two percent (from 20 percent to 20.4 
percent). 
Author's calculations 
Hochguertel et al. 
(1997) 
The Dutch Collective 
Bank Study in 1988 
Tobit Results show that the level of financial 
wealth and the marginal tax rate are 
major determinants of the allocation 
between risk-free assets and risky 
assets. 
The measure for the marginal 
tax rate has been constructed 
from this variable and the 
parameters of the Dutch tax 
system in 1988. 
Stephens and 
Ward-Batts (2004) 
UK Family 
Expenditure Survey 
(FES) data 
DD 
estimation 
Households responded to this policy 
change by reallocating asset 
ownership. 
Author's calculations 
Alan et al. (2010) Canadian Survey of 
Consumer Finances 
(SCF) from 1986 to 
1991 
DD 
estimation 
Canadian couples reallocate asset 
ownership to minimize tax liabilities. 
Author's calculations 
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3. Household-Specific Factors and Risky Asset 
Choice 
3.1 Introduction 
Theory suggests that the proportion of wealth invested in risky assets should be 
constant regardless of the investors‟ ages or wealth if we assume investment 
opportunities are constant and investors‟ utility has constant relative risk aversion 
(Merton 1969, 1971). Empirical studies reveal that the age has positive or has an 
inverse-U shape effect on individual‟s risky asset allocation in the US (Ameriks and 
Zeldes, 2004), in the European countries such as UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy 
(Guiso et al., 2002) and in Japan (Iwaisako, 2009). Furthermore, investment advisors 
typically would suggest younger investors hold a portfolio with relatively high risk. As 
they age, the investment time horizon shrinks and a reduction in risk is appropriate so 
that, not surprisingly, older investors would be advised to invest most of their wealth in 
risk-free assets (Bali et al., 2009). Malkiel concluded that the investors‟ risky portfolio 
share should equal “100 minus the investor‟s age” (Malkiel, 1999, p418).  
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     Furthermore, theory predicts wealth has no impact on the optimal risky portfolio 
share under classical assumptions, including individual preference with CRRA, constant 
investment opportunities or the individual with log utility function, and no labour 
income is generated. However, empirical studies generally reveal a positive correlation 
between the proportion of wealth invested in risky assets and households‟ wealth after 
controlling for the level of education and other demographic variables (Wachter and 
Yogo, 2010).  Furthermore, theory predicts a much higher stock market participation 
rate and higher proportion of investment in stocks than is observed (Guiso et al., 2002; 
McCarthy, 2004; Iwaisako, 2009).  
Incorporating factors, such as transactions costs and borrowing constraints 
(Constantinides, 1986; Davis and Norman, 1990; Heaton and Lucas, 1997), life-cycle 
considerations (Gomes and Michaelides, 2003; Polkovnichenko, 2007; Cocco et al., 
2005), and the variation in background risk exposure from sources, such as labour and 
entrepreneurial income or real estate holdings (Cocco et al., 2005; Viciera, 2001), can 
explain the cross-sectional variation in portfolio allocation.  
In this chapter we consider how such factors influence portfolio variation from a 
household perspective. We use data from the UK Panel Household Survey (BHPS) 
which provides evidence on a sample of around 3000 household, of choice of risky asset 
portfolio. We identify a set of household specific factors which are observed to 
influence risky asset choice. From a theoretical perspective we identify both the risk 
aversion parameter and habit formation as mechanisms by which the household specific 
variables influence choice. We do not believe systematic variation in household beliefs 
can explain choice and hence ignore this as a possibility. We use a Tobit model and 
censored quantile regression (CQR) model for UK based data from the BHPS so as to 
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identify factors that influence household asset allocation decisions and then interpret the 
cross-sectional variation in asset allocation in the context of observed risk aversion of 
households. 
     The remaining part of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly 
outlines the theoretical considerations and then identifies how it can explain household 
variation in risky asset selection. Section 3.3 discusses our data set, empirical 
methodology and reports our results. Section 3.4 interprets these results and provides 
some concluding comments.  
 
3.2 Theoretical foundations 
Early work on portfolio theory is set in a static one-period setting (Markowitz, 
1952, Tobin, 1958) and involves maximising a utility function of wealth. The principles 
established in that work are incorporated into dynamic specifications (Samuelson (1969) 
and Merton (1969, 1971)). However, such models are found to contain propositions that 
are not empirically justified, predicting too high a proportion of risky assets in 
portfolios and failing to explain the age profile of the risky asset holding. Merton (1969) 
suggested that, under restrictive assumptions including constant relative risk aversion 
and constant investment opportunities, the risky asset allocation decision is independent 
of the investment time horizon and the investor‟s wealth. However, if investment 
opportunities vary over time, multi-period investors will be also concerned about 
hedging consumption against shocks due to time-varying expected returns and/or 
covariances. As a consequence portfolio models, where consumption is the key driver 
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of utility, are developed to handle the possibility of inter-temporal hedging which arise 
naturally from time-varying returns (Campbell et al., 2003; Chacko and Viceira, 2005). 
Such models are observed to describe what is called „„strategic asset allocation‟‟ 
(Brennan et al., 1997, p1377).  
Empirical analysis has also demonstrated the failing of the basic Merton model. An 
inverse-U shape of age effect on individual‟s risky asset allocation has been found in a 
wide range of empirical studies (Ameriks and Zeldes (2004), Italy (Guiso et al., 2002) 
and in Japan (Iwaisako, 2009). There appears to be a positive correlation between the 
proportion of wealth invested in risky assets and household wealth (Wachter and Yogo, 
2010). Guiso et al. (2002, Table I.7) documented this fact for five countries, namely the 
US, the UK, Netherland, Germany and Italy, based on various household surveys. 
Similar correlation has also been found in early household surveys, for example, for the 
US, the 1962 and 1963 Federal Reserve Board Surveys of the Financial Characteristics 
of Consumers and Changes in Family Finances (Blume and Friend, 1975; Friend and 
Blume, 1975; cited in Wachter and Yogo, 2010, p3). Wealth does not only have an 
impact on stock market participation but also has an impact on the risky portfolio share. 
The probability of low wealth individuals investing in risky assets is much smaller than 
the probability for the rich and, even conditional upon participation, the poor tend to 
invest less in risky assets. As also has been suggested in many empirical studies, after 
controlling for the level of education and other demographic variables, wealth is still 
found to have positive effect on risky portfolio share (Wachter and Yogo, 2010).  
A number of factors, which are likely to influence portfolio selection, have been 
analysed theoretically. Among then we note transactions costs and borrowing 
constraints (Constantinides, 1986; Davis and Norman, 1990; Heaton and Lucas, 1997), 
  77 
restricted pension investments (Curcuru et al., 2006), life-cycle considerations (Gomes 
and Michaelides, 2003; Polkovnichenko, 2007; Cocco et al., 2005), and the variation in 
background risk exposure from sources such as labour and entrepreneurial income or 
real estate holdings (Cocco et al.,2005; Viciera, 2001). As a consequence 
cross-sectional variation in asset allocation has been more fully explained, although 
differences between the theory and empirical observation still remain (Cauley et al., 
2007).  Cocco (2005) found that housing can dramatically improve the predictability of 
the standard optimising model. By adding housing into the model, the predicted age 
profile of risky asset selection moves to greater consistency with empirical studies 
(McCarthy, 2004, p25). Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Campbell and Cocco (2003), 
Marshall and Parekh (1999), and Hu (2005), also studied the impact of housing on asset 
allocation and, generally, observed that housing “crowds out risky asset holdings” 
(McCarthy, 2004, p28; Cauley et al., 2007). Households in the UK appear to hold more 
risky portfolios than those in the US and housing ownership is used to explain this 
(Banks et al., 2002a). 
The introduction of habit into the utility function has helped to bring theoretical 
predictions of asset pricing closer to empirical observation (explaining the equity 
premium). Less work has been done on introducing habit into the portfolio choice 
decision. However, recent papers suggest that such a modification can help to explain 
age profile, income and wealth effects and potentially the impact of housing wealth (eg: 
Polkovnichenko, 2007; Gupta, 2009). The key thing to note is that habit allows risk 
aversion to vary significantly, particularly for consumption levels close to the habit 
level, and hence participation rates and levels of risky assets below expectation can be 
understood with such an innovation.  
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3.3 Data, empirical model and methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
We use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which is a general 
household panel survey and has been seldom used to study household portfolio 
allocation and saving behaviour (although see Guariglia, (2001); Guariglia and Rossi 
(2002); Banks et al. (2002b)). The BHPS is a UK annual survey, started from 1991 with 
an initial sample size of 5,500 households and 10,000 people are roughly involved. The 
sample is “a stratified clustered design drawn from the Postcode Address File and all 
residents present at those addresses at the first wave of the survey were designated as 
panel members” (BHPS, 2010). Whenever new families are formed or separated from 
their parent‟s household, the new family members and the old both get re-interviewed 
every year, with the exception of children under 16. In total, the survey has conducted 
eighteen waves from 1991 to 2008. The data for the first seventeen waves are available 
to scholars, while Wave 18 data is in process and will be published in 2010. Detailed 
questionnaire content and other information related to the survey are provided by the 
University of Essex (BHPS, 2010).  
BHPS is a panel survey and it has been reported that there is a high proportion of 
respondents who were interviewed in 1991 till present in the subsequent surveys. The 
proportion is around 62% for the 2000 BHPS. Furthermore, data information on 
household composition, housing conditions, residential mobility, education and training, 
basic consumption, labour market behaviour, income from employment, benefits and 
pensions are available for each wave survey and can be accessed via the UK data 
archive. In contrast, detailed data on financial wealth are only collected every five years 
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starting from 1995. In 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 BHPS, respondents were required to 
report information on savings, investments and debts separately. They were asked what 
kind of savings and investments they hold, how much of the total amount they saved, 
how much of the total amount they invested and how much of the total amount they 
owed.  
3.3.2 Definition of variables  
In this thesis we employ a standard measure of “liquid wealth" which is defined to 
include both risky assets (investments) and risk-free assets (savings). Our dependent 
variable, proportion of liquid wealth invested in risky assets in 2000 (α2000), is defined 
as is the amount of valid investment in risky assets divided by total valid investment in 
both risky and risk- free assets at the time when the survey was carried out in 2000. 
 According to classification in BHPS, savings include saving or deposit account 
(with a bank, post office or building society), National Savings Bank (Post Office), 
TESSA or ISA. Investments consist of National Savings Certificates, Premium Bonds, 
Unit Trusts/Investment Trusts, Personal Equity Plan, Shares (UK or foreign), National 
Savings bonds (Capital, Income or Deposit), and other investments (government or 
company securities). Housing and pensions are not classified as investment products.  
From our review of theory and previous empirical studies we have identified a 
series of variables that we think will be important in explaining the risky asset selection 
of individual household. Using the data collected from the BHPS survey in 2000 and 
1995, we construct the following variables, some of which have been used in previous 
studies of asset allocation:  
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The proportion of liquid wealth invested in risky assets in 1995 (α1995) is the amount of 
valid investment in risky assets divided by total valid investment in both risky and risk- 
free assets at the time when the survey was carried out in 1995 (we have a similar 
definition for 2000).  
Net liquid wealth (NETLIQUIDWEALTH) is the sum of total savings and investments in 
2000, minus personal debt in 2000; NETLIQUIDWEALHTSQUARED is the square 
value of NETLIQUIDWEALTH.  
Personal debt (PERSONALDEBT) is the respondents‟ personal debt in 2000 including 
“hire purchase agreements, personal loans (from bank, building society or other 
financial institution), unpaid credit cards (including store cards), catalogue or mail order 
purchase agreements, DSS social fund loan, overdrafts, any other loans from a private 
individual, overdrafts, student loan and other debts
15
.  
Gross house value (HOUSING) is the expected house value perceived by the 
households in 2000; HOUSINGQUARED is the square value of HOUSING.  
Net house value (NETHOUSING) is equal to gross house value in 2000 minus any 
outstanding mortgage loans. NETHOUSINGSQUARED is the square value of 
NETHOUSING.  
OUTSTANDINGMORTGAGE equals total amount of outstanding mortgage loans on the 
properties that are owned by the respondent or his/her family members in 2000.  
Labour income (LABOURINCOME) is the respondent‟s annual labour income before 
tax in 2000.   
                                                          
15
 “For a full list of which products are included as savings, investments and debt, see Annex B.” (Bank 
et al, 2002b). 
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Income to net liquid wealth ratio (INCOMENLW) is the respondent‟s annual income 
before tax in 2000 divided by his/her net liquid wealth.  
Age (AGE) is the respondent‟s age in 2000. AGESQUARED is the square value of AGE.  
Education dummy variables include OLEVELORUNDERDUM, ALEVELDUM and 
DEGREEDUM. OLEVELORUNDERDUM equals one if the respondent‟s highest 
education level is O level or under
16
, and it equals zero otherwise.  ALEVELDUM 
equals one if the respondent‟s highest education level is an A-level or equivalent17, and 
it equals zero otherwise. DEGREEDUM equals one if the respondent‟s highest 
education level is first degree or higher
18
, and the dummy variable equals zero otherwise. 
The respondent whose highest education is an O-level or under is set to be the base 
category and the dummy variable for this education level is not included in the 
regression. All these education dummy variables are set up based on the information 
given in the 2000 BHPS survey. 
Pension dummy (PENSIONDUM) equals one if the respondent reported that he/she 
belongs to his/her employer‟s pension scheme and/or private personal pensions in 2000,  
and the dummy variable equals zero otherwise.  
Dummy variables for employment status have also been generated, including 
EMPLOYEEDUM, SELFEMPLOYEDDUM, RETIREDDUM and UNEMPLOYEDDUM. 
EMPLOYEEDUM equals one if the respondents is in paid employment, and it equals 
zero otherwise. SELFEMPLOYEDDUM equals one if the respondent is self employed 
and it equals zero otherwise. RETIREDDUM equals one if the respondent reported 
                                                          
16
 O level or CSE, GCSE. 
17
 A level or HNC (Higher National Certificate ) or HND (Higher National Diploma), Teaching 
qualifications, Nursing qualifications  
18
 first degree or higher degree 
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himself/herself as being retired and it equals zero otherwise. UNEMPLOYEDDUM 
equals one if the respondent is out of labour force and it equals zero otherwise. The 
group of respondents who are retired is set to be the base category for the employment 
status. All these employment status dummy variables are set up based on the 
information given in 2000 BHPS survey. 
Sex dummy (SEXDUM) equals one if the respondent is male in 2000, and it equals zero 
otherwise.  
Marital status dummy (MARITALDUM) equals one if the respondent is legally married 
in 2000, and it equals zero if he/she is either separated, divorced, widowed or just 
single.  
Children dummy (CHILDDUM) equals one if the respondent is living in a family that 
has one or more than one child aged 12 or under in 2000, and it equals zero otherwise.  
Finally,  
Region London dummy (LONDONDUM) is defined that it equals one if the respondent 
lives in the greater London in 2000, and it equals zero otherwise. 
3.3.3 Data descriptions  
We select the group of individuals who attended both the 1995 BHPS and 2000 
BHPS interviews. The number of individuals in this group is 2484. Table 3.1 presents 
the distribution of savings, investments, personal debts, total liquid wealth and total net 
liquid wealth for our sample of 2484 observations from the 2000 BHPS. Table 3.2 
shows the breakdown of total net liquid wealth for the same sample. As we can see from 
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the Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, the average savings of these 2484 respondents is £7,281 
whereas the median amount of savings is just £2,000; the average investments in risky 
assets is £7,067, whereas the median amount of investments in risky assets is £15. 
Similarly, the average values of personal debts, total liquid wealth and total net liquid 
wealth are all much higher than the corresponding median values. These large 
differences between the average values and median values suggest that in terms of each 
asset classes, there is a small proportion of individuals who hold a large amount of it. If 
we consider the wealth distribution by percentiles, as detailed in Table 3.1, we get 
further insights. We observe that from 2484 individuals, the lower 50% have £2,000 or 
less of savings whereas the top 10 percent have at least £17,000 of savings. Compared 
with the distribution of savings, the distribution of investments in risky assets is much 
more heavily skewed. The bottom 50 percent of the distribution invest £15 or less in 
risky assets, and the top 10 percent invest at least £15,875 in risky assets. Individuals in 
our sample size have a low participation rate in risky investments. Upon participation, 
the median as well as 75 percentile and 90 percentile values of the risky investments are 
still much less than those values of savings. Table 3.1 also reveals there is a large 
inequality in terms of net liquid wealth in our sample. The group of individuals who are 
in the bottom 25 percent have only £150 of net liquid wealth whereas the group of 
individuals who are at the top 25 percent have roughly 75 times that at £11,300. In sum, 
Table 3.1 suggests that there are large variations across households‟ asset allocations 
and their wealth and that there is a significant skewness towards the upper end of the 
distribution.  
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Table 3. 1The Distribution of Liquid Wealth in 2000 
 
Table 3.2 shows the breakdown of total net liquid wealth for our 2484 sample. On average, the net liquid wealth consists of 56.85% in 
savings, 55.18% in investment in risky assets, and -12.02% in personal debt. 
Table 3. 2The Composition of Liquid Wealth 
ASSET CLASS Obs MEAN Std.Dev. PERCENTAGE 
Savings (investment in risk-free 
asset) 2484 7281 17439 56.85% 
Investments in risky assets 2484 7067 25062 55.18% 
TOTAL LIQUID WEALTH 2484 14348 33999 112.02% 
Personal debt 2484 -1540 4352 -12.02% 
TOTAL NET LIQUID WEALTH 2484 12808 107504 100.00% 
 
 
ASSET CLASS Obs 
10 
Percentile 
25 
Percentile Median 
75 
Percentile 
90 
Percentile 
Savings (investment in risk free asset) 2484 5 350 2000 7000 17000 
Investments in risky assets 2484 0 0 15 3000 15875 
TOTOAL LIQUID WEALTH 2484 100 800 3800 12000 36125 
Personal debt 2484 0 0 0 1000 5000 
TOTAL NET LIQUID WEALTH 2484 -2492 150 3000 11300 35110 
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Despite the high average holdings of risky asset, it is heavily skewed. Figure 3.1 
and 3.2 suggests that 45 percent of these 2484 respondents have no risky investments at 
all in 1995. Beyond that 8% report only risky asset holding while the remainder are 
distributed across the range. Table 3.3 below confirms these results. 
Figure 3. 1:Spike plot of risky asset shares in 1995 (α1995) 
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Figure 3. 2:Spike plot of risky asset shares in 2000 (α2000) 
 
     Table 3.3 reports descriptive statistics for our explanatory variables. We may note 
that wealth and income is unequally distributed and this provides insight into the pattern 
of risky asset selection which is discussed in our empirical specification. Notice also 
that we have missing observations for some of our key explanatory variables. Since we 
don‟t think that the reporting of data is determined by factors that affect risky asset 
holding this is not likely to represent an econometric problem. The overall message of 
our descriptive statistics indicates that we have a representative sample of UK 
households that will allow us to provide useful insights into factors that influence their 
risky asset choice. 
 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
alpha2000
  87 
Table 3. 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs  Mean Std. Dev. 
10 
Percentile 
25 
Percentile Median 
75 
Percentile 
90 
Percentile 
α2000 2484 0.28 0.37 0 0 0.01 0.56 0.96 
α1995 2484 0.27 0.36 0 0 0 0.55 0.94 
NETLIQUIDWEALTH 2484 12808 34488 -2492 150 3000 11300 35110 
PERSONALDEBT 2484 1540 4352 0 0 0 1000 5000 
HOUSING 2484 101229 93929 0
19
 45000 80000 140000 210000 
NETHOUSING 2408 74416 86509 0 16000 53000 100000 182300 
OUTSTANDINGMORTGAGE 2408 25523 44148 0 0 3000
20
 40000 70000 
LABOURINCOME 2484 10592 288 0 0 4438 17160 29173 
INCOMENLW 2470 26 8 -3.19 0 0 2.34 12 
AGE 2484 49 18 27 35 47 62 75 
OLEVELORUNDERDUM 2473 0.58 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 
ALEVELDUM 2473 0.27 0.45 0 0 0 1 1 
DEGREEDUM 2473 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 0 1 
PENSIONDUM 2484 0.45 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 
EMPLOYEEDUM 2294 0.62 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 
SELFEMPLOYEDDUM 2294 0.07 0.26 0 0 0 0 0 
RETIREDDUM 2294 0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 
UNEMPLOYEDDUM 2294 0.05 0.21 0 0 0 0 0 
SEXDUM 2484 0.47 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 
MARITALDUM 2484 0.62 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 
                                                          
19
 Although the 10 percentile of gross housing value distribution is zero, there are actually 17 percent of respondents (i.e.: 420 out of 2484) who doesn’t own his/her 
accommodation.  
20
 Although the median is £3000, there are 49 percent of respondents(i.e.: 1173out of 2408) who has zero outstanding mortgage loans.  
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CHILDDUM 2484 0.22 0.42 0 0 0 0 1 
LONDONDUM 2484 0.10 0.29 0 0 0 0 0 
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The Table 3.4 presents how the risky asset shares in 2000 vary by net liquid 
wealth, personal debt, gross housing value, net housing value, outstanding mortgage 
loan, annual labour income, ratio of labour income to net liquid wealth.  
Table 3. 4: The distribution of risky asset shares in 2000 (α2000) 
  Risky asset shares (α2000) at percentiles and mean 
  Obs 25th Median 75th Mean 
Net liquid wealth 
quintile 
     Lowest 497 0 0 0.40 0.23 
2nd 497 0 0 0.17 0.19 
3rd 497 0 0 0.29 0.19 
4th 497 0 0.11 0.55 0.30 
Highest 496 0.11 0.50 0.81 0.48 
  
     Personal debt quintile 
     Lowest 497 0 0 0 0 
2nd 497 0 0.02 0.12 0.07 
3rd 497 0.51 0.74 0.94 0.72 
4th 497 0 0 0.60 0.27 
Highest 496 0 0.04 0.68 0.32 
  
     Gross housing value 
quintile 
     Lowest 497 0 0 0.12 0.17 
2nd 497 0 0 0.33 0.21 
3rd 497 0 0.05 0.59 0.29 
4th 497 0 0.11 0.67 0.32 
Highest 496 0 0.29 0.77 0.39 
  
     Net housing value 
quintile 
     Lowest 482 0 0 0.13 0.18 
2nd 482 0 0 0.5 0.25 
3rd 482 0 0.01 0.51 0.27 
4th 481 0 0.06 0.62 0.31 
Highest 481 0 0.32 0.75 0.39 
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Outstanding mortgage 
quintile  
     Lowest 497 0 0 0 0 
2nd 497 0.02 0.19 0.50 0.28 
3rd 497 0 0.54 0.99 0.49 
4th 497 0 0 0.50 0.27 
Highest 496 0 0.17 0.74 0.35 
  
 
     Annual labour income 
quintile 
     Lowest 497 0 0 0 0 
2nd 497 0.06 0.33 0.63 0.37 
3rd 497 0 0.17 1 0.43 
4th 497 0 0 0.50 0.25 
Highest 496 0 0.17 0.70 0.34 
  
 
     (labour income/nlw) 
quintile 
     Lowest 497 0 0 0 0.15 
2nd 497 0 0 0 0 
3rd 497 0.38 0.67 0.96 0.64 
4th 497 0 0.25 0.71 0.36 
Highest 496 0 0 0.38 0.23 
The main message of Table 3.4 is that at the lowest percentiles we have a 
preponderance of households which hold zero risky assets and these households also 
have low income, low wealth and don‟t own real estate. At higher quantiles we observe 
relationships which would be expected, namely that increases in income, wealth and 
housing wealth increase the share of risky assets in the portfolio.   
The following Table 3.5 presents how the risky asset shares in 2000 varies by age, 
education level, pension status, employment status, gender, marital status, number of 
children and living area.  We observe that age has an inverse-U shape relationship with 
the risky asset shares. Risky asset shares increase in education level. Similarly, having 
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an occupational pension plan and/or private pension plan is associated with an 
increasing risky asset share. In terms of employment status, Table 3.5 suggests that 
unemployed respondents hold the lowest risky asset shares among all the respondents. 
In addition, male respondents are found to allocate a higher proportion of wealth in 
risky assets. Marriage and having at least one child with age less than 12 is also linked 
positively to risky asset share. The impact of region is limited. 
Table 3. 5: The distribution of risky asset shares in 2000 (α2000) 
 
Risky asset shares (α2000) at percentiles and mean 
 
Obs 25th Median 75th Mean 
Age band 
     
<25 160 0 0 0 0.11 
25-29 183 0 0 0.14 0.16 
30-34 244 0 0 0.55 0.27 
35-39 288 0 0.01 0.49 0.27 
40-44 252 0 0.25 0.80 0.38 
45-49 221 0 0.05 0.67 0.31 
50-54 248 0 0.06 0.56 0.28 
55-59 187 0 0.15 0.67 0.34 
60-64 154 0 0.27 0.68 0.37 
65-69 138 0 0.03 0.82 0.33 
70-74 147 0 0.12 0.68 0.34 
75+ 262 0 0 0.24 0.20 
      
Education level 
     
O-Level or under 1413 0 0 0.50 0.25 
A-Level or equivalent 679 0 0.02 0.60 0.29 
Degree or above 381 0 0.18 0.71 0.35 
      
Pension status 
     
No pension 1366 0 0 0.50 0.26 
Occ. Pension 843 0 0.05 0.63 0.30 
Pers. Pension 401 0 0.17 0.69 0.33 
both 126 0 0.18 0.68 0.35 
      
Employment status 
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Employee 1416 0 0 0.56 0.28 
Self employed 172 0 0.20 0.58 0.31 
Retired 602 0 0.03 0.65 0.30 
Unemployed 104 0 0 0.28 0.18 
      
Gender 
     
Male 1167 0 0.07 0.67 0.31 
Female 1317 0 0 0.50 0.25 
      
Marital status 
     
Married 1544 0 0.05 0.64 0.30 
Others 940 0 0 0.43 0.23 
     
 
 
No. of children(age<12) 
     
1+ 555 0 0.05 0.68 0.32 
0 1929 0 0 0.52 0.27 
      
Living area 
     
Greater London 238 0 0.03 0.58 0.28 
Others 2246 0 0 0.55 0.27 
From Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and Table 3.3, we may note that the distribution for 
the share of risky assets of an individual in 2000 is similar to that in 1995. However, we 
find there are changes in the risky asset share for our sample between 1995 and 2000, 
reported in Table 3.6. As we can see from Table 3.6, in 1995, 1199 out of 2484 
respondents do not have any risky investments. Among these 1199 respondents, there 
are 812 individuals still do not invest in risky assets in 2000. Of the remaining 387 
individuals, 202 invest less than half of their total liquid wealth in risky assets, 16 
individuals invest exactly half, 108 individuals invest more than half, and 61 individuals 
invest all of their total liquid wealth in risky assets. Based on Table 3.6, we calculate 
that 52 percent of respondents in our sample (i.e.1299 out of 2484 individuals) do not 
move out their risky asset share bracket. This comprises 234 individuals who keep their 
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risky asset shares in the range between zero and 0.5, 205 individuals whose share stay in 
the 0.5-1 bracket, and 860
21
 respondents who invest either zero, 50 percent or 100 
percent of their total liquid wealth in 1995 and remained their risky asset share exactly 
the same in 2000. As can be seem from Table 3.6, 812 out of 1199 individuals (i.e. 68 
percent) who hold no risky assets in 1995 still do not invest in them in 2000. More than 
a quarter of respondents (i.e. 46 out of 177 individuals) who invest all their liquid 
wealth in risky asset in 1995 are found to stay in the same position in 2000. In addition, 
2 individuals invest exactly half of their total liquid wealth in risky assets in both years. 
Thus, to sum up, at least 35 percent of total respondents (i.e. 860 out of 2484 
respondents) do not change their risky asset share at all in 2000 and 52 percent of total 
respondents in our sample (i.e.1299 out of 2484 individuals) do not move out their risky 
asset share bracket. These imply that more than half of our 2484 respondents changed 
their risky asset share in year. One purpose of our analysis is to identify factors that can 
explain these changes in risky asset share.  
Table 3. 6: Changes in individual's Risky Asset Share from 1995 to 2000 
  Risky Asset Share in 2000 (α2000) 
Risky Asset Share in 1995 (α1995) 0 (0,0.5) 0.5 (0.5,1) 1 Total 
0 812 202 16 108 61 1199 
(0,0.5) 118 234 13 92 42 499 
0.5 26 40 2 13 3 84 
(0.5,1) 89 169 14 205 48 525 
1 56 35 4 36 46 177 
Total 1101 680 49 454 200 2484 
                                                          
21
 The number of 860 is the sum of 812, 46 and 2. 
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3.3.4 Empirical model and methodology  
The main equation in the model that we are going to estimate is as follows: 
*
2000i =( i19950 )1  + 1 iealthnetliquidw + iedealthsquarnetliquidw2 +
ibtpersonalde3 + ighou sin4 + igsquaredhou sin5 + igedingmortgaouts tan6 +
iincomenlw7 iage8 iagesquared9 + ialeveldum10 + ireedumdeg11 + 
ipensiondum12  + imemployeedu13 + ieddumselfemploy14 + idumunemployed15 +
isexdum16 + itusmaritalsta17 + ichilddum18 + ilondondum19 + i , ),0(~
2 Ni , 
which is derived from the following equation: 
*
200019951995
*
200019952000 )1()(   = *)1( 1995   f ( , r , t ,  , 
X  , X ).  
where α 2000 and  α 1995 are the proportion of liquid wealth invested in risky assets in 
2000 and 1995 respectively, derived by using BHPS data; *2000  is the optimal risky 
asset allocation rule. The basis for this specification is a partial adjustment equation due 
to transaction costs. This therefore incorporates a particular feature of assets markets 
which have been identified as important in explaining asset choice, namely transactions 
costs. The question arises which variables should appear in influencing the desired risky 
asset share. We identify a range of household level variables which we expect to 
influence the individual‟s asset choice, based upon previous empirical work and the 
preliminary analysis of the data above. The empirical work, for example, Cocco (2005, 
p554) regressed portfolio share on current labour income, financial net-worth, age, 
relative real estate and relative mortgage, where “financial net worth is defined as the 
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sum of stocks, bills, and house value less debt”. Wachter and Yogo‟ (2010) regressed on 
log net-worth, age, marital status. King and Leape (1998) regressed on log net-worth, 
log net-worth squared, age, age squared, income from employment, education, marital 
status, and employment status. Hochguertel et al (1997) regressed on log financial 
wealth, age, age squared, employment status and education. Alan et al. (2010) regressed 
on income, wealth, age, education, married with kids, number of children, gender and 
house ownership. Guariglia (2001) regressed saving ratio on age, age squared, gender, 
number of children, marital status, education, health status, permanent income and 
regional dummies. Therefore, in order to be consistent with the existing literature and 
examine the factors that determine household risky asset shares, we regress portfolio 
share on a range of variables including net-worth, personal debt, gross house value, 
outstanding mortgage, income, age, education, employment status, gender, marital 
status, child and regional dummy variables. In some specifications, we also include 
health status
22
, number of children and permanent income.   
In our specifications, we have quadratic terms for net liquid wealth, housing, and age. 
This is because we expect these explanatory variables have quadratic effect on risky 
asset share. The key thing is that the quadratic term allows for individuals with different 
wealth to react differently to changes in the underlying variable and this is something 
that we wish to investigate since it has policy relevance. For example, if age has 
non-linear effects then we can think about the impact of an ageing population and so on. 
                                                          
22
 The health status equals to 1, if the individual is reported in excellent health condition; it equals 2 if 
he/she is in very good health; it equals 3 if he/she is in fair health; it equals 4, if he/she is in poor health; 
it equals 5, if he/she is in very poor health. In addition, in some specification in my thesis, I also use 
youngunhealthdum(defined as age<70 and report very poor health condition), oldunhealthdum (defined 
as age>=70 and report very poor health condition), oldhealthdum(defined as age>=70 and report either 
in excellent, very good, fair or poor health condition) 
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The theoretical justification for our chosen explanatory variables is based around 
the individual‟s attitude to risk, either via an influence on the risk aversion parameter or 
through an impact on the habit level of consumption. Therefore, we do not use 
systematic variation in expectations which can be identified by household specific 
variables, although behavioural finance proponents might wish to include this as a 
possible explanation for these household specific effects. We have some points to make 
in this context when we discuss our results in section 3.4.  
 We use a standard Tobit model because substantial censoring occurs in the 
explanatory variables, α2000 as we have already observed in terms of households which 
hold no risky assets. We also have to recognise the possibility of right-hand censoring 
and note that 200 households which report 100% risky asset holding may be subject to 
this. In terms of demand of the risky assets, individuals who are risk lover can borrow at 
risk-free rate and invest all in risky assets, which would lead to the risky asset share 
greater than 1. However, this is not observable
23
. Previous studies used an Ordinary 
Least Squares regression with the risky asset proportion of wealth as a dependent 
variable (Gomes and Michaelides, 2005; Friend and Blume, 1975; Morin and Suarez, 
1983; Schooley and Worden, 1996) but in so doing are unable to handle the censored 
observations.  
                                                          
23
 The risky asset share in this thesis is defined as amount of risky assets holdings divided by total 
amount of risky and risk-free asset holdings, which means the risky asset share, α , satisfies 0≤α ≤1, 
and this is observable. Now, suppose there is an individual, who invests all his money in risky assets, so 
his risky asset share is 1, as we observe. But his actual demand for risky asset may be greater. If he is 
allowed to borrow at risk free rate, then his risky asset share could be: risky asset holdings/(risky asset 
holdings + risk-free asset holdings)= £100/[£100+(-£50)]=2, which is greater than 1, but is not 
observable. So, in theory, α can be greater than 1, but in practice, it is not. 
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The standard Tobit model (Tobin, 1958) is shown below where 
*
iy  is a latent 
variable, i
x
is a vector of explanatory variables, and   is a vector of parameters. The 
random disturbance i

 is assumed to be normally, independently, and identically 
distributed. i
y
 is the observed dependent variable and C is the point of censoring 
(Hamilton and Wyckoff, 1991, p461). 
iii xy  
* , ),0(~ 2 Ni , 
where 
},max{ * Cyy ii   
In our case: 
*
2000i =( i19950 )1  + 1 iealthnetliquidw + iedealthsquarnetliquidw2 +
ibtpersonalde3 + ighou sin4 + igsquaredhou sin5 + igedingmortgaouts tan6 +
iincomenlw7 iage8 iagesquared9 + ialeveldum10 + ireedumdeg11 + 
ipensiondum12 + imemployeedu13 + ieddumselfemploy14 + idumunemployed15 +
isexdum16 + itusmaritalsta17 + ichilddum18 + ilondondum19 + i , ),0(~
2 Ni , 
where  
1
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   In order to address the specification problem of standard Tobit model, we estimate 
also the heteroscedastic Tobit model. To round-off our empirical analysis we also 
estimate the model using censored quantile regression (CQR) which was first developed 
by Powell (1986) and has been explored by several scholars such as Fitzenberger (1996), 
Buchinsky and Hahn (1998), and Chernozhukov and Hong (2002). The CQR regression 
is an extension of least absolute deviations (LAD) estimation methods for more general 
quantiles (Powell, 1986). “More importantly, the CQR estimator places no requirement 
on the distribution of the errors and produces consistent estimates in the presence of 
heteroskedastic errors” (Billett and Xue, 2007, p1829). Unlike OLS or Tobit estimation, 
which “estimates the effect of independent variables only on the conditional mean of a 
dependent variable”, censored quantile regression can “estimate the effect of 
independent variables at a variety of points in the conditional distribution of the 
dependent variable” (Conley and Galenson, 1998, p475). By using censored quartile 
regression, we can investigate how the impact of different determinants on portfolio 
share varies across different quantile of the portfolio share distribution. 
The censored quantile regression (CQR) we estimate is as follows: 
*
2000i =( i19950 )1  + 1 iealthnetliquidw + iedealthsquarnetliquidw2 +
ibtpersonalde3 + ighou sin4 + igsquaredhou sin5 + igedingmortgaouts tan6 +
iincomenlw7 iage8 iagesquared9 + ialeveldum10 + ireedumdeg11 +
ipensiondum12 + imemployeedu13 + ieddumselfemploy14 + idumunemployed15 +
isexdum16 + itusmaritalsta17 + ichilddum18 + ilondondum19 + i ,  
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where }0,max{ *20002000 ii    
and .)|( iQuantile   is the 
th conditional quantile of the 
disturbance.  
3.3.5 Standard Tobit Results 
Table 3. 7: The results of Tobit regression for our sample 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  
   Variables    
α1995 0.501*** 0.487*** 0.499*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Netliquidwealth 0.579*** 0.522*** 0.542*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Netliquidwealthsquared -0.120*** -0.109*** -0.114*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Personaldebt 1.263*** 1.197*** 1.395*** 
  (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) 
Housing 0.131*** 0.119*** 
   (0.03) (0.04) 
 Housingsquared -0.020*** -0.021*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
 Outstandingmortgage 
 
0.108*** 
   
 
(0.04) 
 Nethousing 
  
0.071** 
  
  
(0.03) 
Nethousingsquared 
  
-0.014* 
  
  
(0.01) 
Grosslabourincome 0.106 
    (0.11) 
  Incomenlw 
 
1.10E-04*** 1.03E-04** 
  
 
(4.03E-05) (4.03E-05) 
Permanentincomenlw 
     
   Age 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  100 
Agesquared -2.47E-04*** -3.02E-04*** -3.05E-04*** 
  (4.91E-05) (5.50E-05) (5.52E-05) 
Aleveldum 
 
0.043 0.054 
  
 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Degreedum 
 
0.074* 0.097** 
  
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
Pensiondum 0.046 0.034 0.055 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Employeedum 
 
-0.098* -0.103* 
  
 
(0.06) (0.06) 
Selfemployeddum 
 
-0.167** -0.149** 
  
 
(0.07) (0.07) 
Unemployeddum 
 
-0.200** -0.214*** 
  
 
(0.08) (0.08) 
Sexdum 0.027 0.035 0.026 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Maritaldum 0.004 -0.010 0.015 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Childdum 0.095*** 0.079** 0.097** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Londondum -0.012 -0.016 0.002 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant -1.071*** -1.068*** -0.995*** 
  (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
Log likelihood -1989.510  -1748.969  -1758.580  
LR chi2 554.20 509.66 490.43 
Pro>chi2 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1223 0.1272 0.1224 
No. of observations 2484 2203 2203 
Left-censored observations 
at α2000<=0 1101 957 
957 
Uncensored observations 1183 1072 1072 
Right-censored 
observations at α2000>=1 
200 174 174 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage and Nethousing are 
measured in £100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared, 
Housingsquared and Nethousingsquared are the squared terms for  
Netliquidwealth ,Housing and Nethousing which are measured in £100,000 
respectively.   
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Table 3.7 reports the results of the standard Tobit regression using maximum 
likelihood methods. We note that previous portfolio share in investment ( 1995  ) has a 
positive impact on the portfolio share invested in risky assets in 2000 as expected from 
the partial adjustment model, although the parameter indicates quite slow adjustment to 
the desired portfolio share. Other factors are shown in the table, namely net liquid wealth, 
personal debt, housing value, outstanding mortgage loan, the ratio of income to net liquid 
wealth, age, education level, whether participating in pension schemes, employment 
status, gender, marital status, whether having children in the family and the London 
dummy. Table 3.7 reveals an inverted-U shape impact of net liquid wealth on portfolio 
allocation. In addition, as there are only 10 out of 2484 observations whose net liquid 
wealth are above the turning point of £239K, it implies that the effect can be simplified to 
a positive relationship between portfolio share and wealth except for the very wealthy. 
This positive relationship between portfolio share and wealth is also found in the analysis 
of Wachter and Yogo (2010).   
The risky asset shares follow a hump-shaped pattern in response to variation in 
housing wealth, with a peak when the net housing value is about £245K. If the net 
housing value is below £245K, risky asset shares increase in net housing value. If the net 
housing value is above £245K, risky asset shares decrease in net housing value. Due to 
missing data for the variable of outstanding mortgage, there are 2408 observations for the 
variable OUTSTANDINGMORTGAGE as well as NETHOUSING. Among these 
observations, 2296 observations are living in a property that has net housing value less 
than £245K, which implies that for the majority, roughly 95 percent of the sample, their 
risky asset shares increase in net housing value. The higher net value of their houses, the 
  102 
higher proportion of their wealth would be invested in risky assets. This is consistent with 
the result observed for liquid wealth above. 
Gross housing value also influences households‟ asset allocation decisions. It has 
an inverse U-shape of impact on risky asset shares. Roughly 96 percent of the 
respondents in our sample (i.e.:2375 out of 2484) are living in a property that worth less 
than the threshold of £282K. As gross house value increases, the risky asset share 
increases, but at a decreasing rate. This inverse-U shape impact of gross house value on 
risky asset shares can be explained by the overall effect from three sub-effects, namely, 
the negative house price risk, the negative housing consumption commitment effect and 
positive housing wealth effect, which we have detailed in the literature survey (chapter 
2.7.1).That means if the property is worth less than the threshold of £282K, the positive 
housing wealth effect dominants. The house value will provide financial security and 
encourage the households to invest in risky assets. In contrast, if the property worth is 
more than the threshold of £282K, the negative house price risk and the negative 
housing consumption commitment effect dominant.  
As the ratio of gross income to liquid wealth rises the individual‟s risky asset share 
will increase. This positive impact of the ratio of labour income to net liquid wealth 
implies that as households have more income relative to their wealth they are in a better 
position to meet habit level consumption or respond to really bad economic shocks. 
Hence they can hold a more risky portfolio.  
It has also been found that age has an inverse-U shape relationship with risky asset 
shares with the age of 56 being the turning point. This hump-shaped pattern in age is 
also consistent with findings in Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) and Wachter and Yogo 
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(2010). The positive relationship between age and risky-asset share could be explained 
by risk aversion or through habit. In other words as individuals age their habit level of 
consumption does not grow as quickly as their income and hence risk aversion declines.  
Increasing education attainment increases the risky asset share whereas 
participation in a pension scheme, no matter whether occupational pension schemes or 
individual pension schemes, is not statistically significant.  
Employment status also affects risky asset shares. The unemployed have the least 
proportion of investment in risky assets. The self-employed have the second least. It 
seems likely that such an effect comes from the effect that these two employment states 
have on the probability of falling close to habit level of consumption with the 
consequent rise in risk aversion. The base group, the retirees have the highest risky asset 
shares and this leaves the employees‟ risky asset shares being the second highest. This 
may be due to that compared with labour income, the annuity income received by the 
retirees is more certain and not correlated with the economic environment, hence the 
retirees is least risk averse. 
Gender is not significant in determining asset choice which is inconsistent with the 
current literature which suggests that “women are indeed more risk-averse than men” 
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009, p1). Croson and Gneezy (2004) stated that gender 
differences in preferences were found in many experimental psychology studies. 
Marital status has no significant effect while the presence of children does link 
positively to risky asset holding. Finally the regional (London) dummy is insignificant.  
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3.3.6 Diagnostic tests and heteroscedastic Tobit regression 
results 
Greene (2008) argued that the standard Tobit model may suffer from inconsistent 
estimates in the presence of either heteroscedasticity or non-normality in the error terms. 
By conducting a Lagrange multiplier test (LM test) of normality based on generalized 
residuals (Chesher and Irish, 1987), we find the hypothesis of normally distributed error 
is rejected at a normal significance levels. Then we conduct the conditional moment test 
(Pagan and Vella,1989) to test whether the disturbances in the model are homoscedastic 
or not. The test results suggest that the null hypothesis of homoskedsticity is also 
rejected for the standard Tobit model. Therefore, the estimation results in Table 3.7 may 
be inconsistent. 
Another way to test whether heteroscedasticity emerges in our Tobit model is to 
estimate the restricted model and unrestricted model first and then calculate the 
likelihood ratio statistics (Greene, 2008). If we can reject the null hypothesis then the 
errors are not homoscedastic, and we need to interpret the results in the heteroscedastic 
Tobit model. 
Hence, now we first estimate the restricted model where we assume that the errors 
are homoscedastic. As we can see from Table 3.8, in the homoscedastic Tobit regression, 
we regress the same explanatory variables as we regressed in Model 2 of Table 3.7. 
The difference between a homoscedastic and heteroscedastic Tobit model is that in 
the homoscedastic Tobit model the variance of the regression error, (   ), is 
homoscedastic whereas in the heteroscedastic Tobit model the variance of the 
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regression error (  ), is heteroscedastic. In other words, in the homoscedastic Tobit 
model, 22 )(  iE .In the heteroscedastic Tobit model, we assume the variance of the 
regression error can be specified as a function of variables: 
)exp()( '222  iii ZE   
where 'iZ is a row vector and  iZ refers to the individual i‟s ALLOCATION1995 ( 1995 ), 
NETLIQUIDWEALTH, NETLIQUIDWEALTHSQUARED, PERSONALDEBT, 
HOUSING, HOUSINGSQUARED, OUTSTANDINGMORTGAGE, INCOMENLW, AGE, 
AGESQUARED, ALEVELDUM, DEGREEDUM, PENSIONDUM, EMPLOYEEDUM, 
SELFEMPLOYEDDUM, UNEMPLOYEDDUM, SEXDUM, MORITALDUM, 
CHILDDUM and LONDONDUM; where   is a column vector and refers to the 
corresponding coefficients for iZ . 
As can be seem from Table 3.8, the log likelihood for the restricted model and 
unrestricted model is -1749 and -1678 respectively. Our null hypothesis is that the 
errors are homoscedastic, in other words, we test whether  =0 or not. The likelihood 
statistic is -2[-1749-(-1678)]=142. This statistic follows a limiting chi-squared 
distribution with 20 degrees of freedom which implies a critical value of 38. Thus, we 
reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the errors are heteroscedastic. We report the 
results of estimating our model with heteroscedastic corrected standard errors in Table 
3.8. 
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Table 3. 8: Homoscedastic Tobit model and heteroscedastic Tobit model 
  Homoscedastic Heteroscedastic 
Variables coefficient coefficient 
 
α1995 0.487***  0.445*** -0.087 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) 
Netliquidwealth 0.522 *** 0.731*** -1.782*** 
  (0.07) (0.10) (0.26) 
Netliquidwealthsquared -0.109 *** -0.293*** 0.669*** 
  (0.02) (0.06) (0.13) 
Personaldebt 1.197 *** 1.234*** -1.806 
  (0.33) (0.27) (1.26) 
Housing 0.119 *** 0.151*** -0.467*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) 
Housingsquared -0.021 *** -0.027*** 0.066** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Outstandingmortgage 0.108 *** 0.142*** 0.257* 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) 
Incomenlw 1.10E-04*** 1.93E-04 3.17E-04 
  (4.03E-05) (1.38E-04) (3.39E-04) 
Age 0.034 *** 0.037*** -0.03 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Agesquared -3.02E-04*** -3.24E-04*** 2.55E-04 
  (5.50E-05) (4.60E-05) (2.03E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.043  0.016 -0.037 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) 
Degreedum 0.074 * 0.078** -0.318** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) 
Pensiondum 0.034  0.086** -0.286** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) 
Employeedum -0.098 * -0.124** 0.119 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.2) 
Selfemployeddum -0.167 ** -0.161*** -0.164 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.23) 
Unemployedum -0.200 ** -0.217** 0.149 
  (0.08) (0.10) (0.32) 
Sexdum 0.035  -0.008 0.188* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.1) 
Maritaldum -0.010  -0.034 0.099 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) 
Childdum 0.079 ** 0.064 0.068 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) 

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Londondum -0.016  -0.049 -0.044 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.16) 
Constant -1.068*** -1.186*** 
 
  (0.14) (0.17)   
Log likelihood -1749 -1678 
No. of observations 2203 2203 
Left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 
957 957 
Uncensored observations 1072 1072 
Right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 
174 174 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, and Outstandingmortgage are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
 
Table 3.8 suggests that the coefficient estimates in the heteroscedastic Tobit model 
have the same sign as in the homoscedastic Tobit model and values are similar across 
the two estimations, for example, the coefficients on PERSONALDEBT, HOUSING, 
HOUSINGSQUARED, AGE and AGESQUARED. However, risky asset shares in 1995 
have less of an effect on risky asset shares in 2000. The net liquid wealth still has an 
inverse U-shape effect, but the turning point is £122K rather than £239K as in the 
homoscedastic model. Because there are only 1.8 percent of respondents ( i.e.:39 out of 
2203 respondents) who have more than £122K net liquid wealth, we can still simplify 
the inverse-U shape effect as a positive relationship between risky asset share and 
individual‟s net liquid wealth.  
The outstanding mortgage has a larger effect. The effect from the ratio of income 
to net liquid wealth is not statistically significant under the heteroscedastic model. The 
effect of receiving higher education increases slightly. Of significance we note that the 
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coefficient for PENSIONDUM is more than tripled and it is statistically significant from 
zero at the 5% significance level. We can also observe that the effects of employment 
status are relatively the same under homoscedastic model and herteroscedastic model, 
however, the effect becomes more significant under heteroscedastic estimation. Overall 
the results are similar with some variation and we will explain this in more details when 
we interpret these results in section 3.4. 
 
3.3.7 CQR model and results  
To provide a further perspective on the empirical analysis of our dataset, we 
analyze the empirical model using a censored quantile regression. This estimator is 
confirmed to “remain consistent and asymptotically normal for a wide class of error 
distributions and be robust to heteroscedasticity” (Powell, 1986; Billett and Xue, 2007, 
p1841). Unlike OLS or Tobit estimation, which considers the conditional mean, 
censored quantile regression estimates the effect of explanatory variables at different 
quantiles of the distribution of the error term. By using censored quantile regression, we 
also control for the censored nature of our observations of the dependent variable.  
Our quantile regression mode can be written as: 
*
2000i =( i19950 )1  + 1 iealthnetliquidw + iedealthsquarnetliquidw2 +
ibtpersonalde3 + ighou sin4 + igsquaredhou sin5 + igedingmortgaouts tan6 +
iincomenlw7 iage8 iagesquared9 + ialeveldum10 + ireedumdeg11 +
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ipensiondum12 + imemployeedu13 + ieddumselfemploy14 + idumunemployed15 +
isexdum16 + itusmaritalsta17 + ichilddum18 + ilondondum19 + i ,  
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ghoubtpersonaldeedealthsquarnetliquidwealthnetliquidwQuantile 
where }.0,max{ *20002000 ii  
 
and .)|( iQuantile   is the 
th conditional quantile of the disturbance.  
The results for a standard Tobit model and CQR models are reported in Table 3.9 
and Table 3.10, while a summary of the CQR results are presented in Figure 3.3-3.6. 
Because we have 20 independent variables and one intercept, hence we have 21 plots in 
Figure 3.3-3.6, in other words, each plot depicts one coefficient in the CQR model. In 
each plot, the darker solid curve represents the 9 distinct censored quantile regression 
estimates for quantile ranging from 0.1 to 0.9. These point estimates measure the impact 
of a one-unit change of the independent variable on risky asset allocation while keeping 
the value of other independent variables constant. The horizontal axis of each plot is the 
different quantiles and the vertical axis is the covariate effect. The lighter solid line 
describes the estimates from the Tobit model which indicate the impact on the 
conditional mean. The two dark dotted curves represent 95% confidence intervals for 
the censored quantile regression estimates. The two light dotted lines depict 95% 
confidence intervals for the standard Tobit regression estimates.
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Table 3. 9: Estimation results for standard Tobit model and CQR models 
  Coefficients 
Variables Tobit Quantile 0.1 Quantile 0.2 Quantile 0.3 Quantile 0.4 
α1995 0.487*** 0.472** 0.588*** 0.271*** 0.281*** 
  (0.04) (0.22) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Netliquidwealth 0.522*** 2.028*** 1.514*** 1.692*** 0.919*** 
  (0.07) (0.66) (0.13) (0.12) (0.06) 
Netliquidwealthsquared -0.109*** -1.813*** -0.919*** -1.223*** -0.295*** 
  (0.02) (0.66) (0.09) (0.10) (0.03) 
Personaldebt 1.197*** 3.200*** 2.382*** 2.245*** 1.315*** 
  (0.33) (0.82) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) 
Housing 0.119*** 0.227 0.153*** 0.134*** 0.055* 
  (0.04) (0.24) -0.04 (0.03) (0.03) 
Housingsquared -0.021*** -0.067 -0.047*** -0.039*** -0.012* 
  (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Outstandingmortgage 0.108*** 0.121** 0.111*** 0.082*** 0.079*** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Incomenlw 1.10E-04*** 1.16E-04*** 9.28E-05*** 8.46E-05*** 7.81E-05*** 
  (4.03E-05) (2.64E-05) (5.31E-06) (1.01E-05) (1.19E-05) 
Age 0.034*** 0.017 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.019*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Agesquared -3.02E-04*** -1.28E-04 -2.57E-04*** -2.78E-04*** -1.75E-04*** 
  (5.50E-05) (1.97E-04) (7.23E-05) (5.76E-05) (5.32E-05) 
Aleveldum 0.043 0.057 -0.052 -0.021 0.034 
  (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Degreedum 0.074* 0.038 0.038 0.043 0.066** 
  (0.04) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Pensiondum 0.034 0.129 0.073* -0.011 0.015 
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  (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Employeedum -0.098* -0.119 -0.068 0.014 -0.097** 
  (0.06) (0.16) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Selfemployeddum -0.167** -0.267* -0.258*** -0.078 -0.177*** 
  (0.07) (0.15) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Unemployeddum -0.200** 0.564*** -0.048 -0.010 -0.227** 
  (0.08) (0.21) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) 
Sexdum 0.035 0.033 0.092*** 0.035* -0.000 
  (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Maritaldum -0.010 -0.061 -0.141*** -0.078*** -0.052** 
  (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Childdum 0.079** 0.048 0.090** 0.080*** 0.068** 
  (0.04) (0.16) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Londondum -0.016 -0.121 0.006 -0.051 -0.110*** 
  (0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Constant -1.068*** -1.393 -1.549*** -1.028*** -0.595*** 
  (0.14) (0.89) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) 
Pseudo R2 0.1272 0.1938 0.1463 0.1337 0.1094 
No. of observations 2203 205 348 607 959 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is 
presented in parentheses. Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Outstandingmortgage are measured in £100,000 in the above 
regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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Table 3. 10: Estimation results for standard Tobit model and CQR models 
  Coefficients 
Variables Tobit Quantile 0.5 Quantile 0.6 Quantile 0.7 Quantile 0.8 Quantile 0.9 
α1995 0.487*** 0.395*** 0.550*** 0.609*** 0.493*** 0.194*** 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Netliquidwealth 0.522*** 0.677*** 0.510*** 0.415*** 0.236*** 0.054 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) 
Netliquidwealthsquared -0.109*** -0.149*** -0.100*** -0.083*** -0.047 -0.014 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Personaldebt 1.197*** 1.026*** 0.869*** 0.779*** 0.809** 0.389* 
  (0.33) (0.26) (0.30) (0.28) (0.36) (0.23) 
Housing 0.119*** 0.078** 0.095*** 0.107*** 0.032 -0.012 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Housingsquared -0.021*** -0.017** -0.019** -0.026*** -0.010 -0.001 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Outstandingmortgage 0.108*** 0.083** 0.072** 0.102*** 0.162*** 0.144*** 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Incomenlw 1.10E-04*** 5.92E-05*** 5.11E-05*** 4.55E-05** 8.65E-05*** 4.73E-05*** 
  (4.03E-05) (1.55E-05) (1.84E-05) (1.99E-05) (2.37E-05) (1.13E-05) 
Age 0.034*** 0.014** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.037*** 0.017*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Agesquared -3.02E-04*** -1.39E-04** -1.64E-04*** -2.08E-04*** -3.35E-04*** -1.32E-04*** 
  (5.50E-05) (5.85E-05) (5.92E-05) (5.26E-05) (5.38E-05) (4.82E-05) 
Aleveldum 0.043 -0.010 -0.010 0.006 0.039 -0.006 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Degreedum 0.074* 0.003 0.007 0.028 0.019 -0.034 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
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Pensiondum 0.034 0.039 0.025 0.046 0.002 0.009 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Employeedum -0.098* -0.072 -0.081 -0.052 -0.097 -0.042 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Selfemployeddum -0.167** -0.142** -0.109* -0.083 -0.197*** -0.157** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Unemployeddum -0.200** -0.109 -0.136 -0.069 -0.188** -0.163** 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Sexdum 0.035 0.057** 0.041 0.052** 0.052* 0.054** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Maritaldum -0.010 0.008 -0.022 -0.004 0.020 -0.002 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Childdum 0.079** 0.009 0.046 0.091*** 0.085** 0.047 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Londondum -0.016 -0.048 -0.048 -0.022 0.020 0.004 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Constant -1.068*** -0.425*** -0.385** -0.548*** -0.577*** 0.297** 
  (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
Pseudo R2 0.1272 0.1227 0.1589 0.1733 0.1469 0.0393 
No. of observations 2203 1305 1643 1942 2185 2203 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in 
parentheses. Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage are measured in £100,000 in the above regression, whereas 
Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £100,000 respectively.
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Figure 3. 3: Standard Tobit and Censored Quantile Regression Estimates for risky asset 
allocation 
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Figure 3. 4:Standard Tobit and Censored Quantile Regression Estimates for risky asset 
allocation 
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Figure 3. 5:Standard Tobit and Censored Quantile Regression Estimates for risky asset 
allocation 
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Figure 3. 6:Standard Tobit and Censored Quantile Regression Estimates for risky asset 
allocation 
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We discuss different behaviour across the quantiles that is revealed by the 
parameter estimates. Note that a key aspect of the analysis is to identify those departures 
of the quantile coefficients from the conditional mean levels which are significant. Thus, 
in the top right panel of Figure 3.3, we can see that the mean effect of the lagged risky 
asset share (allocation1995), on current risky asset share is 0.5. The results from 
censored quantile regression indicate that this parameter varies significantly according 
to quantile. Broadly we can identify a smaller adjustment parameter in lower quantiles 
while the effect is significantly larger in the upper quantiles.  
Net liquid wealth has a clearly asymmetric impact according to which quantile we 
are investigating. We observe that the impact declines significantly as we move to 
higher quantiles. The non-linear aspect of this relationship is also markedly different at 
the lower quantiles. In the lower quantiles, for example, at the 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 
quantile of the conditional distribution, the net liquid wealth maximizes its effect on 
individual‟s risky asset share when the net liquid wealth approximately equals to 
£56,000, £82,000, £69,000 and £156,000 respectively
24
. When we look at the higher 
quantiles, the optimal point would be reached if the net liquid wealth is equal to a higher 
value, for example, at the 0.8 quantile the risky asset share is increasing if net liquid 
wealth increases from negative value to £250,000, and it falls as if the value of net 
liquid wealth is beyond £250,000. These findings may suggest that if we want to 
encourage individuals to invest a higher proportion of wealth in risky assets, then we 
may focus on increasing net liquid wealth of the individuals who are in the lower 
quantile of the conditional distribution of risky asset shares, because one unit increase in 
                                                          
24
 We can calculate it by using the coefficient of netliquidwealth and netliquidwealthsquared.. 
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the net liquid wealth would have a larger impact on risky asset shares of individuals in 
the lower quantiles than risky asset shares of individuals in the higher quantiles. 
Housing wealth also has a significant differential impact according to the quantile 
examined. However, this is limited to the lowest and highest quantiles. It has a quadratic 
effect on household‟s risky asset shares. In the lower quantiles, for example, at the 0.3 
quantile, the gross housing effect increases as the housing value increases from zero to 
£170,000 and the effect starts to decrease as the housing value is above £170,000. In the 
higher quantiles, the housing effect peaks at a higher housing value. For example, at the 
0.7 quantile, the housing effect reaches its maximum point when the value of the house 
exceeds £210,000. In comparison, the result of Tobit model suggests that the peak point 
is £282,085, which is much higher than the optimal points under the censored quantile 
regressions.  
  The outstanding mortgage loan has positive impact on risky assets shares, as we 
can see from the top right panel of Figure 2 (b). If the total amount of outstanding 
mortgage increases by £100,000, then at the 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, and 0.6 quantile of the 
conditional distribution, the individual‟ risky asset share would increase by roughly 8 
percent in point, whereas at the 0.8 and 0.9 quantile of the conditional distribution, the 
individual‟s risky asset share would increase by 16 percent in point and 14 percent in 
point respectively. This disparity could not be revealed by the Tobit model. The result 
from Tobit model estimated the mean effect of increasing outstanding mortgage loan by 
£100,000 is 11 percent point increase in individual‟s risky asset share.  
 
 120 
 
The income-to -wealth ratio also exhibits differential significant impacts across 
quantiles. Generally we see a smaller positive impact in the middle quantiles. For the 
middle quantiles we observe that age has a differential non-linear impact. 
Unemployment has significant differential impacts in the lowest 4 quantiles. Apart from 
these effects we do not see a particularly clear differential response across the quantiles. 
      
3.3.8 Marginal effects and Robustness 
This section provides robustness tests for the main specifications we estimated in 
the section 3.3.5.  
The model 1 in the following Table 3.11 is our main specification, which is 
regressed on the same explanatory variables as model 2 in Table 3.7, Homoscedastic 
model in Table 3.8, Tobit model in Table 3.9 and Tobit model in Table 3.10. The 
interpretation of the results is, therefore, the same.   
The marginal effects after Tobit regression are also reported Table 3.11. The 
marginal effects measure the expected change in risky asset share as a function of one 
unit increase in the explanatory variable. The second column presents the value of dy/dx 
and the third column presents the average value of the explanatory variable. As we can 
see, an increase of ten percentage point in previous risky asset share (α1995) implies an 
increase in the proportion of net wealth invested in risky assets by 2.44 percentage point 
in 2000. In other words, the expected/predicted portfolio share would increase from 
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26.01 percent25 to 28.45 percent. Similarly, if average net liquid wealth increases by 
£100,000, the expected/predicted risky asset share would increase by 20.7 percentage 
point. An increase of £100,000in personal debt would result in an increase of 60 
percentage point in expected risky asset share. An increase of £100,000 in gross house 
value would result in an increase of 4.9 percentage point in expected risky asset share. If 
average outstanding mortgage increases by £100,000, the expected portfolio share in 
risky asset would increase by 5.4 percentage point. The marginal effect of incomenlw on 
risky asset share is close to zero but is positive and significant. An increase of 10 years 
in average age would increase the expected risky asset share by 15.49 percentage point. 
Because the marginal effect of the dummy variables is measured in terms of discrete 
change of dummy variable from 0 to 1, the results in Table 3.11 suggest that an 
individual whose highest education level is first degree or higher would invest 3.8 
percentage point higher than an individual with whose highest education is an O-level 
or under. Compared with the retirees‟ risky asset share, the risky asset share of 
employees is 5 percentage point less; the risky asset share of self-employed people is 
7.8 percentage point less; the risky asset share of unemployed people is 9.1 percentage 
point less. The presence of chid/children increases the risky asset share by 4 percentage 
point.    
We recognise that some of the explanatory variables are potentially endogenous, 
and this could lead to inconsistent estimators. Therefore, we carry out a two-step 
procedure (Wooldridge, 2002, p532) to test the exogeneity, and we find that there is 
evidence that incomenlw is endogenous in the specification. We assume that 
incomenlw1995, netliquidwealth, personaldebt, housing, outstandingmortgage, age, 
                                                          
25
 Please note this predicted portfolio share is not presented in the Table 3.11. It is part of the results 
we obtain when estimating the marginal effects after Tobit 
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agesquared, aleveldum, degreedum, pensiondum, employeedum, selfemployeddum, 
unemployeddum, sexdum, maritaldum, childdum,and londondum are exogenous in the 
incomenlw equation, therefore these are instruments for incomenlw. We firstly regress 
incomenlw on these variables and get the residual. Then we run the main tobit 
specification with this residual, and we find the coefficient for this residual is -0.013 
with t statistic equals -1.89. Hence, we regress on permanentincome and 
permanentincomenlw in model 2 and 3 in the following Table 3.11, as well as in model 
2,3, 6,7 in Table 3.12, in order to test the robustness of our results. In addition, 
following the two-step procedure, we can not reject other explanatory variables are 
exogenous. Furthermore, there are some literature which do not handle the endogeneity 
issue, for example, Wachter and Yogo (2010), and Cocco (2005).  
In the fourth column of the following Table 3.11, we present the results for 
estimating model 2 where we regress on the ratio of permanent income to net liquid 
wealth (Permanentincomenlw) instead of the ratio of labour income to net liquid wealth 
(Incomenlw). We follow Guariglia‟s (2001) approach to obtain the value of permanent 
income for individuals whose age is between 21 and 65. We use the BHPS data in 1995 
and 2000, and we, firstly, run a random effect model by regressing individuals‟ gross 
labour income on “age, age squared, education dummies, occupational dummies, and 
interactions of the latter two groups of dummies with age and age squared” (Guariglia, 
2001, p627). Then we use the estimated coefficients to predict the permanent income 
for individuals in 1995 and 2000 respectively. Finally, we divide permanent income by 
net liquid wealth to get the ratio. The reason why we regress on Permanentincomenlw is 
that we recognise gross labour income is potentially endogenous which may lead to 
inconsistent estimators. The results for this specification are presented in column four. 
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Because under the current approach, only individuals aged between 21 and 65 can have 
permanent income, so the sample size is reduced to 1708. For comparison, we set up 
model 3 which regresses on Incomenlw but use the same sample. As we can see, in 
terms of sign and significance level, there is no difference between model 2 and model 3, 
although the value of the coefficient is slightly different between these two.  
We also carry out a robustness test by deleting the outliers. We delete the 1% tails 
of all regression variables in model 1 and report the results in the last column of Table 
3.11. As a result, the number of observations is reduced from 2203 to 2081. If we 
compare the results of model 1 and model 4, we find that the results do not change in 
terms of sign and significance level for variables such as α1995, Netliquidwealth, 
Netliquidwealthsquared, Personaldebt, Housing, Housingsquared, 
Outstandingmortgage, Age , Agesquared and Unemployeddum. The positive effects of 
Incomenlw, Degreedum and Childdum which are observed in model 1 are not found in 
model 4.The negative effect of Employeedum are also not found in model 4. The 
negative effect of Selfemployedum becomes less and the significance level is changed 
from 5 percent to 10 percent.
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Table 3. 11:  Marginal effects and robustness tests for the main specification 
  Model 1 
Marginal effects 
Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: 
  
 
regress on 
Pincomenlw 
compare with 
model 2 
control for 
outlier Variables   dy/dx X 
α1995 0.487*** 0.244*** 0.278  0.437*** 0.438*** 0.463*** 
  (0.04) (0.02) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Netliquidwealth 0.522*** 0.262*** 0.134  0.587*** 0.583*** 1.419*** 
  (0.07) (0.04) 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.15) 
Netliquidwealthsquared -0.109*** -0.055*** 0.143  -0.123*** -0.122*** -0.904*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.13) 
Personaldebt 1.197*** 0.600*** 0.015  1.193*** 1.188*** 1.864*** 
  (0.33) (0.17) 
 
(0.33) (0.33) (0.51) 
Housing 0.119*** 0.060*** 0.997  0.056 0.060 0.142*** 
  (0.04) (0.02) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Housingsquared -0.021*** -0.011*** 1.844  -0.011 -0.012 -0.039*** 
  (0.01) (3.95E-03) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Outstandingmortgage 0.108*** 0.054*** 0.251  0.136*** 0.134*** 0.173*** 
  (0.04) (0.02) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Incomenlw 1.10E-04*** 5.51E-05*** 28.482  
 
1.04E-04*** -3.00E-04 
  (4.03E-05) (2.00E-05) 
  
(3.98E-05) (5.78E-04) 
Permanentincomenlw 
   
8.03E-05*** 
  
    
(2.88E-05) 
  Age 0.034*** 0.017*** 49.988  0.041*** 0.041*** 0.026*** 
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  (0.01) (2.83E-03) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Agesquared -3.02E-04*** -1.51E-04*** 2806.470  -3.82E-04*** -3.91E-04*** -2.35E-04*** 
  (5.50E-05) (3.00E-05) 
 
(1.37E-04) (1.37E-04) (5.53E-05) 
Aleveldum 0.043 0.022 0.272  0.031 0.032 0.027 
  (0.03) (0.02) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Degreedum 0.074* 0.038* 0.150  0.074* 0.075* 0.031 
  (0.04) (0.02) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Pensiondum 0.034 0.017 0.473  0.027 0.021 0.015 
  (0.04) (0.02) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Employeedum -0.098* -0.050* 0.609  -0.105 -0.105 -0.072 
  (0.06) (0.03) 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Selfemployeddum -0.167** -0.078*** 0.076  -0.166** -0.157** -0.137* 
  (0.07) (0.03) 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Unemployeddum -0.200** -0.091*** 0.047  -0.242** -0.235** -0.167** 
  (0.08) (0.03) 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Sexdum 0.035 0.017 0.497  0.058* 0.058* 0.026 
  (0.03) (0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Maritaldum -0.010 -0.005 0.619  0.004 0.002 -0.012 
  (0.03) (0.02) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Childdum 0.079** 0.040* 0.200  0.059 0.061 0.066 
  (0.04) (0.02) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Londondum -0.016 -0.008 0.097  0.012 0.010 -0.009 
  (0.05) (0.02) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
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Constant -1.068*** 
  
-1.152*** -1.165*** -0.917*** 
  (0.14)     (0.22) (0.22) (0.15) 
Log likelihood -1748.969  
  
-1351.224  -1350.791  -1617.480  
LR chi2 509.66 
  
380.63 381.50 497.64 
Pro>chi2 0 
  
0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1272     0.1235 0.1237 0.1333 
No. of observations 2203 
  
1708 1708 2081 
Left-censored observations at α2000<=0 957   
737 737 913 
Uncensored observations 1072   846 846 1015 
Right-censored observations at α2000>=1 174     125 125 153 
Note:*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is 
presented in parentheses. Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Outstandingmortgage are measured in £100,000 in the above 
regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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The following Table 3.12 consists two parts. The first part is comprised of model 1 
to model 4 which are all Tobit regressions. The second part is comprised of model 5 to 
model 8 which are all Probit regressions. The difference between these four Tobit 
regressions and the previous main specification in Table 3.11 is that in these four Tobit 
regressions we include variable on gross labour income, variables on the number of 
children aged below 15 in the family and variables on the health of the individual
26
.  
As we can see, compared with the main specification (model 1 in Table 3.11), the 
results in model 1 of Table 3.12 do not change in terms of sign and significance level 
for variables such as α1995, Netliquidwealth, Netliquidwealthsquared,, Personaldebt, 
Housing, Housingsquared, Outstandingmortgage, Incomenlw, Age , Agesquared, 
Degreedum,Selfemployeddum,Unemployeddum and Childdum. Only the coefficient for 
Employeedum becomes statistically insignificant.  
In model 2 of Table 3.12, we regress on Permanentincome and 
Permanentincomenlw instead of Grosslabourincome and Incomenlw. Because only 
individuals aged between 21 and 65 can have permanent income, the sample size is 
reduced to 1708. For comparison, we set up model 3 which regresses on 
Grosslabourincome and Incomenlw but use the same sample. The Table 3.12 suggests 
that in terms of sign and significance level, there is no much difference between model 
2 and model 3, except that in model 2 the coefficients of Degreedum and Sexdum are 
not statistically significant 
                                                          
26
 The health status equals to 1, if the individual is reported in excellent health condition; it equals 2 if 
he/she is in very good health; it equals 3 if he/she is in fair health; it equals 4, if he/she is in poor health; 
it equals 5, if he/she is in very poor health. In addition, in some specification in my thesis, I also use 
youngunhealthdum(defined as age<70 and report very poor health condition), oldunhealthdum (defined 
as age>=70 and report very poor health condition), oldhealthdum(defined as age>=70 and report either 
in excellent, very good, fair or poor health condition) 
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We also carry out a robustness test by controlling for outliers. We delete the 1% 
tails of all regression variables in model 1 and report the results in column four of Table 
5.12. Therefore, the number of observations is reduced from 2203 to 2057. If we 
compare the results of model 1 and model 4, we find that the results do not change in 
terms of sign and significance level for most variables, except that the positive effects of 
Incomenlw, Degreedum and Childdum which are observed in model 1 are not found in 
model 4. 
In addition to the Tobit regressions, from model 5 to model 8 in Table 3.12 we 
report some Probit regressions to examine the factors which determine the probability 
of an individual investing in risky assets. Similar to the Tobit regressions in Table 3.12, 
the Probit regressions also include variable on gross labour income, variables on the 
number of children aged below 15 in the family and variables on the health of the 
individual.  
As we can see from the results of these four Probit regressions, previous 
participation in holding risky assets (Participation1995) has a big impact on the 
participation in 2000. The coefficient of Participation1995 is 0.992, 0.920, 0.918 and 
1.000 in model 5 to model 8 respectively, which is statistically significant. The net 
liquid wealth has inverse-U shape of impact on participation and personal debt has a 
positive impact, both of which are consistent with the findings in Tobit regressions. 
Although the results in model 5 suggests the non-linear impact of gross house value on 
probability of an individual investing in risky assets, only positive impact has been 
found in model 6, 7 and 8. The positive impact of outstanding mortgage has also been 
found in model 8 where we control for outliers. In model 6 we regress on 
Permanentincome and Permanentincomenlw, and we find permanent income has a 
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positive impact on the probability of holding risky assets. Consistent with the findings 
in Tobit regressions, the impact of age is inverse-U shape and the impact of 
unemployment (unemployeddum) is negative in Probit regressions. The results in model 
5 of Table 3.12 also suggest that an individual whose highest education level is first 
degree or higher have a higher probability of investing in risky assets than an individual 
whose highest education is an O-level or under have. This positive impact has also been 
found in model 7 in which all the individuals are aged between 21 and 65. The results in 
model 6 and model 7 suggest that the number of kids in the family have an negative 
impact on probability of investing in risky assets. The results in model 5 and model 8 
suggest that compared with individuals who are young and healthy, individuals who are 
old and unhealthy have much less probability in investing in risky assets. The 
coefficient of oldunhealthdum is -1.147 and -1.277 in model 5 and model 8 
respectively.  
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Table 3. 12: Robustness tests for other specifications which include number of kids and health status 
  Model 1 Model 2: Model 3: Model4: Model 5 Model 6 : Model 7: Model 8: 
  
 
regress on 
pincome, 
pincomenlw 
compare 
with model 
2 
control for 
outliers 
 
regress on 
pincome, 
pincomenlw 
compare 
with model 
6 
control for 
outliers   
  Variables Tobit   Tobit Probit   Probit 
α1995 0.491*** 0.443*** 0.442*** 0.476***   
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)   
   Participation1995 
    
0.992*** 0.920*** 0.918*** 1.000*** 
  
    
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Netliquidwealth 0.520*** 0.581*** 0.585*** 1.418*** 3.124*** 3.450*** 3.484*** 5.618*** 
  (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.31) (0.38) (0.38) (0.50) 
Netliquidwealthsquared -0.108*** -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.880*** -0.586*** -0.640*** -0.648*** -3.376*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.42) 
Personaldebt 1.191*** 1.188*** 1.183*** 1.823*** 3.696*** 3.966*** 3.953*** 5.710*** 
  (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.52) (0.90) (0.94) (0.94) (1.43) 
Housing 0.121*** 0.052 0.061 0.139*** 0.322*** 0.211** 0.225** 0.273** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
Housingsquared -0.021*** -0.011 -0.012 -0.039*** -0.049*** -0.027 -0.029 -0.051 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Outstandingmortgage 0.109*** 0.130*** 0.135*** 0.183*** 0.135 0.141 0.153 0.361** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) 
Grosslabourincome -0.041 
 
-0.046 -0.029 0.149 
 
0.094 0.321 
  (0.13) 
 
(0.14) (0.17) (0.35) 
 
(0.37) (0.43) 
Incomenlw 1.09E-04*** 
 
1.03E-04*** -3.97E-04 1.31E-04 
 
1.25E-04 -0.001 
  (4.02E-05) 
 
(3.98E-05) (5.88E-04) (9.19E-05) 
 
(9.20E-05) -1.23E-03 
Permanentincome 
 
0.578 
  
  1.589* 
    
 
(0.39) 
  
  (0.92) 
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Permanentincomenlw 
 
8.10E-05*** 
  
  4.90E-05 
    
 
(2.88E-05) 
  
  (5.98E-05) 
  Age 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.045*** 0.027*** 0.051*** 0.067** 0.091*** 0.036** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Agesquared -3.30E-04*** -2.93E-04* -4.29E-04*** -2.39E-04*** -.4.79E-04*** -0.001* -9.58E-04*** -3.28E-04** 
  (7.05E-05) (1.61E-04) (1.40E-04) (7.09E-05) (1.52E-04) (3.61E-04) (3.17E-04) (1.56E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.045 1.26E-04 0.033 0.028 0.106 0.002 0.085 0.086 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Degreedum 0.076* 0.015 0.078* 0.034 0.213** 0.047 0.210* 0.155 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) 
Pensiondum 0.034 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.029 -0.009 -0.013 -2.51E-04 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Employeedum -0.090 -0.104 -0.099 -0.064 -0.206 -0.286 -0.311 -0.174 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.14) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) 
Selfemployeddum -0.164** -0.166** -0.159** -0.141** -0.253 -0.374* -0.351 -0.186 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.17) (0.21) (0.22) (0.18) 
Unemployeddum -0.194** -0.237** -0.236** -0.165** -0.406** -0.534** -0.554** -0.357* 
  (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.18) 
Sexdum 0.033 0.048 0.059* 0.024 -0.023 -0.010 0.005 -0.068 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Maritaldum -0.008 0.008 0.003 -0.009 0.015 0.021 0.011 0.037 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Childdum 0.144** 0.129** 0.133** 0.112 0.222 0.202 0.214 0.083 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
numberofkids -0.042 -0.046 -0.046 -0.028 -0.098 -0.116* -0.118* -0.032 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Londondum -0.018 0.012 0.009 -0.008 0.018 0.057 0.042 0.049 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
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youngunhealthdum 0.007 
  
0.010 0.068 
  
0.110 
  (0.14) 
  
(0.14) (0.30) 
  
(0.30) 
oldhealthdum 0.052 
  
0.013 -0.098 
  
-0.169 
  (0.07) 
  
(0.07) (0.17) 
  
(0.18) 
oldunhealthdum -0.348 
  
-0.413* -1.147** 
  
-1.277** 
  (0.23) 
  
(0.23) (0.52) 
  
(0.54) 
Healthstatus -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.046 -0.051 -0.052 -0.043 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -1.103*** -1.064*** -1.213*** -0.936*** -1.902*** -2.143*** -2.429*** -1.646*** 
  (0.16) (0.24) (0.23) (0.16) (0.34) (0.52) (0.49) (0.36) 
Log likelihood -1746.030  -1348.959  -1349.649  -1594.447  -1103.464  -863.860  -864.515  -1017.110  
LR chi2 515.53 385.16 383.78 505.09 809.06 607.91 607 788.14 
Pro>chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1286 0.1249 0.1245 0.1367 0.2683 0.2603 0.2597 0.2792 
No. of observations 2203 1708 1708 2057 2203 1708 1708 2057 
Left-censored 
observations at 
α2000<=0 
957 737 737 906 
  
   Uncensored 
observations 
1072 846 846 999 
  
   Right-censored 
observations at 
α2000>=1 
174 125 125 152 
        
Note:*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is 
presented in parentheses. Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage,Grosslabourincome, and Permanentincome are 
measured in £100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms for  
Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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3.4 Interpretation and Conclusion  
We now turn to interpreting these results and drawing some conclusions. We 
consider firstly our Tobit estimation and then move on to the censored quantile 
regression.  
In the Tobit model we identify a number of variables that have an influence on 
households‟ risky asset selection. Specifically, we find that individuals hold a higher 
share of risky assets when they have higher net liquid wealth. However, this effect is 
non-linear in the sense that for very high wealth households the effect reverses. Similar 
effect has been found in Alan et al.’ (2010) work. They regressed the portfolio share of 
tax-favoured assets on four wealth dummies and reported that the coefficients for these 
four wealth dummies were 0.522, 0.645, 0.689 and 0.634 respectively. Other 
reserachers, for example, Hochguertel et al. (1997), and Wachter and Yogo (2010) who 
regressed on log net-worth found positive impact of wealth. In the context of theory, the 
positive impact of net liquid wealth on risky asset share is consistent with decreasing 
risk aversion as individual‟s become wealthier.  
This link between wealth and asset choice is also observed with housing wealth. 
The inverse-U shape impact of housing wealth on risky asset shares can be explained by 
the overall effect from three sub-effects, namely, the negative house price risk, the 
negative housing consumption-commitment effect and the positive housing wealth 
effect, which we have detailed in the literature survey (chapter 2.7.1). That means if the 
property is worth less than the threshold, the positive housing wealth effect dominants. 
The house value will provide financial security and encourage the households to invest 
in risky assets. In other words, the individual will be less risk averse and be willing to 
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invest in risky assets (ie: take large-payoff gambles) if he/she has large wealth in 
housing and is facing a big negative wealth shock (Chetty and Szeidl, 2007). In contrast, 
if the property is worth larger than the threshold, the negative house price risk and the 
negative housing consumption-commitment effect dominant. The negative house price 
risk effect has been explored by setting up a mean-variance portfolio model (Brueckner, 
1997, Flavin and Yamashita, 2002) and by setting up a lifecycle portfolio model (Cocco, 
2005). The negative housing consumption-commitment effect could come from the 
minimum house size requirement which forces the individual to invest in house and this 
housing investment keeps individual‟s liquid assets at a relatively low level, so he/she 
will choose not to participate in the stock market (Cocco, 2005, p555). 
The positive impact of the ratio of the labour income to net liquid wealth implies 
that as households have more income relative to their wealth they are in a better position 
to meet habit level consumption or respond to really bad economic shocks. Hence they 
can hold a more risky portfolio. Although we have not found any other empirical work 
which regress on this variable of incomenlw, and we have not found effect of gross 
labour income in our regressions such as in Table 3.12, some researchers found positive 
effect of labour income, for example, Cocco (2005) and Alan et al. (2010), and some 
researchers did not (King and Leape 1998). 
 In addition, this study confirms the response of asset choice to age. Specifically, 
as individuals age they increase their share of risky asset, although above a certain age, 
relating to the time of retirement, the risky asset share declines. In the following chapter 
4 we investigate further the impact of retirement on individual asset choice. The positive 
relationship between age and risk-asset share could be explained by risk aversion or 
through habit. In other words as individuals age their habit level of consumption does 
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not grow as quickly as their income and hence risk aversion declines. This positive 
effect of age is consistent with the predication of portfolio theory with habit formation, 
which predicts that habit formation would provide strong motive for the young to save 
in risk-free assets in order to maintain their consumption level above habit for a longer 
horizon and hence invest less in risky assets (Polkovnichenko, 2007; Lax, 2002; Gupta, 
2009). Much empirical evidence are also consistent with our findings that risky asset 
allocations tend to be an inverse U shape or increasing with age, for example, the 
findings in Ameriks and Zeldes (2004), Wachter and Yogo (2010), and Guiso et al. 
(2002). Guiso et al. (2002, pp11) reported that in the UK, Germany and Italy, there is “a 
hump-shaped age profile of participation in risky assets”. The households in those three 
countries have the highest probability of holding risky assets when they are in the age of 
50s, whereas in the Holland, instead of the hump-shaped relationship, age is found to 
have positive impact on households‟ risky asset holdings.  
The impact of retirement on asset choice is also identified through the positive 
effect of the individual having a pension beyond the standard basic state provision. 
Again this is likely to reduce the probability of the household going close to its habit 
level, therefore increasing the willingness to take risk. 
 Education to degree standard provides a positive effect to risky asset share. This 
is unlikely to emanate from risk attitude but is probably a reflection of the ability to 
process information and make rational choices. It does suggest that financial decisions 
are complicated and the more individuals are used to processing such decisions the 
more ability they have to identify the benefits of investing in risky assets. The positive 
impact of education on risky assets share has also been found in some empirical studies. 
(for example, King and Leape 1998; Hochguertel et al.,1997). Alan et al. (2010) only 
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found positive effect of education to high-school, and no effect of college and post 
college education.  
The positive influence of debt (personal debt and outstanding mortgage) also 
suggests that the financial sophistication of the household is a determinant of the extent 
to which they invest in risky assets. For example, Cocco (2005) also found positive 
impact of relative mortgage on portfolio share of stocks.   
The positive impact of the presence of child/children on risky asset choice is 
interesting. It is unclear what drives this effect, although possibly the presence of 
children in a family provides a security for old age which makes households more 
willing to take risk. Note, however, that this effect disappears when we take into 
account possible heteroscedasticity. In addition, we do not find effect of number of 
children on portfolio share of risky assets
27
. In other empirical studies, for example, 
Alan et al. (2010) found positive impact of number of small children on portfolio share 
of tax-favoured assets. 
Finally employment status is seen to be important in the context of a negative 
influence of unemployment and being self-employed. It seems likely that such an effect 
comes from the effect that these two employment states have on the probability of 
falling close to habit level of consumption with the consequent rise in risk aversion.  
The results from the censored quantile regression reveal that, for many of the 
explanatory variable there appears to be no significant difference between the 
conditional mean and quantile estimates of the effects. However, we identify a number 
of interesting results from this analysis. Firstly, for those households at the lower end of 
                                                          
27
 This results can be found in Table 3.12. 
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the conditional distribution we find the coefficient which represents how quickly they 
adjust to the desired portfolio is lower. The explanation for this could be related to 
disproportionately large transaction costs when trading small volumes of asset.  The 
asymmetric impact of net liquid wealth could also be a reflection of transaction costs in 
that households with low shares of risky assets respond much more to net liquid wealth, 
suggesting that this could be an indicator of trade volume.  Alternatively those with 
larger holding of wealth are less likely to approach their habit level of consumption and 
hence can take more risk. Housing wealth has similar effects, although restricted to the 
lowest and highest quantiles. This would tend to suggest support for the habit-based 
explanation since it is difficult to see how transactions costs would be a function of 
housing wealth. Age is observed to have a differential impact on asset holdings. This is 
further support for the importance of habit since we might expect this to vary according 
to an individual‟s age and wealth. The impact of employment status also could be 
driven by habit or just a reflection of the underlying consumption-based model where 
the correlation between labour income and asset return is a key determinant of the 
benefit of holding risky stocks. 
Overall we may observe that our empirical results provide further support for the 
consumption-based view of portfolio selection particularly augmented with habit 
formation in preferences. There are clearly some policy conclusions that can be drawn 
about the way in which portfolios are structured and the extent to which incentives to 
hold a diversified portfolio are constrained by various household characteristics. If we 
would like to promote wealth holding among the lower income groups of society then 
the results of this paper suggest that we need to provide more support to such 
households in terms of financial education and in ensuring that they have a minimum 
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safety net which will protect them should stock returns be low or negative. Whilst we 
do not analyse it here the following chapter 5 considers the impact of the tax system and 
we have further results which may be of interest. 
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4. The Impact of Retirement and Housing on 
Household Risky Asset Choice 
4.1 Introduction 
The research on asset portfolio of the older population has become popular in 
recent years for a number of reasons. Firstly, similar to other EU countries, and more 
generally globally, the UK is experiencing an ageing population (ONS, 2009). Based on 
national population projections in 2008, “the proportion of people aged 65 and over is 
projected to increase from 16 per cent in 2008 to 23 per cent by 2033”, which suggested 
that the expected growth rate of the older population was more than 40 percent (ONS, 
2009). This was largely due to the demographics of baby-boomers, who were born after 
the Second World War up to the mid-1960s (ONS, 2009). 
Secondly, it has been well documented that the elderly in the UK hold large 
amount of financial wealth. Based on survey data from BHPS, in 2005, the median net 
financial wealth was £21,000 for respondents with age between 60 and 69, and £18,503 
for respondents with age of 70 and above. Both figures were considerably higher than 
£11,000 which was the median net financial wealth for the whole sample size of 15,627. 
The overall net financial wealth held by these elderly respondents in the BHPS 2005 
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survey accounted for approximately 50 percent of the total net financial wealth of the 
whole sample. Other research also suggest that not only in the UK, but also in other 
developed nations, for example the US, Canada, and Italy, the elderly holds substantial 
net financial wealth (OECD, 2008). 
These financial assets are regarded as playing an important role in providing 
financial security for the elderly. The elderly may use the financial assets to finance 
their daily consumption when they are retired. In order to smooth their consumption 
overtime, they also may need to use the assets to hedge the financial risk, for example, 
financial risk from “illness or death of a spouse” (Coile and Milligan, 2009, pp227). 
Largely due to the improvements in health and welfare, life expectancies have increased 
in the recent decades. Hence nowadays households would be faced with managing 
larger portfolios over a longer expected investment horizon.  
Clearly, “the shifts in both public and private pension schemes from defined 
benefit to defined contribution plans, such as those seen for employer-provided 
pensions in the US and in the public pension systems of Sweden and the United 
Kingdom” (Coiled and Milligan, 2009, pp247) would also reinforce the argument that 
households have to take more responsibility than before to save and manage their 
portfolios in order to secure and maintain their standard of living during the retirement 
period. Under the defined benefit pension plans, the elderly receive their pensions based 
on their historical salaries and employment durations, which is similar to receiving 
income from investment in risk-free assets in a retirement savings account (see e.g.: 
Campbell et al., 2001, pp440). Whereas under the defined contribution pension plans, 
although the amount of contribution the household needs to pay is defined, the benefit 
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they will receive when they are retired is undefined. The households annuities are 
exposed to investment risk.  
Moreover, household portfolio may also have an impact on stock prices, 
especially the portfolio for baby-boomers who are currently approaching retirement or 
are retired, because the UK has a large population of old individuals and they may 
release their equities to finance their consumptions, which would have “important 
implications for asset markets” (Kedar-Levy, 2006; Coile and Milligan, 2009, pp227).  
As we can see, the asset portfolio starts to play a crucial role in financial security 
for the older population and it has also been considered as having some influence on 
asset markets. Due to all those factors, there is a growing research agenda which has 
explored older households‟ asset allocation, for example the portfolio holdings of the 
older population in the US (Hurd, 2001), the impact of health on the elderly‟ asset 
allocation (Yogo, 2009; Rosen and Wu, 2004; Feinstein and Ho, 2001; Wu, 2003; 
Poterba et al.,2009), as well as the effect of marital history and family status (Ulker, 
2009; Poterba et al.,2009). However, not much attention has been paid to the group of 
individuals who are approaching their retirement age or have just retired and not much 
attention has been paid to investigate whether the event of retirement itself would have 
an impact on individuals‟ saving and investment behaviour. To carry out research on 
this specific group should be of particular interest. The elderly in this group may make 
different portfolio allocation decisions compared with individuals who are still in the 
labour force (Lai, 2008). The downward shift of their income and wealth when they are 
retired is commonly considered as the most influential factor (Hurd, 2001). In addition, 
compared with their labour income prior their retirement, their income streams from 
regular pensions and annuity are normally less correlated with the economic condition, 
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which may encourage them to take relatively high risks in investment ( Hurd, 2000). 
Although the impact of retirement on household asset allocation has not been studied 
yet, early retirement has been predicted to have a positive effect on risky asset 
allocations. Farhi and Panageas (2007) developed a theoretical model which suggests 
that if the agent is given an option to retire early then this option would motivate her to 
save and her optimal portfolio would be “tilted more towards stocks” (Farhi and 
Panageas, 2007, pp89). The reason is that in order to retire early and enjoy more leisure 
time, the individuals are more likely to save more at present and accumulate more 
wealth for their later consumptions during retirement. Investing a higher proportion of 
savings in risky assets is expected to earn higher returns and this would also “bring the 
retirement closer” (Farhi and Panageas, 2007, pp89). If, for example, in the future the 
actual return generated from the stock market does not meet expectation, individuals 
can postpone their retirement so that they can accumulate enough wealth for later 
consumption.   
This theoretical prediction of early retirement effect from Farhi and Panageas‟s 
model is empirically tested in our research. This chapter try to contribute the current 
literature in the following ways. It investigates how the portfolios of the UK individuals 
evolve due to changes in retirement status by using data from the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS). In particular, it examines the impact of retirement and house 
ownership on the share of a household‟s total assets held in risky assets.  
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explores 
the existing literature which examines older household asset allocation and the impact 
of retirement on the risky portfolio that households held. Section 4.3 provides further 
explanation why the BHPS dataset is still considered to be the reasonable survey data 
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used to carry out the analysis in this chapter, followed by a discussion of the research 
methodology and results in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 respectively. The conclusion is 
drawn at the end of the chapter. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
As mentioned before, “baby-boomers”, who were born after the Second World 
War up to the mid-1960s, are approaching their retirement (ONS, 2009). Since these 
elderly hold a large proportion of the UK‟s personal wealth, for example reported as 80% 
in 2004 (Walker, 2004), and these asset portfolios play a crucial part in financial 
security for the elderly and are considered as having some influence on asset markets, 
there is a growing interest in the research area on the asset allocation of the older 
generation (Coile and Milligan, 2009, p228). The common perception is that the young 
generation should invest primarily in equities. As they age, their investment portfolios 
need to be shifted towards a more balanced allocation and when they are old, they 
should invest primarily in bonds (Bali et al., 2009, p817). This strategy is consistent 
with the expectation made in overlapping generation models as in Constantinides et al. 
(2002) and Constantinides and Duffie (1996). Constantinides et al. (2002) suggested 
that in an overlapping generation model with 60 generations, the youngest individuals 
would not invest for several years due to the borrowing constraints, and as they aged, 
they would invest in stocks and bonds. But the proportion of stocks would decrease as 
the investment horizon shrinked and the attractiveness of stocks diminished because of 
high volatility of stock return.  From a theoretical perspective, the model suggested 
that the old generation would release their stock holdings to finance their consumption 
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first. Compared with stocks, bonds were less risky, so bonds would be sold by the older 
households later (Kedar-Levy, 2006, p285). Similar results have been derived in 
Storesletten et al. paper (2001), which also used the OLG model but incorporateed 
individual labour risk and transactions were allowed among different cohorts 
(Kedar-Levy, 2006, p285). Hence, the OLG models predicted that age had a negative 
impact on risky asset allocations. 
However, the theoretical model introduced by Farhi and Panageas (2007) 
predicts that as individuals age, they would invest a higher proportion of wealth in risky 
assets if they were facing a constant investment opportunity set and having constant 
labour income. This predication is consistent with much empirical evidence that risky 
asset allocations tend to be an inverse-U shape or increasing with age, for example, the 
findings in Ameriks and Zeldes (2001). The reason why Farhi and Panageas (2007) can 
have this interesting predication is that in their model, an agent was free to choose 
his/her consumption level, the amount of investments in risky asset and money market 
and importantly, the retirement time was also free to choose but he/she can only work 
full time or choose to retire. When he/she chose to work, his/her labour income was 
fixed. If he/she chose to retire, he/she could no longer enter the labour market again
28
. 
The investment opportunity set was constant in their model and there were no 
borrowing constraints and short selling was permitted. Under these assumptions, in 
order to retire early with sufficient wealth the agent was found to increase his/her 
savings overtime and his /her optimal portfolio would be tilted more towards risky asset. 
In other words, Farhi and Panageas‟s model (2007) may suggest that early retirement 
has a positive impact on risky asset allocations.  
                                                          
28
 Even if the agent is allowed to reenter the labour market with a lower income, the major predications 
are still valid (Farhi and Panageas, 2007).  
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There is significant evidence of the non-linear relationship between age and 
risky asset holdings. By using cross-sectional data, Guiso et al. (2002, pp11) reported 
that in the UK, Germany and Italy, there was “a hump-shaped age profile of 
participation in risky assets”. The households in those three countries had the highest 
probability of holding risky assets when they were in the age of 50s, whereas in the 
Holland, instead of the hump-shaped relationship, age was found to have positive 
impact on households‟ risky asset holdings.  
This non-linear relationship between age and risky asset holdings is consistent 
with the findings in Guiso and Jappelli‟s (2000) work. Guiso and Jappelli (2000) found 
that the proportion of wealth invested in risky assets decreased with age for the elderly 
who were retired (cited in Guiso and Paiella, 2008, p1139). This asset allocation 
behaviour of the elderly can be explained by the factors that were introduced in Hurd‟s 
(2001) work. He explored the portfolio holdings of the older population in the US by 
using the panel survey data of Assets and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old 
(AHEAD). He identified several factors that may influence the elderly in determining 
different portfolio allocation decisions compared with those made by the households 
who were still in the labour force. Firstly, the downward shift of their income and 
wealth when they were retired was commonly considered as the most influential factor. 
Bardasi et al. (2002) reported that, by using the British Household Panel Survey data 
from 1991 to 1999, retirement was significantly correlated with decrease in UK 
households‟ economic wellbeing in terms of their income. This decline in income may 
have an impact on the elderly‟s risk attitudes towards investment in financial assets and 
hence may lead them to rebalance their asset portfolios when they had just entered their 
retirement status (Georgarakos, 2005). Secondly, the flexibility of labour supply from 
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the older population may also have impact on their asset allocation decisions. In the 
Bodie-Merton-Samuelson (BMS) life-cycle model (1992), the labour supply was set to 
be endogenous, which implied that individuals were free to decide the amount of work 
they wanted to do in terms of daily working hours, number of jobs and retirement date, 
and they could adjust their labour supply continuously
29
. The logic in BMS model is 
that, compared with income from equity investment, the income stream from human 
capital is normally less risky, therefore, the greater flexibility of labour supply an 
individual has, the greater proportion of risky assets allocated in his/her portfolio. 
However, the elderly who are retired may have limited ability to go back to work and 
hence may not be able to hedge against the losses from risky asset investment. Thus, 
based on Bodie et al. (1992), the limitation of participation in the labour force for the 
elderly may have negative impact on their intention to invest in risky assets (Bodie and 
Crane, 1997, p15). This might suggest that a greater proportion of older households 
choose a zero risky asset allocation. Furthermore, the old population may have to save 
more in risk-free assets and invest less in risky assets in order to hedge against the risk 
associated with a high level of healthcare expenditure due to the effect of ageing (Hurd, 
2001) , but whether this health concern effect would take place as soon as the individual 
enters the retirement was not investigated.  
 On the other hand, investment in risky assets for the elderly can also be 
affected by other factors which may have a positive impact on it. For example, Hurd 
                                                          
29
 The assumption of adjusting labour supply continuously without cost is not so realistic. “A more 
realistic model would allow limited flexibility in varying labour and leisure…. and analyze the retirement 
problem as an optimal stopping problem and to evaluate the accompanying portfolio effects.” (Bodie et 
al., 1992, p32). For example, the assumptions in Farhi and Panageas’ (2007) paper are more realistic. 
The retirement time is free to choose but he/she can only work full time or choose to retire. When 
he/she chooses to work, his/her labour income is fixed. If he/she chooses to retire, he/she can no longer 
enter the labour market again.  
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(2001) pointed out that the retirees regularly received their pensions and annuity 
incomes, and these income streams may have different risks relative to the risks of 
labour income. The income stream from pensions and annuity were less correlated with 
the economic situation. When the economy was in recession, the probability of losing a 
job was increasing for working people while the probability of not receiving pensions 
was null for retirees. Therefore, to some extent the income stream from pensions and 
annuity were relatively safe and this would encourage the retirees and people who were 
approaching retirement to invest in risky assets so that they could benefit from taking 
sufficient risk in their investment portfolio.  In addition, as mentioned above, the 
intention to accumulate enough wealth for later consumption in retirement could also 
have a positive impact on the elderly‟s risky asset allocations.  
 Although some attention has been made to study the asset allocation behaviour 
of the old population worldwide, there is no such literature that focuses on the impact of 
retirement on risky asset allocation for the elderly, in other words, whether or not the 
retirement itself has effect on the elderly‟ portfolio allocation. Therefore, this chapter 
use BHPS survey data to look closely at the investment decisions of a selected group 
consisting of British households who are approaching their retirement age or have just 
retired. There are three specific hypotheses that we test. The first hypothesis is that early 
retirement has a positive impact on risky asset shares. The second hypothesis is that 
normal retirement also has a positive impact on risky asset shares. The third hypothesis 
is that house ownership would have a positive impact on risky asset shares, in other 
words, the house ownership would provide extra financial security which encourages 
individuals to invest in risky assets.  
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4.3 Data  
The research in this chapter uses the data from the British Household Panel 
Survey, specifically the Survey data collected in 1995 and 2000. The reason why we use 
the BHPS in this chapter is that it not only provides detailed financial wealth and asset 
information on a large number of British households but also information on labour 
market status as well as housing wealth (Banks et al., 2002b).  
Most variables we are going to use in this chapter are similar to those in the 
previous chapter, so for a clear definition please refer to chapter 3.3.2. Just for a 
reminder, we define an individual as being in retirement if he/she reported him/herself 
as being retired in the corresponding BHPS survey. This definition of retirement has 
also been used in other research papers investigating patterns of labour market and 
analysing retirement behaviour (Bardasi et al., 2002, p135). In the survey, the 
respondents are required to assess their labour market status by choosing from a list of 
options, including self-employed, employed, unemployed, retired, maternity leave, 
family care, full-time student, disabled, government training scheme and others.  In 
our later analysis, we classify the household as a retiree only if he/she reported 
himself/herself as being retired. Similarly, working household refers to self-reported as 
being employed.  
We also define the concept of early retirement. If an individual is female and is 
retired before age of 60 then she is classified as early retiree. Similarly, if an individual 
is male and is retired before age of 65 then he is classified as early retiree. We will use 
this definition to define an early retirement dummy variable in our later research in this 
chapter. 
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In addition, in the cross-section studies, the reason why I did not include the 
lagged dependent variable (allocation 1995) in the regression for the year 2000 is 
because I want to make my main specification the same for both cross-section studies. 
In the regression for the year 1995, there is no previous risky asset share data available 
(allocation 1990). The BHPS survey started from 1991. Similar reasons for not using 
the previous period‟s risky asset share in the DD estimation and in the short panel study. 
4.4 Research Methodology 
4.4.1: Cross sectional studies for 1995 and 2000 respectively 
In this chapter, we will first use individual level data from the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) for 1995 and 2000 respectively. Our sample data are constructed 
from both the household files as well as the individual files of the BHPS. We will divide 
the sample into two subsamples, namely house-owner subsample and non-house owner 
subsample. For each subsample, we set up all the control variable as well as two 
retirement dummy variables, called early retirement dummy variable and normal 
retirement dummy variable, in order to examine the impact of retirement in 1995 and 
2000 respectively on portfolio shares in risky assets. For comparison reasons, the whole 
sample in 1995 and 2000 are also used and examined. As we did in the previous chapter, 
diagnostic tests are calculated. By conducting a Lagrange multiplier test (LM test) of 
normality based generalized residuals (Chesher and Irish, 1987), we find the hypothesis 
of normally distributed error is rejected at a conventional significance levels. By 
conducting a conditional moment test (Pagan and Vella, 1989), we also reject the null 
hypothesis of homoskedsticity. Hence, we first set up a standard Tobit model, followed 
by hetroskedastic Tobit model. 
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4.4.2: Control and treatment groups (Difference-in-Difference 
(DD) estimation) 
4.4.2.1: Definition of control and treatment groups under DD 
methods  
We continue to use individual level data from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) for 1995 and 2000. Rather than carrying out cross-sectional studies, now we 
pool the data together and examine the impact of retirement during 1995 and 2000 on 
portfolio shares in risky assets by using the Difference-in-Difference method.  
The simple case of DD method is defined by two groups, namely the treatment 
group and the control group, and two time periods. The treatment group is exposed to a 
treatment in the second period only and the control group is not exposed to the 
treatment in either period (Wooldridge, 2007). The DD method involves subtracting the 
average gain in the control group from the average gain in the treatment group across 
both periods. This method “removes biases in second period comparisons between the 
treatment and control group that could be the result from permanent differences between 
those groups, as well as biases from comparisons over time in the treatment group that 
could be the result of trends” (Wooldridge, 2007). A more detailed explanation of the 
DD approach can be found in later section 4.4.2.3.  
Before we run the DD estimation, we need to define our treatment and control 
groups using the BHPS dataset. If he /she was employed in 1995 and was reported as 
being retired in 2000, then he/she would be regarded as a member of our treatment 
group. If the individual household was employed in 1995 and 2000, then he/she is 
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classified as in the control group. Because we drop the observations when there is a 
missing value for our independent variable or any control variable, as we can see from 
Table 4.1, our treatment group consists of 86 respondents and control group consists of 
907 respondents, which give us 993 respondents in total
30
. Since we expect a 
homeowner‟s demographic and economic variables would be quite different from a 
non-homeowner‟s, we divide the whole sample into two subsamples, one for house 
owners and the other for non-house owners. The former subsample consists of 73 
respondents in the treatment group and 812 respondents in the control group. The latter 
subsample consists of 13 respondents in the treatment group and 95 respondents in the 
control group. Here we define a respondent as a house owner if he/she was living in a 
family that own the accommodation, no matter if the accommodation was owned 
outright or was still on mortgage. The outright owners could own the property through 
different means, including by a lump-sum payment, paying off their mortgage loans, 
and inheritance. A non-house owner is defined as a respondent who was living in a 
family that does not own the property and he/she may pay the rent to live.  
 
Table 4. 1: Number of Observations for Treatment Group and Control Group in 
Different Sample 
No. of observation Treatment group Control group 
Total sample 86 907 
House owner subsample 73 812 
Non-house owner subsample 13 95 
 
                                                          
30
 In our earlier research, we have fewer control variables; hence the sample size is bigger. If we control 
for age, gender, gross income, gross housing value, net liquid wealth and personal debt only, then our 
treatment group consists of 106 respondents and control group consists of 1447 respondents, which 
give us 1553 respondents in total. We will present the results of the regression adjusted DD regression 
for this larger sample size in later section 4.5.3 Table 4.21. 
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4.4.2.2: Descriptive statistics for each group  
The original summary data for the whole sample, the house owner sub-sample and 
non-house owner subsample are presented in Table (A), Table (B) and Table (C) 
respectively in the appendix. The following Table 4.2 is derived from Table (A), Table 
(B) and Table (C), which provides a better way of summarizing the data. If we look at 
the variable allocation first, which measures the individual‟s risky asset allocation, 
Table 4.2 suggests that in the whole sample the average risky asset allocation for the 
treatment group is higher than the average risky asset allocation for the control group in 
1995 and 2000. In addition, from 1995 to 2000, the treatment group in the whole sample 
had an increase in average risky asset allocation, so did the control group in the whole 
sample. Notably, we have similar findings in the house owner sub-sample, but not in the 
non-house owner subsample. In the non-house owner subsample, although in 2000 
individual‟s average risky asset allocation for treatment group is higher than the average 
risky asset allocation for control group, it is not the case in 1995. In 1995, the average 
risky asset allocation for the treatment group in the non-house owner sample is 19 
percent, whereas for the control group in the non-house owner sample is 22 percent. The 
former increase to 41 percent in 2000, but the latter decrease slightly to 20 percent in 
2000. In sum, as we can see, although there are increases of investment in risky assets 
for both groups in the house owner subsample, the proportion of increase for the 
treatment group members is less than that for the control group members. In contrast, in 
the non-house owner subsample, the average risky asset allocation actually increases 
significantly for the treatment group but it falls for the control group in 2000. Surely 
there are many factors that would have an impact on generating those differences, this 
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chapter try to examine whether retirement itself could play a role in explaining the 
differences.    
The value of net liquid wealth, as we can see from Table 4.2, increases from 1995 
to 2000 for all control groups. In other words, the control group for the total sample has 
an average net liquid wealth of £7,940 in 1995 and it increases to £10,180 in 2000; the 
average net liquid wealth for the control group in the house owner sub-sample increases 
from £8,450 in 1995 to £10,180 in 2000; in the non-house owner subsample, the net 
liquid wealth for the control group has an average value of £3,570 in 1995 which rise to 
£4,880 in 2000. In comparison, in the non-house owner sub-sample as well as in the 
whole sample, the individuals who are in the treatment group are found to have less net 
liquid wealth in 2000 than in 1995. In addition, the individuals in the treatment group of 
the house owner sub-sample are having roughly the same average amount of net liquid 
wealth in both years. Another finding is that, on average, the house owners have much 
higher net liquid wealth than the non-house owners have regardless of labour force 
participation status and year.  
Table 4.2 also suggests that the average amount of personal debt for house owners 
is generally higher than that for non-house owners. In both subsamples, the average 
personal debt for the treatment group decreases from 1995 to 2000, whereas the 
personal debt for the control group increases. It seems that approaching retirement or 
being retired would encourage individuals to reduce their personal debts, whereas 
staying in the labour force would encourage individuals to continue accumulating debts. 
From 1995 to 2000, the average gross housing value for the house owners in the 
treatment group increases by 65 percent from £80,830 to £133,110, and meanwhile,  
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the average gross house value for the house owners in the control group increases by 67 
percent from £72,390 to £120,870. 
An outstanding mortgage loan, which is defined as total outstanding mortgage loan 
of current living property and other properties, may not be zero for an individual who is 
a non-house owner because a non-house owner is defined as an individual who is living 
in a family that does not own the property they reside in and he/she may pay the rent to 
live. Therefore, there is a possibility that a non-house owner actually is paying mortgage 
on another property or properties. This could help us to explain why, in Table 4.2, the 
average outstanding mortgage loan for the treatment group in the non-house owner 
subsample is zero in 1995 and it increases to £2,460 in 2000. For the treatment group in 
the house owner subsample, the average outstanding mortgage loan drops significantly 
from £8,100 to £3,740. Compared with the treatment group in the house owner 
subsample, the control group in the house owner subsample has much higher average 
outstanding mortgage loan of £34,900 in 1995 and £38,620 in 2000.  
The average gross labour income for the treatment group in the house owner 
subsample is £15,730 in 1995 and it falls to £260 in 2000 due to retirement. The reason 
why the average annual labour income of these respondents is still positive in 2000 
could be that the retirement of some respondents take place sometime during the 2000. 
In contrast, in the same house owner subsample, the control group has an average gross 
labour income of £16,790 in 1995 and this increases to £20,780 in 2000. For the non- 
house owner subsample, similar patterns have been found. The treatment group receive 
no labour income after retirement and the control group receive an increased average 
labour income in 2000. The difference between these two subsamples is that, on average, 
house owners earn higher labour income than non house owners in each year.  
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Incomenlw, which measures the gross labour income to net liquid wealth ratio, has 
an average value of 85.79 for the treatment group in the house owner subsample in 1995 
and falls to -0.02 after retirement in 2000. The control group in the same subsample has 
29.67 in 1995 and it increased to 43.73 in 2000. For the non-house owner subsample, 
the treatment group drops its average Incomenlw from 68.79 to zero, whereas the 
control group increases the ratio from 38.37 to 210.45. However, as we can see from 
Table 4.2, the standard errors of the average values for this ratio are quite high, so we 
have to interpret these average values with caution.   
 Table 4.2 also suggests that no matter in the house owner subsample or in the 
non-house owner subsample, respondents in the treatment group are older than 
respondents in the control group. The average age for the treatment group in the whole 
sample is 58 in 1995 and it increases to 63 in 2000. The average age for the control 
group in the whole sample is 38 in 1995 and it increases to 43 in 2000.  
In terms of education, we find that if a respondent was in the treatment group, then 
he/she would report the same highest education level in 2000 as it in 1995, no matter 
he/she is house owner or not. However, for the control group, we have a different 
situation. For the control group in the whole subsample, the dummy variable 
olevelorunderdum has an average value of 0.51 in 1995 and it reduces to 0.48 in 2000. 
This implies that for the control group in the whole sample there is 51 percent of 
respondents having O-levels or under as their highest level of qualification in 1995. 
This proportion drops to 48 percent in 2000. Meanwhile, for the same group, from 1995 
to 2000, the proportion of respondents having an A-level or equivalent as their highest 
level of qualification increases from 33 percent to 34 percent, and the proportion of 
respondents having a degree level or higher as their highest level of qualification 
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increases from 16 percent to 18 percent. In addition, for the control group in the house 
owner subsample and in the non-house owner subsample, we have similar findings for 
these education variables.   
Pensiondum, a dummy variable which equals one if the respondent is involved in 
public or/and private pension schemes, is also summarized in Table 4.2. As we can see, 
the average value of pensiondum for the treatment group in the house owner subsample 
is 0.64 in 1995 and it falls to zero in 2000 after retirement. In other words, 64 percent of 
respondents in this group is involved in pension schemes in 1995 when they are 
employed and zero percent of respondents is involved in pension schemes in 2000 
because no contribution is needed after retirement. In contrast, in the same house owner 
subsample, the control group has an average of 75 percent in pension participation in 
1995 and this increases to 79 percent in 2000. For the non-house owner subsample, 
similar patterns have been found. The treatment group does not involve in pension 
schemes after retirement and the control group has an increased average pension 
participation rate in 2000. Notably, the difference between these two subsamples is that, 
on average, the pension participation rate is higher for house owners than that for non 
house owners in each year.  
The four dummy variables for different labour market status are clearly presented 
in Table 4.2. Employeedum equals 1 for all treatment groups in 1995 and for all control 
groups in 1995 and 2000, no matter the groups are in the whole sample or in the two 
subsamples. Retireddum equals 1 for all treatment groups in 2000, including groups in 
the whole sample and two subsamples. The summaries for the selfemployeddum and 
unemployeddum suggest that we only consider two labour market status here, and 
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respondents with other labour market status, such as self employed or unemployed, are 
not included in our sample.  
As we know, in the whole sample, we have two groups, namely, the treatment 
group and the control group. In the former group, 53 percent of the respondents are 
male, whereas in the latter group, 51 percent of the respondents are male. In the house 
owner subsample, 56 percent of the respondents in the treatment group are male and 52 
percent in the control group are male. In comparison, in the non-house owner subsample, 
38 percent of the respondents in the treatment group are male and 39 percent in the 
control group are male. 
In terms of marital status, Table 4.2 suggests that no matter in which sample, there 
is a higher proportion of married respondents in the treatment group than that in the 
control group. In addition, for each group in the house owner subsample, there is a 
higher proportion of married respondents than that in the corresponding group in 
non-house owner subsample.  
As we can see from Table 4.2, in the house owner subsample there is only 3 
percent of respondents in the treatment group having one or more children with age 
under 12 in the family in 1995 and this proportion reduces to 1 percent in 2000, whereas 
in the control group in the same subsample the proportion is 31 percent in 1995 and the 
same proportion remains in 2000. Similarly, in the non-house owner subsample, the 
control group has a higher proportion of respondents with young child/children in the 
family than the treatment group in each year.  
The summaries for the dummy variable, Londondum, suggests that in the whole 
sample there is 8 percent of respondents in the treatment group living in greater London 
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in 1995 and this proportion falls to 6 percent in 2000. Still in the whole sample, the 
proportion of respondents living in greater London in control group also drops from 11 
percent to 10 percent. For the house owner subsample, the proportion drops for both 
groups from 1995 to 2000, while for the non-house owner subsample, the proportion 
dropped for the control group and it remains at zero for the treatment group. 
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Table 4. 2:Descriptive Statistics 
  
Treatment group 
 
Control group 
 
Sample Variable Mean   
Std. 
Dev.   Mean   
Std. 
Dev.   
The whole sample allocation1995 0.36 [ 0.37 ] 0.28 [ 0.37 ] 
 
allocation2000 0.41 [ 0.38 ] 0.31 [ 0.37 ] 
House owner 
subsample allocation1995 0.39 [ 0.37 ] 0.28 [ 0.37 ] 
 
allocation2000 0.41 [ 0.37 ] 0.32 [ 0.37 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample allocation1995 0.19 [ 0.31 ] 0.22 [ 0.37 ] 
  allocation2000 0.41 [ 0.43 ] 0.20 [ 0.35 ] 
                    
The whole sample netliquidwealth1995 36.21 [ 77.87 ] 7.94 [ 30.00 ] 
 
netliquidwealth2000 35.97 [ 69.25 ] 10.18 [ 29.59 ] 
House owner 
subsample netliquidwealth1995 41.17 [ 83.42 ] 8.45 [ 31.52 ] 
 
netliquidwealth2000 41.26 [ 73.95 ] 10.80 [ 30.91 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample netliquidwealth1995 8.34 [ 14.37 ] 3.57 [ 8.85 ] 
  netliquidwealth2000 6.25 [ 5.58 ] 4.88 [ 12.64 ] 
                    
The whole sample personaldebt1995 0.55 [ 1.12 ] 1.19 [ 2.44 ] 
 
personaldebt2000 0.08 [ 0.34 ] 2.03 [ 5.24 ] 
House owner 
subsample personaldebt1995 0.65 [ 1.19 ] 1.26 [ 2.52 ] 
 
personaldebt2000 0.09 [ 0.37 ] 2.11 [ 5.41 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample personaldebt1995 0.02 [ 0.06 ] 0.61 [ 1.42 ] 
  personaldebt2000 0 [ 0 ] 1.39 [ 3.38 ] 
                    
The whole sample housing1995 68.61 [ 49.01 ] 64.81 [ 45.45 ] 
 
housing2000 112.99 [ 98.53 ] 108.21 [ 91.70 ] 
House owner 
subsample housing1995 80.83 [ 42.83 ] 72.39 [ 41.94 ] 
 
housing2000 133.11 [ 93.51 ] 120.87 [ 88.67 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample housing1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
  housing2000 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
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The whole sample 
outstandingmortgag
e1995 
6.88 [ 14.98 ] 31.30 [ 31.67 ] 
 
outstandingmortgag
e2000 
3.55 [ 11.51 ] 34.69 [ 38.77 ] 
House owner 
subsample 
outstandingmortgag
e1995 8.10 [ 15.97 ] 34.90 [ 31.51 ] 
 
outstandingmortgag
e2000 3.74 [ 11.96 ] 38.62 [ 39.06 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample 
outstandingmortgag
e1995 0 [ 0 ] 0.57 [ 5.54 ] 
  
outstandingmortgag
e2000 2.46 [ 8.88 ] 1.09 [ 7.12 ] 
                    
The whole sample grossincome1995 14.35 [ 11.67 ] 16.13 [ 12.56 ] 
 
grossincome2000 0.22 [ 1.40 ] 19.87 [ 15.09 ] 
House owner 
subsample grossincome1995 15.73 [ 12.05 ] 16.79 [ 12.89 ] 
 
grossincome2000 0.26 [ 1.52 ] 20.78 [ 15.47 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample grossincome1995 6.59 [ 4.01 ] 10.50 [ 7.15 ] 
  grossincome2000 0.00 [ 0.00 ] 12.10 [ 7.87 ] 
                    
The whole sample incomenlw1995 83.22 [ 678.59 ] 30.58 [ 280.59 ] 
 
incomenlw2000 -0.01 [ 0.74 ] 61.19 [ 653.00 ] 
House owner 
subsample incomenlw1995 85.79 [ 730.89 ] 29.67 [ 277.52 ] 
 
incomenlw2000 -0.02 [ 0.81 ] 43.73 [ 435.74 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample incomenlw1995 68.79 [ 237.14 ] 38.37 [ 307.09 ] 
  incomenlw2000 0.00 [ 0.00 ] 210.45 [ 
1564.1
7 ] 
                    
The whole sample age1995 57.90 [ 6.04 ] 37.84 [ 10.42 ] 
 
age2000 63.06 [ 6.02 ] 43.02 [ 10.41 ] 
House owner 
subsample age1995 57.37 [ 6.21 ] 37.88 [ 10.05 ] 
 
age2000 62.52 [ 6.18 ] 43.05 [ 10.04 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample age1995 60.85 [ 3.93 ] 37.45 [ 13.21 ] 
  age2000 66.08 [ 3.93 ] 42.73 [ 13.17 ] 
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The whole sample 
olevelorunderdum19
95 
0.80 [ 0.40 ] 0.51 [ 0.50 ] 
 
olevelorunderdum20
00 
0.80 [ 0.40 ] 0.48 [ 0.50 ] 
House owner 
subsample 
olevelorunderdum19
95 0.79 [ 0.41 ] 0.49 [ 0.50 ] 
 
olevelorunderdum20
00 0.79 [ 0.41 ] 0.46 [ 0.50 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample 
olevelorunderdum19
95 0.85 [ 0.38 ] 0.71 [ 0.46 ] 
  
olevelorunderdum20
00 0.85 [ 0.38 ] 0.67 [ 0.47 ] 
                    
The whole sample aleveldum1995 0.10 [ 0.31 ] 0.33 [ 0.47 ] 
 
aleveldum2000 0.10 [ 0.31 ] 0.34 [ 0.47 ] 
House owner 
subsample aleveldum1995 0.10 [ 0.30 ] 0.34 [ 0.47 ] 
 
aleveldum2000 0.10 [ 0.30 ] 0.35 [ 0.48 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample aleveldum1995 0.15 [ 0.38 ] 0.19 [ 0.39 ] 
  aleveldum2000 0.15 [ 0.38 ] 0.21 [ 0.41 ] 
                    
The whole sample degreedum1995 0.09 [ 0.29 ] 0.16 [ 0.37 ] 
 
degreedum2000 0.09 [ 0.29 ] 0.18 [ 0.39 ] 
House owner 
subsample degreedum1995 0.11 [ 0.31 ] 0.17 [ 0.37 ] 
 
degreedum2000 0.11 [ 0.31 ] 0.19 [ 0.39 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample degreedum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0.11 [ 0.31 ] 
  degreedum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0.12 [ 0.32 ] 
                    
The whole sample pensiondum1995 0.60 [ 0.49 ] 0.72 [ 0.45 ] 
 
pensiondum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0.77 [ 0.42 ] 
House owner 
subsample pensiondum1995 0.64 [ 0.48 ] 0.75 [ 0.43 ] 
 
pensiondum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0.79 [ 0.41 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample pensiondum1995 0.38 [ 0.51 ] 0.49 [ 0.50 ] 
  pensiondum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0.61 [ 0.49 ] 
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The whole sample employeedum1995 1 [ 0 ] 1 [ 0 ] 
 
employeedum2000 0 [ 0 ] 1 [ 0 ] 
House owner 
subsample employeedum1995 1 [ 0 ] 1 [ 0 ] 
 
employeedum2000 0 [ 0 ] 1 [ 0 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample employeedum1995 1 [ 0 ] 1 [ 0 ] 
  employeedum2000 0 [ 0 ] 1 [ 0 ] 
                    
The whole sample 
selfemployeddum19
95 
0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
 
selfemployeddum20
00 
0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
House owner 
subsample 
selfemployeddum19
95 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
 
selfemployeddum20
00 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample 
selfemployeddum19
95 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
  
selfemployeddum20
00 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
                    
The whole sample retireddum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
 
retireddum2000 1 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
House owner 
subsample retireddum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
 
retireddum2000 1 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample retireddum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
  retireddum2000 1 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
                    
The whole sample 
unemployeddum199
5 
0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
 
unemployeddum200
0 
0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
House owner 
subsample 
unemployeddum199
5 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
 
unemployeddum200
0 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample 
unemployeddum199
5 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
  
unemployeddum200
0 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
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The whole sample sexdum1995 0.53 [ 0.50 ] 0.51 [ 0.50 ] 
 
sexdum2000 0.53 [ 0.50 ] 0.51 [ 0.50 ] 
House owner 
subsample sexdum1995 0.56 [ 0.50 ] 0.52 [ 0.50 ] 
 
sexdum2000 0.56 [ 0.50 ] 0.52 [ 0.50 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample sexdum1995 0.38 [ 0.51 ] 0.39 [ 0.49 ] 
  sexdum2000 0.38 [ 0.51 ] 0.39 [ 0.49 ] 
                    
The whole sample maritaldum1995 0.72 [ 0.45 ] 0.66 [ 0.47 ] 
 
maritaldum2000 0.71 [ 0.46 ] 0.68 [ 0.46 ] 
House owner 
subsample maritaldum1995 0.75 [ 0.43 ] 0.69 [ 0.46 ] 
 
maritaldum2000 0.74 [ 0.44 ] 0.72 [ 0.45 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample maritaldum1995 0.54 [ 0.52 ] 0.38 [ 0.49 ] 
  maritaldum2000 0.54 [ 0.52 ] 0.35 [ 0.48 ] 
                    
The whole sample childdum1995 0.02 [ 0.15 ] 0.30 [ 0.46 ] 
 
childdum2000 0.02 [ 0.15 ] 0.29 [ 0.46 ] 
House owner 
subsample childdum1995 0.03 [ 0.16 ] 0.31 [ 0.46 ] 
 
childdum2000 0.01 [ 0.12 ] 0.31 [ 0.46 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample childdum1995 0.00 [ 0.00 ] 0.21 [ 0.41 ] 
  childdum2000 0.08 [ 0.28 ] 0.17 [ 0.38 ] 
                    
The whole sample londondum1995 0.08 [ 0.28 ] 0.11 [ 0.31 ] 
 
londondum2000 0.06 [ 0.24 ] 0.10 [ 0.31 ] 
House owner 
subsample londondum1995 0.10 [ 0.30 ] 0.11 [ 0.31 ] 
 
londondum2000 0.07 [ 0.25 ] 0.10 [ 0.30 ] 
Non house owner 
subsample londondum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0.13 [ 0.33 ] 
  londondum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0.12 [ 0.32 ] 
Note: standard errors are in square brackets..  
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage are measured in £1,000 in the 
above regression, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms 
for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £1,000 respectively.  
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4.4.2.3: The fundamental concept behind the 
difference-in-difference (DD) estimation  
The fundamental concept behind the difference-in-difference (DD) estimation can 
be explained by using Table 4.3. Suppose PA1 and PA2 represents the average portfolio 
share in risky assets for the control group in the whole sample in 1995 and 2000 
respectively, and PA3 and PA4 denotes the average portfolio share in risky assets for 
treatment group in the whole in 1995 and 2000 respectively:  
Table 4. 3:Simple illustration for DD methods 
  Control group (dumtreatment=0) 
Treatment group 
(dumtreatment=1) 
1995 
PA1 PA3  (timedummy=0) 
2000  
PA2 PA4 (timedummy=1) 
 
The change in portfolio share for the treatment group over 1995 and 2000 is 
PA4-PA3. Some of this change may be attributed to the change in the labour force 
participation status and the other part is due to external factors, for example changes in 
interest rates. The assumption we made for the DD estimator is that individuals in the 
control group reflect those external factors in the change in their portfolio share, which 
is denoted as PA2-PA1. This “common trends” assumption is a fundamental concept of 
DD estimation. Therefore, an estimate of the impact of retirement on the portfolio 
allocation in the treatment group is (PA4-PA3)- (PA2-PA1). In other words, basically 
we need to compare the portfolio share change of individual who are in the transition 
period to retirement with that of individuals who are employed all the time, under the 
assumption that they would have reallocated their portfolio share in the same way and 
same amount in the absence of changes in labour force participation status.  
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However, the “common trends” assumption may not be satisfied, because the 
control group and treatment group may “differ in time trends of either observable or 
unobservable characteristics or both” Crossley and Jeon, 2007, p355). As we have 
already seen in section 4.4.2.2, many observable factors, such as net liquid wealth, 
personal debt, gross housing value, outstanding mortgage loans and gross labour income, 
had different average values for the control group and the treatment group in 1995 and 
2000. These observable group characteristics or other unobservable group 
characteristics or both can explain the difference between the changes in portfolio 
shares which refers to (PA4-PA3)- (PA2-PA1). A possible remedy is to carry out a 
regression-adjusted DD estimation. By controlling for the relevant and observable 
factors, this remedy would reduce the bias that is caused by the different changes over 
time in the observable characteristics between the control group and the treatment group 
(Meyer, 1995; Crossley and Jeon, 2007). Meyer (1995) also points out that compared 
with a simple DD estimation approach, this regression-adjusted DD estimation method 
would lead to more efficient estimates.  
In addition, Wooldridge (2002, p130) also pointed out that in most situations, extra 
explanatory variables were needed in the simple DD model, because in the simple DD 
model, “unbiasedness of the DD estimator requires that the policy change not be 
systematically related to other factors that affect the dependent variable ( and are hidden 
in the error term)”. In comparison, in the regression-adjusted DD model, adding extra 
explanatory variables “allows for the possibility that the random samples within a group 
have systematically different characteristics in the two time periods” (Wooldridge, 2002, 
p130).  
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Therefore, besides running the following simple DD regression,  
*
it = 0 + 1 idumtreatment + 2 ttimedummy + 3( * )ittimedummy dumtreatment + it , 
2~ (0, )it N  ,                                                                           (1)                                                                                                                                     
where 
1
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we would also augment it with regression-adjusted DD estimation, which is specified as 
follows: 
*
it = 0 + 1 idumtreatment + 2 ttimedummy + 3( * )ittimedummy dumtreatment + 4 itX +
it , 
2~ (0, )it N  ,                                                                      (2) 
where  
1
10
0
1
0
*
*
*
*
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 . 
Since our portfolio allocation data are left censored at zero if the respondent does 
not invest in the risky assets, and are right censored at one if the respondent invest all 
his/her wealth in the risky assets, we estimate via a Tobit regression which allows for 
data censoring both at zero and one. In this estimation, the portfolio share, αit*, is the 
latent variable which indicates the proportion of personal wealth that would notionally 
be invested in the risky assets. We control for a series of socioeconomic and 
demographic variables, including net liquid wealth, personal debt, gross housing value, 
outstanding mortgage loan, gross labour income, gross labour income to net liquid 
wealth ratio, age, education, pension participation, gender, marital status, children and 
regional dummy variable. All these control variables are given by Xit  in equation 2 and 
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the detailed definition for each variable are the same as in the earlier chapter 3 and can 
be referred back to section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3. In later sections, we will run simple DD 
estimation and regression-adjusted DD estimation for the whole sample as well as the 
two subsamples, namely the house owner subsample and the non-house owner 
subsample. We expect that the estimation results would be different for these two 
subsamples since we have observed that respondents in these two subsamples clearly 
possessed different socioeconomic status. Hence, for the whole sample and for the 
house owner subsample, we would control for all the variables we mentioned above, but 
for the non-house owner subsample, we could omit the variable of gross housing value. 
In chapter 3, we have identified that these factors have an impact on households‟ 
risky asset allocation and hence this explains our choice of control variables in equation 
2. Note that gross labour income refers to the households‟ annual labour income only. 
Income from savings and investments are not included in order to avoid potential 
endogeneity problem of the portfolio share and income variables; dumtreatment is a 
dummy variable which equals to one if the respondent is in the treatment group, in other 
words, if the respondent was reported as being retired in 2000 but being employed in 
1995. It captures “possible differences between the treatment and control groups prior to 
the policy change” (Wooldridge, 2007, p3), where policy change refers to the change in 
labour force participation status. The sign of coefficient β1 in equation 2 is not easy to 
predict, because as can been seen in Table 4.2, the respondents in the treatment group 
tend to be older, owe relatively less debt and their average annual labour income drop 
dramatically in 2000. However, they have much higher average net liquid wealth than 
individuals in the control group over 1995 and 2000 respectively. This economic 
condition would make the households‟ investment decision much more unpredictable. 
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Reduced income is supposed to have a negative impact on investment in risky assets, 
whereas the effect of higher net financial wealth on the risky asset allocation could be 
positive. If households have high net financial wealth, then they may be more willing to 
take risk and hence invest a higher proportion of wealth in risky assets.  
In equation 2, the dummy variable timedummy equals to one for 2000 and equals to 
zero for 1995. This dummy variable captures “aggregate factors that would cause 
changes in y even in the absence of a policy change” (Wooldridge, 2007, p3).  Its 
coefficient,  2, is expected to be negative if the respondents were able to foresee stock 
market crash. In order to examine the effect of retirement on households‟ risk portfolio 
allocation, we need to examine to what extent the treatment group change their portfolio 
shares relatively to the control group. The sign of  3, which is the coefficient of variable 
timedummydumtreatment, would reveal whether retirement has a positive or negative 
impact on portfolio share in risky assets.  
4.4.3 Short panel study on the joint impact of retirement and 
housing ownership 
In this chapter, we will also carry out a short panel study on the joint impact of 
retirement and house ownership by using 1995 and 2000 BHPS data. We control all the 
relevant economical and demographical variables and set up three dummy variables, 
namely Dumhosuingr, Dumhousingw, Dumnonhousingr. Dumnonhousingw is omitted 
to avoid multicolinearlity in the estimation. The definitions for these four variables are 
as follows. Dumhosuingr equals one if in both years the individual is retired and is 
living in an accommodation that is owned by him/her or by his family. It equals zero if 
otherwise. Dumhousingw equals one if in both years the individual is employed and is 
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living in an accommodation that is owned by him/her or by his family. It equals zero if 
otherwise. Dumnonhousingr equals one if in both years the individual is retired and is 
living in an accommodation that is not owned by him/her or by his family. It equals zero 
if otherwise. Dumnonhousingw equals one if in both years the individual is employed 
and is living in an accommodation that is not owned by him/her or by his family. It 
equals zero if otherwise. 
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4.5 Estimation Results   
4.5.1 cross-sectional estimations for 1995 and 2000 
respectively31 
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 present the standard homoscedastic Tobit estimation 
results for the whole sample and two subsamples using 1995 BHPS data and using 2000 
BHPS data respectively. Table 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 show the standard homoscedastic Tobit 
and heteroscedastic Tobit estimation results for the whole sample, house-owner 
subsample and non house-owner subsample respectively based on 1995 of BHPS data. 
Whereas Table 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 describe the standard homoscedastic Tobit and 
heteroscedastic Tobit estimation results for the whole sample, house-owner subsample 
and non house-owner subsample respectively based on 2000 of BHPS data. 
As we can see, all else equal, in 1995, for the whole sample, the first column in 
Table 4.4 and the first column in Table 4.6 show that if the individual opt for early 
retirement, then his/her average risky asset share will increase by 13.6 percentage point. 
Even the normal retirement will increase the average risky asset share by 3.3 percentage 
point, although these effects are not statistically significant. If we control for the 
heteroscedastic problem, as in Table 4.6, both the early retirement and normal 
retirement still have a positive impacts. The former increases the average risky asset 
share by 7.4 percentage point and the latter increases it by 2.3 percentage point, which is 
present in Table 4.6, although, again, these effects are not statistically significant. 
                                                          
31
 We also set up a probit model which regresses the early retirement dummy variable on risky asset 
shares while controling for social and demographical factors, but the results is in conclusive.   
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For the house-owner subsample in 1995, all else equal, the second column in Table 
4.4 and the first column in Table 4.7 suggest that having retired early will increase an 
individual‟s average risky asset share by 21 percentage point, and this effect is 
significantly from zero at the 5% level. In comparison, normal retirement will only 
increase the average risky asset share by 4.8 percentage point and it is not statistically 
significant. After controlling for the heteroscedastic problem, the early retirement‟s 
effect is reduce to 10.1 percentage point and normal retirement effect is dropped to 
0.0116 percentage point. Both effects are statistically insignificant. 
For the non house-owner subsample in 1995, all else equal, the third column in 
Table 4.4 and the first column in Table 4.8 tell us that both early retirement and normal 
retirement would have no effect on risky asset shares for individuals without housing 
ownership. This results remains if we control for the heteroscedastic problem, as we can 
see from the results in Table 4.8.  
We also notice that for the non house-owner subsample, a pension has a very 
significant positive impact on individual‟s risky asset allocations. The coefficient of 
Pensiondum is 0.211 in Table 4.4 which is significantly from zero at 10% level and it is 
0.266 in Table 4.8 which, unfortunately, is not statistically significant. In comparison, 
this pension effect is not that huge for the house-owner subsample. In Table 4.4, we can 
see that the coefficient of Pensiondum is 0.075 and it equals 0.104 after controlling the 
heteroscedastic problem. Both coefficients are statistically significant.  
This huge impact of pension on risky asset allocations has not only been found in 
1995 using the BHPS data but also been found in 2000 of BHPS survey. Participating in 
private and/or public pension schemes will increase the individual‟s average risky asset 
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share by 11.4 percentage point for the house-owners and increase by 25.4 percentage 
point for the non-house owners. The former effect is significantly from zero at the 1% 
level and the latter effect is significantly different from zero at the 5% level, which has 
been showed in the following Table 4.5. After controlling for the heteroscedastic 
problem, the pension effect is increased to 14.7 percentage point for the house-owners 
and is still significantly from zero at the 1% level, and for the non-house owners the 
effect is increased dramatically to 52.3 percentage point and it is also significantly from 
zero at the 1% level. Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 present these statistics respectively.  
The effect of early retirement and normal retirement on the risky asset share in 
2000 is positive and statistically significant for the whole sample in both standard 
homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit estimations. The effect of early 
retirement on the risky asset share in 2000 is positive and statistically significant for the 
house owner sample in both standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit 
estimations. Still for the house owner sample, the effect of normal retirement on the 
risky asset share in 2000 is null under homoscedastic Tobit but is significantly positive 
under heteroscedastic Tobit. For non-house owners, neither early retirement nor normal 
retirement has been found to have an effect on risky asset shares in 2000 in in both 
standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit estimations. The detailed 
results for standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit estimations for the 
whole sample, house-owner subsample and non house-owner subsample for 2000 can 
be found in the following Table 4.9, Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 respectively. 
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Table 4. 4: The standard Tobit estimations for the whole sample and two subsamples for 
1995 BHPS data 
  Coefficients 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables total sample 
house owner 
sample 
Non-house owner 
sample 
Dum early retirement 0.136 0.210** -0.524 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.39) 
Dum normal retirement 0.033 0.048 -0.160 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.20) 
Net liquid wealth 0.554*** 0.494*** 2.167*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.40) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.056*** -0.050*** -0.638*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) 
Personaldebt 1.476*** 1.382** 3.403 
  (0.56) (0.56) (2.20) 
Housing 0.323*** 0.296*** 
 
  (0.05) (0.07) 
 
Housing squared -0.040*** -0.035** 
 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Outstanding mortgage loans 0.039 0.045 -0.694 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.60) 
Gross labour income 0.073 0.234 -1.944** 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.90) 
Incomenlw 8.56E-05*** 1.40E-04*** 4.63E-05 
  (2.68E-05) (3.76E-05) (5.47E-05) 
Age 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.027** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Agesquared -1.86E-04*** -1.66E-04** -1.84E-04 
  (5.84E-05) (6.73E-05) (1.39E-04) 
aleveldum 0.072** 0.059* 0.119 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.13) 
Degreedum 0.086* 0.055 0.204 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.15) 
Pensiondum 0.084** 0.075* 0.211* 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) 
Sexdum 0.068** 0.064** 0.091 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) 
Maritaldum 0.060* 0.049 0.083 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) 
Childdum 0.045 0.038 0.115 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) 
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Londondum 0.043 -0.014 0.274** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) 
Constant -1.261*** -1.170*** -1.483*** 
  (0.12) (0.14) (0.33) 
Log likelihood -2631.68 -2051.19 -545.10 
LR chi2 552.46 408.19 87.26 
Pro>chi2 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.091 0.074 
No. of observations 3387 2558 829 
Left-censored observations  
1892 1294 598 
at α2000<=0 
Uncensored observations 1289 1105 184 
Right-censored observations 
206 159 47 
at α2000>=1 
Note:*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Outstandingmortgage are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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Table 4. 5: The standard Tobit estimations for the whole sample and two subsamples for 
2000 BHPS data 
  Coefficients 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables total sample 
house owner 
sample 
Non-house owner 
sample 
Dum early retirement 0.139** 0.126** 0.282 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.34) 
Dum normal retirement 0.098* 0.078 0.300 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.22) 
Net liquid wealth 1.016*** 0.914*** 2.303*** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.44) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.222*** -0.200*** -0.514*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.14) 
Personaldebt 1.773*** 1.614*** 2.581 
  (0.22) (0.21) (1.73) 
Housing 0.209*** 0.160*** 
 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Housing squared -0.034*** -0.026*** 
 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Outstanding mortgage loans 0.073* 0.082** 0.550 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.48) 
Gross labour income 0.033 0.054 0.268 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.91) 
Incomenlw -2.57E-05 -6.35E-05* 0.000 
  (1.72E-05) (3.76E-05) (0.00) 
Age 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.034** 
  (4.40E-03) (4.79E-03) (0.01) 
Agesquared -2.43E-04*** -2.19E-04*** -0.000** 
  (4.51E-05) (4.96E-05) (0.00) 
aleveldum 0.067** 0.032 0.353*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) 
Degreedum 0.055 0.038 0.181 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.16) 
Pensiondum 0.134*** 0.114*** 0.254** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) 
Sexdum 0.071*** 0.061*** 0.149 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) 
Maritaldum 0.016 0.010 -0.009 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) 
Childdum 0.053 0.051 0.115 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) 
Londondum 0.036 -0.007 0.242 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.15) 
Constant -1.190*** -1.070*** -1.973*** 
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.36) 
Log likelihood -4073.1477 -3196.70 -795.26 
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LR chi2 801.6 583.28 80.84 
Pro>chi2 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.084 0.048 
No. of observations 4927 3807 1120 
Left-censored observations  
2505 1695 810 
at α2000<=0 
Uncensored observations 2036 1815 221 
Right-censored observations 
386 297 89 
 at α2000>=1 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Outstandingmortgage are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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Table 4. 6:The standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit estimations for 
the whole sample in 1995 of BHPS data 
  
Homoscedastic 
Tobit 
Heteroscedastic Tobit 
Variables coefficient coefficient 
 
Dum early retirement 0.136 0.074 -0.136 
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.25) 
Dum normal retirement 0.033 0.023 -0.043 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.20) 
Net liquid wealth 0.554*** 0.726*** -1.240*** 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.15) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.056*** -0.184*** 0.240*** 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Personaldebt 1.476*** 0.529  7.063*** 
  (0.56) (1.04) (2.51) 
Housing 0.323*** 0.292*** -0.035* 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.20) 
Housing squared -0.040*** -0.050*** 0.107* 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) 
Outstanding mortgage loans 0.039 0.201*** 0.154 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.19) 
Gross labour income 0.073 -1.38E-01 -1.369** 
  (0.18) (0.09) (0.55) 
Incomenlw 8.56E-05*** 5.92E-04*** 8.36E-04*** 
  (2.68E-05) (1.65E-04) (2.24E-04) 
Age 0.026*** 0.03898*** -0.008 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Agesquared -1.86E-04*** -2.71E-04*** -6.03E-05 
  (5.84E-05) (5.64E-05) (0.00) 
Aleveldum 0.072** 0.138*** -0.278*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) 
Degreedum 0.086* 0.092** 0.068 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.13) 
Pensiondum 0.084** 0.134*** -0.085 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) 
Sexdum 0.068** 0.046  0.162* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) 
Maritaldum 0.060* 0.090** -0.302*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) 
Childdum 0.045 -0.059  0.578*** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.13) 
Londondum 0.043 0.033  -0.010 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) 
constant -1.261*** -1.702*** 
 
  (0.12) (0.16) 
 

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Log likelihood -2631.68 -2480 
No. of observations 3387 3387 
left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 
1892 1892 
uncensored observations 1289 1289 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 
206 206 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Outstandingmortgage are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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Table 4. 7:The standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit estimations for 
the house-owner subsample in 1995 of BHPS data 
  
Homoscedastic 
Tobit Heteroscedastic Tobit 
Variables coefficient coefficient 
 
Dum early retirement 0.210** 0.101 -0.138  
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.26) 
Dum normal retirement 0.048 1.16E-04 -0.007  
  (0.08) (0.06) (0.23) 
Net liquid wealth 0.494*** 0.642*** -1.273*** 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.17) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.050*** -0.161*** 0.238*** 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Personaldebt 1.382** 0.873  4.87* 
  (0.56) (1.00) (2.55) 
Housing 0.296*** 0.235*** -0.214 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.23) 
Housing squared -0.035** -0.026*** 0.061 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) 
Outstanding mortgage loans 0.045 0.110  0.371* 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.22) 
Gross labour income 0.234 -0.068 -1.426** 
  (0.18) (0.09) (0.59) 
Incomenlw 1.40E-04*** 5.61E-04*** 6.75E-04*** 
  (3.76E-05) (1.73E-04) (2.25E-04) 
Age 0.024*** 0.036*** -0.004 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Agesquared -1.66E-04** -2.47E-04*** -9.32E-05 
  (6.73E-05) (6.18E-05) (1.99E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.059* 0.123*** -0.296*** 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) 
Degreedum 0.055 0.109** -0.062 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.15) 
Pensiondum 0.075* 0.104** -0.017 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) 
Sexdum 0.064** 0.041  0.202** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) 
Maritaldum 0.049 0.070* -0.352*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) 
Childdum 0.038 -0.018  0.400*** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.14) 
Londondum -0.014 0.003  -0.140 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.15) 
constant -1.170*** -1.510*** 
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  (0.14) (0.17)   
Log likelihood -2051.1895 -1945 
No. of observations 2558 2558 
left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 
1294 
1294 
uncensored observations 1105 1105 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 
159 
159 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Outstandingmortgage are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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Table 4. 8:The standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit estimations for 
the non-house owner subsample in 1995 of BHPS data 
  
Homoscedastic 
Tobit Heteroscedastic Tobit 
Variables coefficient coefficient 
 
Dum early retirement -0.524 -0.186 -0.200 
  (0.39) (0.37) (1.29) 
Dum normal retirement -0.160 -0.020 -0.058 
  (0.20) (0.21) (0.57) 
Net liquid wealth 2.167*** 1.676*** -0.937* 
  (0.40) (0.27) (0.53) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.638*** -0.453*** 
 
  (0.16) (0.09) 
 
Personaldebt 3.403 -28.402* 48.757*** 
  (2.20) (14.55) (13.87) 
Outstanding mortgage loans -0.694 -0.044 -1.609 
  (0.60) (0.53) (1.38) 
Gross labour income -1.944** -0.463 1.497 
  (0.90) (1.48) (3.41) 
Incomenlw 4.63E-05 9.43E-04 0.002** 
  (5.47E-05)  (6.38E-04) (8.60E-04) 
Age 0.027** 0.033** -0.021 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Agesquared -1.84E-04 -2.09E-04 1.20E-04 
  (1.39E-04) (1.47E-04) (3.56E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.119 0.316*** -0.384 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.30) 
Degreedum 0.204  -0.259  0.745  
  (0.15) (0.33) (0.49) 
Pensiondum 0.211* 0.266  -0.625** 
  (0.12) (0.17) (0.34) 
Sexdum 0.091  0.120  -0.200  
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.23) 
Maritaldum 0.083  0.090  0.157  
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.25) 
Childdum 0.115  -0.477  1.452*** 
  (0.13) (0.34) (0.46) 
Londondum 0.274** 0.116  0.333  
  (0.12) (0.20) (0.44) 
constant -1.483*** -1.713*** 
 
  (0.33) (0.42)   
Log likelihood -545.0980  -494.4344  
No. of observations 829 829 
left-censored observations at α2000<=0 598 598 

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uncensored observations 184 184 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 
47 
47 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Outstandingmortgage are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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Table 4. 9:The standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit estimations for 
the whole sample in 2000 of BHPS data 
  
Homoscedastic 
Tobit Heteroscedastic Tobit 
Variables coefficient coefficient 
 
Dum early retirement 0.139** 0.122** -0.060 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.18) 
Dum normal retirement 0.098* 0.097* -0.052 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.17) 
Net liquid wealth 1.016*** 1.172*** -1.827*** 
  (0.07) (0.10) (0.21) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.222*** -0.456*** 0.738*** 
  (0.02) (0.05) (0.08) 
Personaldebt 1.773*** 1.852*** 1.945* 
  (0.22) (0.43) (1.15) 
Housing 0.209*** 0.324*** -0.716*** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) 
Housing squared -0.034*** -0.065*** 0.116*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Outstanding mortgage loans 0.073* 0.106*** 0.241** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) 
Gross labour income 0.033 -0.201** -0.450 
  (0.13) (0.09) (0.33) 
Incomenlw -2.57E-05 -1.46E-04* 1.45E-04 
  (1.72E-05) (8.31E-05) (9.50E-05) 
Age 0.029*** 0.036*** -0.022* 
  (4.40E-03) (5.32E-03) (0.01) 
Agesquared -2.43E-04*** -3.00E-04*** 1.89E-04 
  (4.51E-05) (5.32E-05) (1.37E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.067** 0.077*** -0.226*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) 
Degreedum 0.055 0.081*** -0.291*** 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) 
Pensiondum 0.134*** 0.179*** -0.233** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) 
Sexdum 0.071*** 0.034 0.108 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) 
Maritaldum 0.016 0.032 -0.219*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) 
Childdum 0.053 0.016 0.350*** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) 
Londondum 0.036 -0.007 0.082 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.13) 
constant -1.190*** -1.475*** 
 
  (0.10) (0.13)   
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Log likelihood -4073.1477 -3873 
No. of observations 4927 4927 
left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 2505 2505 
uncensored observations 2036 2036 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 386 386 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Outstandingmortgage are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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Table 4. 10:The standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit estimations for 
the house-owner subsample in 2000 of BHPS data 
  
Homoscedastic 
Tobit Heteroscedastic Tobit 
Variables coefficient coefficient 
 
Dum early retirement 0.126** 0.119** -0.041 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.19) 
Dum normal retirement 0.078 0.090* -0.138 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.18) 
Net liquid wealth 0.914*** 1.092*** -1.851*** 
  (0.06) (0.10) (0.22) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.200*** -0.418*** 0.743*** 
  (0.02) (0.05) (0.08) 
Personaldebt 1.614*** 1.721*** 1.505 
  (0.21) (0.41) (1.21) 
Housing 0.160*** 0.206*** -0.593*** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.13) 
Housing squared -0.026*** -0.038*** 0.085*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Outstanding mortgage loans 0.082** 0.109*** 0.310** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) 
Gross labour income 0.054 -0.163* -0.428 
  (0.12) (0.09) (0.34) 
Incomenlw -6.35E-05* -1.29E-04* 7.00E-05 
  (3.76E-05) (7.82E-05) (8.50E-05) 
Age 0.027*** 0.037*** -0.041*** 
  (4.79E-03) (5.59E-03) (1.5E-02) 
Agesquared -2.19E-04*** -3.02E-04*** 3.86E-04** 
  (4.96E-05) (5.61E-05) (1.56E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.032 0.062** -0.263*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) 
Degreedum 0.038 0.065** -0.321*** 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) 
Pensiondum 0.114*** 0.147*** -0.216** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.11) 
Sexdum 0.061*** 0.041* 0.058 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) 
Maritaldum 0.010 0.008 -0.157* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) 
Childdum 0.051 0.052  0.277** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) 
Londondum -0.007 -0.011 0.003 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.15) 
constant -1.070*** -1.368*** 
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  (0.11) (0.14)   
Log likelihood -3196.6976 -3044 
No. of observations 3807 3807 
left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 1695 1695 
uncensored observations 1815 1815 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 297 297 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Outstandingmortgage are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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Table 4. 11:The standard homoscedastic Tobit and heteroscedastic Tobit estimations for 
the non-house owner subsample in 2000 of BHPS data 
  
Homoscedastic 
Tobit Heteroscedastic Tobit 
Variables coefficient coefficient 
 
Dum early retirement 0.282 0.302 -0.050  
  (0.34) (0.86) (1.41) 
Dum normal retirement 0.300 0.325 0.201  
  (0.22) (0.36) (0.59) 
Net liquid wealth 2.303*** 1.678*** -1.755** 
  (0.44) (0.23) (0.69) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.514*** -0.328** 
 
  (0.14) (0.08) 
 
Personaldebt 2.581 -1.196 8.017* 
  (1.73) (2.78) (4.83) 
Outstanding mortgage loans 0.550 0.801* -0.259 
  (0.48) (0.43) (0.75) 
Gross labour income 0.268 0.673 -1.214 
  (0.91) (1.00) (1.98) 
Incomenlw 5.68E-07 -1.35E-04 2.01E-04 
  (3.82E-05) (2.50E-04) (2.46E-04) 
Age 0.034** -0.004  0.075** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
Agesquared -3.23E-04** 3.67E-05 -7.39E-04* 
  (1.42E-04) (2.37E-04) (4.14E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.353*** 0.440*** -0.238  
  (0.13) (0.16) (0.32) 
Degreedum 0.181 0.179  -0.290  
  (0.16) (0.21) (0.41) 
Pensiondum 0.254** 0.523*** -0.660** 
  (0.13) (0.19) (0.32) 
Sexdum 0.149 0.071  0.371  
  (0.09) (0.15) (0.27) 
Maritaldum -0.009 0.260* -0.685*** 
  (0.10) (0.14) (0.26) 
Childdum 0.115 -0.269  0.879** 
  (0.14) (0.23) (0.36) 
Londondum 0.242 0.251  0.230  
  (0.15) (0.23) (0.42) 
constant -1.973*** -1.257*** 
 
  (0.36) (0.46)   
Log likelihood -795.2617  -775.8333  
No. of observations 1120 1120 
left-censored observations at α2000<=0 810 810 
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uncensored observations 221 221 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 89 89 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Outstandingmortgage are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
 
In previous Table 4.4, we estimate two separate models for house owners and 
non-house owners. Now, we set up a dummy variable for house owners and interact this 
dummy variable with other explanatory variables by using the full sample, so that we 
are able to examine the effects of each repressor on the risky asset holdings of house 
owners and non-house owners respectively. In addition, this section can be regarded as 
providing robustness test for our previous results. The new results are presented in the 
following Table 4.12 and Table 4.13. We also present the results for 2000 in the 
appendix as Table (D) and Table (E). 
The model 1 in Table 4.12 is the main specification. As we can see, for non-house 
owners, after controlling for other social and economical factors, neither early 
retirement nor normal retirement has an impact on portfolio share of risky assets. 
However, the coefficient of dumearlyretirementdumhousing is 0.633, which is positive 
and statistically significant. This confirms what we find and conclude in previous Table 
4.4 that early retirement has positive impact on risky asset holdings for house owners. 
In the model 2 of Table 4.12, we include variables on the number of children aged 
below 15 in the family (numberofkids) and variables on the health of the individual 
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(healthstatus
32
). The marginal effects for model 2 are also reported in Table 4.12. The 
marginal effects measure the expected change in risky asset share as a function of one 
unit increase in the explanatory variable. The second column presents the value of dy/dx 
and the third column presents the average value of the explanatory variable. As we can 
see in the third column, compared with non-house owners, the early retirement increase 
the proportion of net wealth invested in risky assets by 30.3percentage point for house 
owners in 1995. In other words, the expected/predicted portfolio share would increase 
from 19.65 percent
33
 to 49.95 percent.  
Now we look at model 1 and model 2, we find the net liquid wealth still has an 
inverse-U shape impact on risky asset holdings for both house owners and non-house 
owners.  The third column reveals that if average net liquid wealth increases by 
£100,000, the expected/predicted risky asset share would increase by 47.9 percentage 
point for non-house owners and increase by 17 percentage point for house owners.  
     The personal debt has same positive impact on risky asset holdings for both house 
owners and non-house owners as we can see in model 1 and model 2. An increase of 
£100,000 in personal debt would result in an increase of 112.2 percentage point in 
expected risky asset share for both house owners and non-house owners as we can see 
in the third column. 
     Because only house owners have gross house value, we do not interact housing 
and housingsquared with dumhousing. The gross house value has an inverse-U shape 
impact on risky asset share for house owners as we can see in model 1 and model 2. An 
                                                          
32
 The healthstatus equals 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 if the individual reported excellent health; good health, fair 
health, poor health, and very poor health respectively. 
33
 Please note this predicted portfolio share is not presented in the Table 4.12. It is part of the results 
we obtain when estimating the marginal effects after Tobit 
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increase of £100,000 in gross house value would result in an increase of 10.3 percentage 
point in expected risky asset share for house owners.  
     The gross labour income has a negative impact on risky asset holdings for 
non-house owners and has a positive impact for house owners as we can see in model 1 
and model 2. , As we can see in the third column, an increase of £100,000 in gross 
labour income would result in an decrease of 58.9 percentage point in expected risky 
asset share for non-house owners whereas it would results in an increase of 9.3 
percentage point in expected risky asset share for house-owners. This could reveal that 
housing actually act as a financial security for individuals. If individuals are house 
owners, then they are more willing to increase their risky portfolio as their labour 
income increase.  
The ratio of labour income to net liquid wealth has a positive impact on risky asset 
holdings for both house owners as we can see in model 1 and model 2. The third 
column reveals that the marginal effect of incomenlw on risky asset share is close to 
zero but is positive and significant for house owners. 
 Age has same inverse-U shape impact on risky asset holdings for both house 
owners and non-house owners as we can in model 1 and model 2. An increase of 10 
years in average age would increase the expected risky asset share by 8.38 percentage 
point for both house owners and non-house owners as we can in the third column in 
Table 4.12. 
Pensiondum has same positive impact for both house owners and non-house 
owners as we can see in model 1 and model 2. Compared with individuals without 
participating in neither employer‟s pension scheme nor private personal pension scheme, 
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individuals who participate would invest 6.4 percentage point higher. This is revealed in 
the third column. 
Londondum has a positive impact for non-house owners and has negative impact 
for house owners as we can see in model 1 and model 2. The third column suggests that 
for non-house owners, living in London would increase the risky asset share by 9.2 
percentage point. For house owners, living in London would increase the risky asset 
share by 1.4 percentage point. 
Table 4. 12: Models with interaction terms, marginal effects and robustness test (1995) 
  Model 1 Model 2 marginal effect for 
model 2   
  
Varibles     dy/dx X 
Dumearlyretirement -0.415 -0.411 -0.120 0.025  
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.08) 
 
Dumnormalretirement -0.114 -0.118 -0.043 0.221  
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.05) 
 
Netliquidwealth 1.749*** 1.784*** 0.677*** 0.110  
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.11) 
 
Netliquidwealthsquared -0.509*** -0.521*** -0.198*** 0.197  
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.04) 
 
Personaldebt 2.938* 2.956* 1.122* 0.011  
  (1.62) (1.62) (0.61) 
 
Housing 0.302*** 0.308*** 0.117*** 0.536  
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) 
 
Housingsquared -0.035* -0.036** -0.014** 0.530  
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
Outstandingmortgage -0.571 -0.582 -0.221 0.204  
  (0.45) (0.45) (0.17) 
 
Grosslabourincome -1.514** -1.552** -0.589** 0.106  
  (0.65) (0.66) (0.25) 
 
Incomenlw 3.84E-05 3.55E-05 1.35E-05 32.291  
  (4.02E-05) (4.05E-05) (2.00E-05) 
 
Age 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.009*** 45.535  
  (0.01) (0.01) (2.57E-03) 
 
Agesquared -1.87E-04** -1.63E-04** -6.18E-05** 2414.870  
  (7.56E-05) (7.76E-05) (3.00E-05) 
 
Aleveldum 0.095 0.092 0.036 0.239  
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  (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) 
 
Degreedum 0.168 0.170 0.069 0.126  
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) 
 
Pensiondum 0.162* 0.167* 0.064* 0.480  
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.03) 
 
Sexdum 0.075 0.075 0.028 0.488  
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) 
 
Maritaldum 0.060 0.064 0.024 0.571  
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) 
 
Childdum 0.107 0.064 0.025 0.217  
  (0.10) (0.15) (0.06) 
 
Numberofkids 
 
0.021 0.008 0.490  
  
 
(0.07) (0.02) 
 
Londondum 0.223** 0.221** 0.092** 0.100  
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) 
 
Healthstatus 
 
0.025 0.009 2.070  
  
 
(0.03) (0.01) 
 
Dumearlyretirementdumhousing 0.633** 0.627** 0.303** 0.021  
  (0.30) (0.30) (0.15) 
 
Dumnorretirementdumhousing 0.158 0.171 0.069 0.146  
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.07) 
 
Netliquidwealthdumhousing -1.241*** -1.286*** -0.488*** 0.099  
  (0.29) (0.30) (0.11) 
 
Nlwsquareddumhousing 0.458*** 0.471*** 0.179*** 0.186  
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.04) 
 
Personaldebtdumhousing -1.527 -1.518 -0.576 0.009  
  (1.72) (1.73) (0.66) 
 
Outstandingmdumhousing 0.614 0.625 0.237 0.201  
  (0.45) (0.45) (0.17) 
 
Grosslabourincomedumhousing 1.769*** 1.796*** 0.682*** 0.088  
  (0.68) (0.68) (0.26) 
 
Incomenlwdumhousing 1.07E-04* 1.11E-04* 4.21E-05* 18.192  
  (5.66E-05) (5.68E-05) (2.00E-05) 
 
Agedumhousing -0.002 0.003 0.001 34.116  
  (4.98E-03) (0.01) (2.26E-03) 
 
Agesquareddumhousing 3.15E-05 -1.35E-05 -5.11E-06 1765.040  
  (7.34E-05) (7.86E-05) (3.00E-05) 
 
Aleveldumdumhousing -0.035 -0.033 -0.012 0.203  
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) 
 
Degreedumdumhousing -0.111 -0.113 -0.041 0.097  
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.04) 
 
Pensiondumdumhousing -0.085 -0.094 -0.035 0.407  
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) 
 
Sexdumdumhousing -0.011 -0.011 -0.004 0.375  
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  (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) 
 
Maritaldumdumhousing -0.006 -0.014 -0.005 0.485  
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) 
 
Childdumdumhousing -0.068 0.052 0.020 0.179  
  (0.10) (0.16) (0.06) 
 
Numberofkidsdumhousing 
 
-0.068 -0.026 0.392  
  
 
(0.07) (0.03) 
 
Londondumdumhousing -0.237** -0.234** -0.078*** 0.068  
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) 
 
Healthstatusdumhousing 
 
-0.050 -0.019 1.526  
  
 
(0.04) (0.01) 
 
Constant -1.193*** -1.178*** 
  
  (0.13) (0.13)     
Log likelihood -2611.15  -2608.83  
  
LR chi2 593.52 598.17 
  
Pro>chi2 0 0 
  
Pseudo R2 0.1021 0.1029     
No. of observations 3387 3387 
  
left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 
1892 1892 
  
uncensored observations 1289 1289 
  
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 
206 206     
*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 
1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. Netliquidwealth, 
Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage and Grosslabourincome are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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In addition to the Tobit regressions we discuss in the above, in the following 
Table 4.13, we regress on permanent income
34
 and permanentincomenlw in model 3. 
For comparison, we also regress on gross labour income and incomenlw in model 4 
using the same sample data as in model 3. Finally, we regress probit specification and 
report it as model 5 in Table 4.13.  
As we can see, in terms of sign and significance level, there is no difference 
between model 3 and model 4 except for the following repressors. The model 3 suggests 
that outstanding mortgage has a negative impact on risky asset share for non-house 
owners and it has a positive impact for house-owners. The ratio of permanent income to 
net liquid wealth has a positive impact for house-owners although the coefficient is 
close to zero. Londondum has no impact for both house-owners and non-house owners. 
However, we still find the positive impact of early retirement on risky asset share for 
house-owners, which is robust to our previous findings in Table 4.4.  
Similar to the Tobit regressions, the Probit regression in Table 4.13 also include 
variables on the number of children aged below 15 in the family (numberofkids) and 
variables on the health of the individual (healthstatus). The Probit regression uses 3387 
observations which is the same as tobit regression in model 1 and model 2 of Table 4.12. 
In terms of sign and significance level, there is no difference between this Probit model 
in Table 4.13 and Tobit models in Table 4.12 except for the following repressors. As we 
                                                          
34
 The way we construct Permanentincome and Permanentincomenlw is similar to the way we 
construct them in Chapter 3. We follow Guariglia’s (2001) approach to obtain the value of permanent 
income for individuals whose age is between 21 and 65. We use the BHPS data in 1995 and 2000, and 
we, firstly, run a random effect model by regressing individuals’ gross labour income on “age, age 
squared, education dummies, occupational dummies, and interactions of the latter two groups of 
dummies with age and age squared” (Guariglia, 2001, p627). Then we use the estimated coefficients to 
predict the permanent income for individuals in 1995 and 2000 respectively. Finally, we divide 
permanent income by net liquid wealth to get the ratio. The reason why we regress on 
Permanentincome and Permanentincomenlw is that we recognise gross labour income is potentially 
endogenous which may lead to inconsistent estimators. 
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can see in the Probit model of Table 4.13, early retirement has a negative impact on 
probability of a non-house owner investing in risky assets, and it has a positive impact 
on probability of a house owner investing in risky assets. Personaldebt has no impact on 
the probability of an individual investing in risky assets. 
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Table 4. 13: Table 4.12 continued 
  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  
regress on 
pincome, 
pincomenlw 
compare 
with model 
3 
probit 
Varibles   
Dumearlyretirement -0.328 -0.464 -0.802* 
  (0.33) (0.34) (0.48) 
Dumnormalretirement -0.097 -0.173 -0.236 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) 
Netliquidwealth 3.727*** 3.726*** 4.860*** 
  (0.64) (0.64) (0.71) 
Netliquidwealthsquared -2.118*** -2.121*** -1.393*** 
  (0.47) (0.47) (0.31) 
Personaldebt 5.478*** 5.561*** 4.518 
  (1.94) (1.93) (2.85) 
Housing 0.444*** 0.439*** 0.465*** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) 
Housingsquared -0.075*** -0.073*** -0.067* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Outstandingmortgage -0.998* -0.709 -0.765 
  (0.51) (0.52) (0.75) 
Grosslabourincome 
 
-1.676** -2.698** 
  
 
(0.75) (1.13) 
Incomenlw 
 
3.16E-05 2.64E-05 
  
 
(4.76E-05) (6.63E-05) 
Permanentincome -1.595 
 
 
  (1.45) 
 
 
Permanetincomenlw 0.0000871 
 
 
  (7.46E-05) 
 
 
Age 0.017 0.015 0.039*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Agesquared -0.00014 -1.19E-04 -2.64E-04** 
  (2.24E-04) (2.11E-04) (1.30E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.066 0.057 0.223 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.15) 
Degreedum 0.261 0.164 0.219 
  (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) 
Pensiondum 0.085 0.152 0.275* 
  (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) 
Sexdum 0.054 0.109 0.139 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) 
Maritaldum 0.080 0.083 0.107 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
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Childdum -0.040 -0.070 0.073 
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.25) 
Numberofkids 0.088 0.098 -0.056 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) 
Londondum 0.194 0.239* 0.360** 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) 
Healthstatus 0.045 0.048 0.031 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Dumearlyretirementdumhousing 0.515* 0.677* 1.200** 
  (0.31) (0.35) (0.54) 
Dumnorretirementdumhousing 0.153 0.241 0.366 
  (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) 
Netliquidwealthdumhousing -3.244*** -3.250*** -1.335* 
  (0.64) (0.64) (0.77) 
Nlwsquareddumhousing 2.071*** 2.073*** 1.077*** 
  (0.47) (0.47) (0.31) 
Personaldebtdumhousing -4.082** -4.204** -0.357 
  (2.05) (2.04) (3.07) 
Outstandingmdumhousing 1.047** 0.746 0.697 
  (0.51) (0.53) (0.75) 
Grosslabourincomedumhousing 
 
1.876** 3.823*** 
  
 
(0.78) (1.22) 
Incomenlwdumhousing 
 
1.24E-04* 2.29E-04* 
  
 
(6.44E-05) (1.18E-04) 
Permanentincomedumhousing 2.201 
 
 
  (1.60) 
 
 
Permanetincomenlwdumhousing 2.58E-04** 
 
 
  (1.10E-04) 
 
 
Agedumhousing 0.002 0.005 0.003 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Agesquareddumhousing 4.64E-05 -5.74E-07 -3.32E-05 
  (1.86E-04) (1.66E-04) (1.37E-04) 
Aleveldumdumhousing -0.007 0.021 -0.144 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) 
Degreedumdumhousing -0.223 -0.080 -0.113 
  (0.20) (0.14) (0.21) 
Pensiondumdumhousing -0.017 -0.092 -0.174 
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.17) 
Sexdumdumhousing 0.044 -0.022 -0.110 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) 
Maritaldumdumhousing -0.024 -0.028 0.055 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) 
Childdumdumhousing 0.153 0.181 0.112 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.27) 
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Numberofkidsdumhousing -0.145* -0.154* -0.078 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
Londondumdumhousing -0.219 -0.268* -0.353* 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) 
Healthstatusdumhousing -0.072 -0.073 -0.085 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant -1.148*** -1.132*** -1.982*** 
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.22) 
Log likelihood -2026.27  -2028.20  -1860.02  
LR chi2 426.15 422.31 928.69 
Pro>chi2 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.0952 0.0943 0.1998 
No. of observations 2573 2573 3387 
left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 
1473 1473 
 
uncensored observations 925 925 
 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 
175 175   
Note:*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage,Grosslabourincome, 
and Permanentincome are measured in £100,000 in the above regressions, whereas 
Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms for  
Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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4.5.2 Simple DD estimation  
Before we run the simple DD estimation by using the Tobit method to estimate the 
impact of retirement on the portfolio allocation for the elderly, which we have discussed 
in the above section, we will manually calculate the DD estimates and run the simple 
DD estimation by OLS first in order to understand the DD concept. The following Table 
4.14, Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 presents the simple DD estimates by using the whole 
sample, house owner subsample and non-house owner subsample respectively. We first 
look at Table 4.14. As we can see, the change in the portfolio share for the treatment 
group in the whole sample over 1995 and 2000 is PA4-PA3=0.05 where PA stands for 
portfolio allocation. Under the “common trends” assumption, some of this change may 
attribute to the changes in the labour force participation status and the other part of this 
change is due to external factors for example changes in expected return. These external 
non-retirement factors are reflected by the change in the portfolio share for the control 
group over 1995 and 2000, which is PA2-PA1=0.03 reported in the Table 4.14. Finally, 
an estimate of the impact of retirement on the portfolio allocation in the treatment group 
in the whole sample is (PA4-PA3)-(PA2-PA1)= 0.02. In other words, basically we need 
to compare the portfolio share change of individual who experienced the change in their 
labour force participation status with that of individuals who faced no changes, under 
the assumption that they would have reallocated their portfolio share in the same way 
and same amount in the absence of the labour force participation status change between 
1995 and 2000. The explanation for Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 follows the same logic. 
The only difference is that the results in Table 4.15 are based on the house owner 
subsample whereas the results in Table 4.16 are based on the non-house owner 
subsample.  
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Table 4. 14: Simple DD illustration for the whole sample 
  
Control  group 
(dumtreatment=0) 
Treatment group 
(dumtreatment=1) 
1995 
        (timedummy=0) 0.28 [ 0.01 ] 0.36 [ 0.04 ] 
2000 
        (timedummy=1) 0.31 [ 0.01 ] 0.41 [ 0.12 ] 
Difference 0.03 [ 0.04 ] 0.05 [ 0.04 ] 
Difference-in-Differen
ce         0.02   
 
  
Note: The standard errors are presented in square brackets.  
 
Table 4. 15:Simple DD illustration for house owner subsample 
  
Control  group 
(dumtreatment=0) 
Treatment group 
(dumtreatment=1) 
1995 
        (timedummy=0) 0.28 [ 0.01 ] 0.39 [ 0.04 ] 
2000 
        (timedummy=1) 0.32 [ 0.01 ] 0.41 [ 0.04 ] 
Difference 0.04 [ 0.02 ] 0.02 [ 0.05 ] 
Difference-in-Differen
ce         -0.02       
Note: The standard errors are presented in square brackets.  
 
Table 4. 16:Simple DD illustration for non house owner subsample 
  
Control  group 
(dumtreatment=0) 
Treatment group 
(dumtreatment=1) 
1995 
        (timedummy=0) 0.22 [ 0.04 ] 0.19 [ 0.09 ] 
2000 
        (timedummy=1) 0.20 [ 0.04 ] 0.41 [ 0.12 ] 
Difference -0.02 [ 0.04 ] 0.22 [ 0.12 ] 
Difference-in-Differen
ce         0.24       
Note: The standard errors are presented in square brackets.  
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The pitfall of using this method to obtain DD estimates is that we do not know whether 
these estimates are statistically significant or not. Therefore, we run a simple DD 
regression by OLS estimation and report the estimation results in Table 4.17. As we can 
see that the coefficients for Timedummy*Dumtreatment in each model are the same as 
the DD estimates in the above Table 4.14, Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 respectively. 
However, these coefficients Timedummy*Dumtreatment are not statistically significant.  
Table 4. 17:Simple DD estimation for different samples by OLS 
  Coefficients 
Variables Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
  (whole sample) 
(house owner 
subsample) 
( non houseowner 
sample) 
Dumtreatment 0.081* 0.104** -0.034 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.11) 
Timedummy 0.031* 0.038** -0.028 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment 0.019 -0.018 0.246 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.15) 
Constant 0.275*** 0.281*** 0.224*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
  
 
  
F 4.44 4.41 1.36 
 Prob > F  0.0041 0.0042 0.2558 
R-squared  0.0067 0.0074 0.0189 
Adj R-squared 0.0052 0.0058 0.0050 
No.of observations 1986 1770 216 
 
Finally, we run a simple DD regression in a Tobit model for each sample and 
report the estimation results in Table 4.18. As we can see, in each sample, the number 
of observations which are left-censored at zero is much higher than that of observations 
which are right-censored at one. The coefficient of timedummydumtreatment is 0.02, 
-0.04, 0.64 for the whole sample, house owner subsample and non-house owner 
subsample respectively. However, none of these coefficients are statistically significant 
and the values of Pseudo R
2
 in these three models are all very low, which confirms that 
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we have to augment this simple DD estimation with regression-adjusted DD estimation 
by controlling for relevant and observable factors in order to estimate whether the 
changes in labour force participation status has an impact on generating the difference 
between the changes in average portfolio share of the two groups over 1995 and 2000.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 18:Simple DD estimation in tobit for different samples 
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  Coefficients 
Variables Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
  (whole sample) 
(house owner 
subsample) 
( non houseowner 
sample) 
Dumtreatment 0.206*** 0.239*** 0.007 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.32) 
Timedummy 0.078** 0.091*** -0.122 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment 0.024 -0.039 0.640 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.44) 
Constant 0.060** 0.084*** -0.233* 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) 
  
   
 LR chi2(3)  22.85 23.08 4.59 
Prob > chi2  0 0 0.2043 
Pseudo R2   0.0063 0.0072 0.0121 
Log likelihood  -1794.1764 -1585.3975 -188.0772 
  
   
No. of observations 1986 1770 216 
left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 
837 707 130 
uncensored observations 1005 939 66 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 
144 124 20 
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4.5.3 Regression-adjusted DD estimation 
In this section, three regression-adjusted DD estimations in Tobit have been 
implemented and all the estimates are reported in Table 4.19. In the first model and 
second model, we regress the portfolio share on all variables. While in the third model, 
we regress the portfolio share on all variables except housing and housingsquared 
because for the respondents in this model they have zero housing values. 
 As we can see from the Table 4.19, for the second model in which we use all the 
house owners as our sample, the coefficient for the treatment dummy variable 
dumtreatment is positive but not statistically significant. The timedummy is negative but 
not statistically significant neither. Since dumtreatment  “captures possible differences 
between the treatment and the control groups prior to” the labour force participation 
status change, and the timedummy “captures aggregate factors that would cause changes 
in portfolio share even in the absence of” labour force participation status change, the 
coefficient on the interaction of the treatment and time dummies is in our interests, 
which reveals a positive impact of retirement on portfolio shares in risky assets, but it is 
not statistically significant. However, we found that age has an inversed-U shape impact 
and it is statistically significant. The age reaches it maximum effect at age 74, which is 
older than the normal retirement age which is 60 for female and 65 for male. Hence, our 
explanation why retirement itself does not have a significant impact on changes in the 
elderly‟ risky asset allocation is that even the elderly is retired, house ownership can 
still serve as an insurance policy for him/her which provide extra financial security and 
it encourages individual to take higher risk by allocating a higher proportion of financial 
wealth in risky assets.  
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In the third model in which we use all the non-house owners subsample, we can 
see that in this case actually the involvement in public or/and private pension schemes 
serves as an insurance policy rather than house ownership. Respondents who do 
participate in any pension schemes would invest 43 percentage points higher than 
respondents with no participation. This positive impact of involvement in pension 
schemes on risky asset allocation not only is big in magnitude but also is statistically 
significant.  
 As expected, personal debt, being male and gross income has positive impact on 
portfolio share in risky assets. Table 4.19 reveals an inversed-U shape impact of net 
financial wealth on portfolio allocations. Similar patterns of the impact can be found on 
the effect of gross housing value and age. In terms of the impact of housing ownership, 
we find that in model two, owning a housing asset contributes 24 percentage point 
increase in risky asset holdings and this is statistically significant at  the 1 percentage  
significance level. 
Table 4.20, 4.21, 4.22 present the results for homoscedastic Tobit  and 
heteroscedastic Tobit regression-adjusted DD estimation. Table 4.20 is the results for 
the whole sample, Table 4.21 is for the house-owner subsample, and Table 4.22 is for 
the non-house owner subsample. The signs for the coefficients in homoscedastic Tobit  
and heteroscedastic Tobit regression-adjusted DD estimation are the same for the whole 
sample and house-owner subsample, whereas the signs are different for the non-house 
owner subsample, as we can see in Table 22.  
To sum up, based on the heteroscedastic Tobit regression-adjusted DD estimation 
that are reported in Table 4.20, 4.21, 4.22, we find retirement has no effect on risky 
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asset shares either for house owners or for non-house owners. This could be due to the 
small sample size we use here. We drop the observations when there is a missing value 
for our independent variable or any control variable, therefore our treatment group 
consists of 86 respondents and control group consists of 907 respondents, which give us 
993 respondents in total. In our earlier research, we have fewer control variables; hence 
the sample size is bigger. If we control for age, gender, gross income, gross housing 
value, net liquid wealth and personal debt only, then our treatment group consists of 106 
respondents and control group consists of 1447 respondents, which give us 1553 
respondents in total. And in this earlier research, by using DD estimation we have found 
a positive effect of retirement on risky asset shares. This positive effect is significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percentage level. These earlier results have been reported in 
Table 4.23. As we can see in Table 4.23, three regression-adjusted DD models have 
been estimated. The way in which these three models are different from each other are 
how we control for the housing effect. In model 1, we regress the risky asset share on 
the gross housing value and its squared term. While in model 2, we regress on variable 
of dumhousing which indicates the ownership of a housing asset. In model 3, we 
include all these three housing related variables. Since dumtreatment  “captures 
possible differences between the treatment and control groups prior to” the labour force 
participation status change, and the timedummy “captures aggregate factors that would 
cause changes in portfolio share even in the absence of ” labour force participation 
status change, the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment and time dummies is 
our interests, which reveals a positive impact of retirement on portfolio shares in risky 
assets, and it is statistically significant under all three models. In terms of the impact of 
house ownership, we find that in model 2, owning a housing asset contributes 24 
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percent point increase in risky asset shares and this is significantly different from zero at 
1 percentage level. 
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Table 4. 19:Results for regression-adjusted DD estimation using 1995 and 2000 of 
BHPS data 
  Coefficients 
Variables 
Model 1: 
total sample 
Model 
2:house 
owner 
sample 
Model 3:non house 
owner sample 
Dumtreatment 0.036 0.053 -0.028 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.31) 
Timedummy  -0.040 -0.027 -0.253 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment 0.127 0.049 0.694* 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.40) 
Net liquid wealth 0.652*** 0.616*** 2.678 
  (0.08) (0.08) (1.93) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.115*** -0.108*** -2.338 
  (0.02) (0.02) (3.79) 
Personaldebt 1.738*** 1.634*** 2.863 
  (0.39) (0.39) (4.12) 
Housing 0.089* 0.099* 
 
  (0.05) (0.06) 
 
Housing squared -0.016 -0.017 
 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Outstanding mortgage loans 0.274*** 0.283*** -0.210 
  (0.06) (0.06) (1.07) 
Gross labour income -0.058 -0.023 -2.565** 
  (0.14) (0.13) (1.30) 
Incomenlw 1.03E-04*** 7.33E-05* 3.29E-04 
  (3.41E-05) (4.10E-05) (2.22E-04) 
Age 0.024** 0.024** 0.023 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Agesquared -1.62E-04 -1.63E-04 -1.43E-04 
  (1.10E-04) (1.18E-04) (3.86E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.041 0.007 0.614*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.20) 
Degreedum 0.071 0.046 0.271 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.24) 
Pensiondum 0.036 0.012 0.428** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.18) 
Sexdum 0.116*** 0.125*** 0.102 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.15) 
Maritaldum -0.018 -0.019 -0.016 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.16) 
Childdum 0.154*** 0.121*** 0.781*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.21) 
Londondum 0.028 0.002 0.442* 
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  (0.05) (0.05) (0.23) 
constant -0.939*** -0.897*** -1.301* 
  (0.19) (0.21) (0.71) 
Log likelihood -1660.2781 -1473.3759 -161.0764  
LR chi2 290.65 247.12 58.59 
Pro>chi2 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.0805 0.0774 0.1539 
No. of observations 1986 1770 216 
left-censored observations at α2000<=0 837 707 130 
uncensored observations 1005 939 66 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 144 124 20 
Note:  
*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.  
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage are measured in £1,000 in the 
above regression, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms 
for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £1,000 respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 210 
 
Table 4. 20:Results for Homoscedastic Tobit and Heteroscedastic Tobit 
regression-adjusted DD estimation, the whole sample 
  
Homoscedastic 
Tobit Heteroscedastic Tobit 
Variables coefficient coefficient 
 
Dumtreatment 0.036 0.094 -0.351 
  (0.08) (0.06) (0.24) 
Timedummy  -0.040 -0.061* 0.128 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment 0.127 0.105 -0.153 
  (0.11) (0.08) (0.32) 
Net liquid wealth 0.652*** 0.711*** -1.326*** 
  (0.08) (0.11) (0.23) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.115*** -0.221*** 0.408*** 
  (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) 
Personaldebt 1.738*** 1.830*** 0.616 
  (0.39) (0.48) (1.60) 
Housing 0.089* 0.149*** -0.444*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.18) 
Housing squared -0.016 -0.027*** 0.057*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Outstanding mortgage loans 0.274*** 0.260*** 0.254 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.20) 
Gross labour income -0.058 -0.099 -0.683 
  (0.14) (0.09) (0.44) 
Incomenlw 1.03E-04*** 1.62E-04 6.54E-04** 
  (3.41E-05) (1.70E-04) (3.33E-04) 
Age 0.024** 0.037*** -0.035 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Agesquared -1.62E-04 -2.97E-04*** 3.22E-04 
  (1.10E-04) (1.08E-04) (3.72E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.041 0.068* -0.154 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) 
Degreedum 0.071 0.116*** -0.346** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) 
Pensiondum 0.036 0.062 -0.220 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) 
Sexdum 0.116*** 0.082*** 0.200* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) 
Maritaldum -0.018 -0.029 0.038 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) 
Childdum 0.154*** 0.102*** 0.298** 

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  (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) 
Londondum 0.028 0.032 -0.113 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.16) 
constant -0.939*** -1.247*** 
 
  (0.19) (0.22)   
Log likelihood -1660.2781 -1588 
No. of observations 1986 1986 
left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 837 837 
uncensored observations 1005 1005 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 144 144 
Note:  
*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.  
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage are measured in £1,000 in the 
above regression, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms 
for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £1,000 respectively.   
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Table 4. 21:Results for Homoscedastic Tobit and Heteroscedastic Tobit 
regression-adjusted DD estimation, the house-owner subsample 
  
Homoscedastic 
Tobit Heteroscedastic Tobit 
Variables coefficient coefficient 
 
  
 
Dumtreatment 0.053 0.113* -0.314 
  (0.08) (0.06) (0.26) 
Timedummy  -0.027 -0.049 0.104 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.12) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment 0.049 0.045 -0.148 
  (0.11) (0.09) (0.34) 
Net liquid wealth 0.616*** 0.658*** -1.290*** 
  (0.08) (0.11) (0.23) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.108*** -0.195*** 0.379*** 
  (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) 
Personaldebt 1.634*** 1.741*** 0.308 
  (0.39) (0.47) (1.62) 
Housing 0.099* 0.138** -0.313 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.21) 
Housing squared -0.017 -0.023*** 0.031*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Outstanding mortgage loans 0.283*** 0.253*** 0.343* 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.2) 
Gross labour income -0.023 -0.079 -0.672 
  (0.13) (0.09) (0.45) 
Incomenlw 7.33E-05* 1.62E-04 7.61E-04** 
  (4.10E-05) (2.05E-04) (3.73E-04) 
Age 0.024** 0.035*** -0.021 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Agesquared -1.63E-04 -2.83E-04* 1.22E-04 
  (1.18E-04) (1.10E-04) (3.49E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.007 0.039 -0.193 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) 
Degreedum 0.046 0.093** -0.356** 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.15) 
Pensiondum 0.012 0.046 -0.280* 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) 
Sexdum 0.125*** 0.078** 0.246** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) 
Maritaldum -0.019 -0.036 0.058 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) 
Childdum 0.121*** 0.101** 0.095 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) 
Londondum 0.002 0.014 -0.182 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.17) 

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constant -0.897*** -1.166*** 
 
  (0.21) (0.22)   
Log likelihood -1473.3759 -1414 
No. of observations 1770 1770 
left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 707 707 
uncensored observations 939 939 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 124 124 
Note:  
*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.  
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage are measured in £1,000 in the 
above regression, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms 
for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £1,000 respectively.   
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Table4. 22:Results for Homoscedastic Tobit and Heteroscedastic Tobit 
regression-adjusted DD estimation, the non-house owner subsample 
  
Homoscedastic 
Tobit Heteroscedastic Tobit 
Variables coefficient coefficient 
 
Dumtreatment -0.028 -0.059 -0.108 
  (0.31) (0.32) (3.01) 
Timedummy  -0.253 0.053 0.332 
  (0.16) (0.25) (0.64) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment 0.694* 0.579 -0.637 
  (0.40) (0.60) (1.44) 
Net liquid wealth 2.678 2.301 -14.022*** 
  (1.93) (3.06) (5.00) 
Net liquid wealth squared -2.338 -1.570 
 
  (3.79) (5.32) 
 
Personaldebt 2.863 -27.30 8.119 
  (4.12) (23.46) (29.76) 
Outstanding mortgage loans -0.210 -0.797 
 
  (1.07) (2.47) 
 
Gross labour income -2.565** -0.190 -14.750* 
  (1.30) (0.66) (7.60) 
Incomenlw 3.29E-04 2.00E-04 
 
  (2.22E-04) (1.87E-04) 
 
Age 0.023 0.058 0.009 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Agesquared -1.43E-04 -4.47E-04 -1.92E-04 
  (3.86E-04) (3.46E-04) (4.85E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.614*** 0.519** 1.005 
  (0.20) (0.23) (0.83) 
Degreedum 0.271 0.078 -0.561 
  (0.24) (0.43) (1.19) 
Pensiondum 0.428** 0.026 1.610 
  (0.18) (0.13) (1.03) 
Sexdum 0.102 0.072 1.053 
  (0.15) (0.05) (0.80) 
Maritaldum -0.016 -0.154 0.254 
  (0.16) (0.34) (1.37) 
Childdum 0.781*** 0.474 2.541* 
  (0.21) (0.75) (1.31) 
Londondum 0.442* 0.294 0.068 
  (0.23) (0.37) (1.60) 
constant -1.301* -2.177* 
 

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  (0.71) (1.32)   
Log likelihood -161.0764  -132.2632 
No. of observations 216 216 
left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 130 130 
uncensored observations 66 66 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 20 20 
Note:  
*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.  
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage are measured in £1,000 in the 
above regression, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms 
for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £1,000 respectively.   
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Table 4. 23: Earlier research results for regression-adjusted DD estimation using 1995 
and 2000 of BHPS data 
  Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dumtreatment -0.039 -0.055 -0.040 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Timedummy  -0.082** -0.043 -0.077** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment 0.261** 0.298** 0.263** 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Net liquid wealth 1.070*** 1.180*** 1.080*** 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.204*** -0.221*** -0.205*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Personaldebt 2.170*** 2.340*** 2.190*** 
  (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) 
Housing 0.305*** 
 
0.257*** 
  (0.05) 
 
(0.06) 
Housing squared -0.049*** 
 
-0.041*** 
  (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Dumhousing 
 
0.239*** 0.071 
  
 
(0.05) (0.06) 
Gross labour income 0.544*** 0.764*** 0.559*** 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Age 0.049*** 0.0473*** 0.048*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Agesquared -4.81E-04*** -4.46E-04*** -4.671E-04*** 
  (1.17E-04) (1.18E-04) (1.17E-04) 
Sexdum 0.090*** 0.071** 0.088*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -1.719*** -1.775*** -1.738*** 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Log likelihood -2421.067 -2429.100 -2420.421 
LR chi2 447.59 431.53 448.88 
Pro>chi2 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.0846 0.0816 0.0849 
No. of observations 3106 3106 3106 
left-censored observations at α2000<=0 1870 1870 1870 
uncensored observations 1029 1029 1029 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 207 207 207 
Note:  
*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.  
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Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, are measured in £100,000 in the above 
regression, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms for 
Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £100,000.
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4.5.4 Short panel study on the joint impact of retirement and 
housing ownership 
In order to examine the effect of retirement on people who owns a house compared 
with the effect on people who do not own a house, we will, in this section, carry out a 
short panel study on the joint impact of retirement and housing ownership by using the 
1995 and 2000 BHPS data. We estimate regressions which include the additional 
dummy variables of Dumhousingr, Dumhousingw and Dumnonhousingr.  The 
definitions for these three dummy variables
35
 have been given in the above section 
4.4.3 and the definitions for other variables are the same as in the previous chapter. The 
estimation results are reported in the following Table 4.24. 
 The difference between model one and model two is that in model one we control  
for an the outstanding mortgage loan whereas in model two we do not. The sign of the 
coefficient for each variable are the same as in both models. However, the coefficients 
for the dummy variables of Dumhousingr, Dumhousingw and Dumnonhousingr in 
model one and model two are not statistically significant, hence no further implication 
can be made from both models. 
In model three of Table 4.24, we have some interesting findings. As we can see, 
we do not control for the housing value or outstanding mortgage loan in this model. We 
find that an individual who was retired during both surveys and was living in an 
                                                          
35
 Dumhosuingr equals one if in both years the individual is retired and is living in an accommodation 
that is owned by him/her or by his family. It equals zero if otherwise. Dumhousingw equals one if in both 
years the individual is employed and is living in an accommodation that is owned by him/her or by his 
family. It equals zero if otherwise. Dumnonhousingr equals one if in both years the individual is retired 
and is living in an accommodation that is not owned by him/her or by his family. It equals zero if 
otherwise. Dumnonhousingw equals one if in both years the individual is employed and is living in an 
accommodation that is not owned by him/her or by his family. It equals zero if otherwise. 
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accommodation that is owned by him/her or by his family holds the highest proportion 
of risky assets among the four categories of individuals as defined. In other words, on 
average, retired house owners hold the highest proportion of risky assets among all, 
followed by employed house owners who hold the second highest proportion of risky 
assets. The average risky asset shares of the other two categories of households, namely, 
retired non-house owners and employed non house owners are relatively the same and 
are the lowest among all. These results actually confirm what we found in Table 4.23 
that housing ownership has a positive effect. This is because housing can be considered 
to provide financial security which may reduce the individuals‟ relative risk aversion 
and encourage them to invest a higher proportion of wealth in risky assets. Therefore, 
compared with individuals living in not self or family-owned accommodation (non- 
house-owners), individuals who do live in those accommodations (house-owners) will 
generally take a higher risky position in investment.  
In model three of Table 4.24, the retirement status seems to have different effects 
on risky asset allocations for house owners and non-house owners. The coefficients for 
Dumhousingr and Dumhousingw are 0.218 and 0.101 respectively, which are both 
statistically significant. This could reveal that for house owners, due to retirement they 
receive annuity and pension payment which are normally less correlated with the 
economic condition, and this retirement status will have a positive impact on risky asset 
holdings. While for non-house owners, the retirement status may have a negative impact 
as the coefficient for Dumnonhousingr is -0.062 in Table 4.24, although this effect is 
not statistically significant. The explanation could be that retired non house-owners are 
more risk averse than employed non-house owners. When a non-house owner has a job, 
he/she tends to be the low income household and his/her consumption level is close to 
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habit level. Because the retirement would reduce his/her annual income and bring 
his/her consumption even closer to habit level, the retired non-house owner would be 
more risk averse. Therefore, in comparison, the retired non-house owners are less 
willing to take a risky position in investment than employed non-house owners. 
However, since this retirement effect for non-house owners is not statistically 
significant, we need to interpret the above explanation with caution. 
Model four is used for comparison reason. The dummy variables of Dumhousingr, 
Dumhousingw and Dumnonhousingr are not included in Model four. As we can see, 
gross house value has an inverse-U shape of impact on risky asset share.  
From model 1 to model 4, we set up these models by pooling the 1995 and 2000 
BHPS data together and run the standard tobit regression. In comparison, we set up 
model 5 which is a random effect Tobit model. In terms of sign and significance level, 
the results in model 5 are same as in model 2, which suggests that our previous findings 
in model 2 are robust. We also report the marginal effects after random effect Tobit 
model.  The marginal effects measure the expected change in risky asset share as a 
function of one unit increase in the explanatory variable. The sixth column presents the 
value of dy/dx and the seventh column presents the average value of the explanatory 
variable. As we can see, if average net liquid wealth increases by £100,000, the 
expected/predicted risky asset share would increase by 27.2 percentage point. An 
increase of £100,000 in personal debt would result in an increase of 94 percentage point 
in expected risky asset share. Compared with employed non-house owners, retired 
house owners invest 11.4 percentage point higher and employed house owners invest 
5.7 percentage point higher. The marginal effect of incomenlw on risky asset share is 
close to zero but is positive and significant. An increase of 10 years in average age 
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would increase the expected risky asset share by 11.88 percentage point. Because the 
marginal effect of the dummy variables is measured in terms of discrete change of 
dummy variable from 0 to 1, the results in Table 4.24 suggest that an individual whose 
highest education level is first degree or higher would invest 5.6 percentage point higher 
than an individual with whose highest education is an O-level or under. Compared with 
average female‟s risky asset share, the risky asset share of male is 3.4 percentage point 
higher. The presence of chid/children increases the risky asset share by 7.3 percentage 
point.   
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Table 4. 24: Results for short panel study on the joint impact of retirement and housing ownership 
  Coefficients Marginal effects after xttobit 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Model 5 
(xttobit) 
dy/dx X 
Net liquid wealth 0.673*** 0.649*** 0.730*** 0.704*** 0.670*** 0.334*** 0.133  
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) 
 Net liquid wealth squared -0.118*** -0.117*** -0.133*** -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.062*** 0.135  
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
 Personaldebt 1.816*** 1.963*** 2.144*** 1.869*** 1.885*** 0.940*** 0.012  
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) (0.18) 
 Dumhousingr 0.065 0.099 0.218*** 
 
0.219** 0.114** 0.225  
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
(0.09) (0.05) 
 Dumhousingw -0.057 -0.035 0.101* 
 
0.116* 0.057* 0.628  
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
(0.06) (0.03) 
 Dumnonhousingr -0.102 -0.041 -0.062 
 
-0.066 -0.032 0.073  
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
(0.10) (0.05) 
 Housing 0.159*** 0.202*** 
 
0.188*** 
     (0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
   Housing squared -0.025** -0.030*** 
 
-0.030*** 
     (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
   Outstanding mortgage loans 0.190*** 
  
0.174*** 
     (0.05) 
  
(0.05) 
   Gross labour income -0.034 0.073 0.190 -0.100 0.113 0.057 0.127  
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.06) 
 Incomenlw 9.20E-05*** 8.98E-05*** 8.54E-05** 9.35E-05*** 9.01E-05*** 4.49E-05*** 32.218  
  (3.41E-05) (3.40E-05) (3.39E-05) (3.39E-05) (3.46E-05) (2.00E-05) 
 Age 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.013*** 49.995  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (2.89E-03) 
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Agesquared -2.24E-04*** -2.08E-04*** -2.15E-04*** -2.07E-04*** -2.24E-04*** -1.12E-04*** 2814.220  
  (5.21E-05) (5.21E-05) (5.24E-05) (4.89E-05) (5.78E-05) (3.00E-05) 
 Aleveldum 0.038 0.038 0.046 0.036 0.048 0.024 0.273  
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
 Degreedum 0.053 0.063 0.088** 0.055 0.109** 0.056** 0.131  
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
 Pensiondum 0.037 0.046 0.037 0.017 0.035 0.017 0.526  
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
 Sexdum 0.079*** 0.067** 0.057** 0.084*** 0.068** 0.034** 0.502  
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
 Maritaldum 0.021 0.028 0.044 0.023 0.053 0.026 0.652  
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
 Childdum 0.139*** 0.152*** 0.161*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.073*** 0.209  
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
 Londondum 0.002 0.003 0.034 -0.010 0.032 0.016 0.103  
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) 
 constant -0.910*** -0.837*** -0.922*** -0.939*** -0.951*** 
    (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15)   
Log likelihood -2128.953  -2135.946  -2146.950  -2134.283  -2077.223  
  LR chi2 411.14 397.15 375.14 400.47 284.71 
  Pro>chi2 0 0 0 0 0 
  Pseudo R2 0.0881 0.0851 0.0803 0.0858     
No. of observations 2584 2584 2584 2584 2584     
left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 
1099 1099 1099 1099 1099 
  uncensored observations 1302 1302 1302 1302 1302 
  right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 
183 183 183 183 183 
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Note:  
*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage are measured in £1,000 in the above regression, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £1,000 respectively.   
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4.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has investigated how the portfolios of the UK 
households evolve leading up to retirement and beyond. In particular, we examined the 
impact of retirement, housing value and ownership on the households‟ risky portfolio by 
using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 
We first used individual level data from the BHPS for years 1995 and 2000 
respectively and carried out cross-sectional studies. For each year, we divided the 
sample into two subsamples, namely house-owner subsample and non-house owner 
subsample. As we did in the previous chapter, the standard Tobit model has been 
estimated, followed by the hetroskedastic Tobit model. We found that in 1995 for the 
house owner if the individual opted for early retirement, then his/her average risky asset 
share will increase by 21 percentage points and this effect is significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level. However, under the hetroskedastic Tobit model, this positive effect 
disappeared in 1995. In contrast, in 2000, for the house owner if he/she opt for early 
retirement, then his/her average risky asset share will increase by approximately 12 
percentage in point, which is statistically significant under the standard Tobit and 
hetroskedastic Tobit model. In addition, for house owners again, the normal retirement 
has also been found to have a positive impact on risky asset shares. Although this effect 
is statistically insignificant in a standard Tobit model , it becomes statistically 
significant in hetroskedastic Tobit regression. However, for the non-house owner 
subsample, both in 1995 and 2000, all else equal, we have not found the retirement 
effect in both models. 
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In the cross-sectional studies, we also notice that for the non-house owner 
subsample, a pension has a very significant positive impact on an individual‟s risky 
asset allocations. In 2000, Participating in private and/or public pension schemes will 
increase the individual‟s average risky asset share by 11.4 percentage point for the 
house-owners and increase by 25.4 percentage point for the non-house owners. After 
controlling for the heteroscedastic problem, the pension effect is increased to 14.7 
percentage point for the house-owners and is increased dramatically to 52.3 percentage 
point for the non-house owners. All these impacts are statistically significant from zero. 
In comparison, in 1995, for the non-house owners the coefficient of Pensiondum is 0.21 
in the standard homosedastc Tobit model and it is statistically significant. Again, this 
pension effect is not that huge for the house-owner subsample. The coefficient of 
Pensiondum is 0.075 and it equals 0.104 after controlling for the heteroscedastic 
problem. Both coefficients are statistically significant. 
Later we set up a dummy variable for house owners and interact this dummy 
variable with other explanatory variables by using the full sample, so that we are able to 
examine the effects of each repressor on the risky asset holdings of house owners and 
non-house owners respectively. This can be regarded as providing robustness test for 
our previous results. We find that, in both years, for non-house owners, after controlling 
for other social and economic factors, neither early retirement nor normal retirement has 
an impact on portfolio share of risky assets. However, early retirement has positive 
impact on risky asset holdings for house owners. We then carry out robustness tests and 
the results are confirmed. We also find that compared with non-house owners, the early 
retirement increase the proportion of net wealth invested in risky assets by 30.3 
percentage point for house owners in 1995. 
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We then focus on a specific group of households who are either approaching their 
retirement age or at the early stage of their retirement. By adopting regression-adjusted 
DD estimation methods, as we can see from Table 4.23, we found that if we control for 
net liquid wealth, personal debt, housing, gross labour income, age and gender only, the 
changes in labour force participation status or the event of retirement has a positive 
impact on households‟ risky portfolio and this impact is significantly different from 
zero at the 5 percentage level.  
This implies that the households who have just entered their retirement stage or 
who are in the early stage of their retirement would increase risk exposure of their total 
investment portfolio by allocating a higher proportion of their wealth to the risky assets. 
This finding is consistent with some of the existing literature which suggest that there is 
an inversed-U shape of age effect on the elderly‟ risky portfolio, for example, the 
findings in Ameriks and Zeldes (2004), Wachter and Yogo (2010), and Guiso et al. 
(2002). Guiso et al. (2002, pp11) reported that in the UK, Germany and Italy, there is “a 
hump-shaped age profile of participation in risky assets”. The households in those three 
countries have the highest probability of holding risky assets when they are in the age of 
50s. The explanation could be that in the early stage of their retirement, although they 
faces a significantdrop in the labour income, they receive streams of income from their 
pensions which can be regarded or treated as risk-free assets in their entire portfolio. In 
comparison, before they retire, their labour income is considered to be positively 
correlated with the economic condition. To some extent, the income risk involved in 
this positive relationship would discourage householder to put a heavy weight on the 
risky assets investment. While at the early stage of their retirement, they still have a 
relatively long investment horizon, their income from a pension is continuous and 
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risk-free, they may still have a strong desire to accumulate their wealth and plan to 
spend it at a later life in terms of health consumption and maintaining their standard of 
life or make bequest to their next generation. Furthermore, during the early stage of 
their retirement, they may still have the desire to work and to be connected with the 
society, and importantly, their health are normally in good condition and they have a lot 
of time that could be spent on managing their investment portfolio. Therefore, it is 
rational for the elderly who have a good financial capability to take a little bit more risk 
and invest a higher proportion of wealth in risky assets. 
One problem is that if we control for all the socioeconomic and demographic 
variables (ie: except the previous control variable, we have additional control variable 
of outstanding mortgage loans, the ratio of income to net liquid wealth, dummy variable 
for education level, pension, marital status, children, region), then no effect of 
retirement is found, as can be seen from Table 4.19-4.22.  
Lastly, in this chapter, we do a short panel study on the joint impact of retirement 
and housing ownership and found that an individual who was retired during both 
surveys and was living in an accommodation that is owned by him/her or by his family 
holds the highest proportion of risky assets among the four categories of individuals as 
defined. The employed house owners hold the second highest proportion of risky assets. 
The average risky asset shares of the other two categories of households, namely, retired 
non-house owners and employed non-house owners are relatively the same and are the 
lowest among all. These results are statistically significant. We also find that compared 
with employed non-house owners, retired house owners invest 11.4 percentage point 
higher and employed house owners invest 5.7 percentage point higher.   
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These imply that, compared with labour income, the ownership of a house could 
provide a stronger financial security for the households to take risk in their investment. 
For the elderly, they will be more willing to take risk if they own a house. They can take  
a reverse-mortgage their house at their later life to finance their daily consumption, after 
they spend their savings which are relatively easy to access due to the liquidity 
preference.  
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Appendix: 
Table (A): 
  Treatment group   Control group   
Variable Mean   Std. Dev.   Mean   Std. Dev.   
allocation1995 0.36 [ 0.37 ] 0.28 [ 0.37 ] 
allocation2000 0.41 [ 0.38 ] 0.31 [ 0.37 ] 
netliquidwealth1995 36.21 [ 77.87 ] 7.94 [ 30.00 ] 
netliquidwealth2000 35.97 [ 69.25 ] 10.18 [ 29.59 ] 
personaldebt1995 0.55 [ 1.12 ] 1.19 [ 2.44 ] 
personaldebt2000 0.08 [ 0.34 ] 2.03 [ 5.24 ] 
housing1995 68.61 [ 49.01 ] 64.81 [ 45.45 ] 
housing2000 112.99 [ 98.53 ] 108.21 [ 91.70 ] 
outstandingmortgage1995 6.88 [ 14.98 ] 31.30 [ 31.67 ] 
outstandingmortgage2000 3.55 [ 11.51 ] 34.69 [ 38.77 ] 
grossincome1995 14.35 [ 11.67 ] 16.13 [ 12.56 ] 
grossincome2000 0.22 [ 1.40 ] 19.87 [ 15.09 ] 
incomenlw1995 83.22 [ 678.59 ] 30.58 [ 280.59 ] 
incomenlw2000 -0.01 [ 0.74 ] 61.19 [ 653.00 ] 
age1995 57.90 [ 6.04 ] 37.84 [ 10.42 ] 
age2000 63.06 [ 6.02 ] 43.02 [ 10.41 ] 
olevelorunderdum1995 0.80 [ 0.40 ] 0.51 [ 0.50 ] 
olevelorunderdum2000 0.80 [ 0.40 ] 0.48 [ 0.50 ] 
aleveldum1995 0.10 [ 0.31 ] 0.33 [ 0.47 ] 
aleveldum2000 0.10 [ 0.31 ] 0.34 [ 0.47 ] 
degreedum1995 0.09 [ 0.29 ] 0.16 [ 0.37 ] 
degreedum2000 0.09 [ 0.29 ] 0.18 [ 0.39 ] 
pensiondum1995 0.60 [ 0.49 ] 0.72 [ 0.45 ] 
pensiondum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0.77 [ 0.42 ] 
employeedum1995 1 [ 0 ] 1 [ 0 ] 
employeedum2000 0 [ 0 ] 1 [ 0 ] 
selfemployeddum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
selfemployeddum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
retireddum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
retireddum2000 1 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
unemployeddum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
unemployeddum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
sexdum1995 0.53 [ 0.50 ] 0.51 [ 0.50 ] 
sexdum2000 0.53 [ 0.50 ] 0.51 [ 0.50 ] 
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maritaldum1995 0.72 [ 0.45 ] 0.66 [ 0.47 ] 
maritaldum2000 0.71 [ 0.46 ] 0.68 [ 0.46 ] 
childdum1995 0.02 [ 0.15 ] 0.30 [ 0.46 ] 
childdum2000 0.02 [ 0.15 ] 0.29 [ 0.46 ] 
londondum1995 0.08 [ 0.28 ] 0.11 [ 0.31 ] 
londondum2000 0.06 [ 0.24 ] 0.10 [ 0.31 ] 
                  
No. of observations 86       907       
Note: standard errors are in square brackets. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage are measured in £1,000 in the 
above regression, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms 
for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £1,000 respectively.   
 
Table (B): 
                  
 
Treatment group 
 
Control group 
 Variable Mean   Std. Dev.   Mean   Std. Dev.   
allocation1995 0.39 [ 0.37 ] 0.28 [ 0.37 ] 
allocation2000 0.41 [ 0.37 ] 0.32 [ 0.37 ] 
netliquidwealth1995 41.17 [ 83.42 ] 8.45 [ 31.52 ] 
netliquidwealth2000 41.26 [ 73.95 ] 10.80 [ 30.91 ] 
personaldebt1995 0.65 [ 1.19 ] 1.26 [ 2.52 ] 
personaldebt2000 0.09 [ 0.37 ] 2.11 [ 5.41 ] 
housing1995 80.83 [ 42.83 ] 72.39 [ 41.94 ] 
housing2000 133.11 [ 93.51 ] 120.87 [ 88.67 ] 
outstandingmortgage1995 8.10 [ 15.97 ] 34.90 [ 31.51 ] 
outstandingmortgage2000 3.74 [ 11.96 ] 38.62 [ 39.06 ] 
grossincome1995 15.73 [ 12.05 ] 16.79 [ 12.89 ] 
grossincome2000 0.26 [ 1.52 ] 20.78 [ 15.47 ] 
incomenlw1995 85.79 [ 730.89 ] 29.67 [ 277.52 ] 
incomenlw2000 -0.02 [ 0.81 ] 43.73 [ 435.74 ] 
age1995 57.37 [ 6.21 ] 37.88 [ 10.05 ] 
age2000 62.52 [ 6.18 ] 43.05 [ 10.04 ] 
olevelorunderdum1995 0.79 [ 0.41 ] 0.49 [ 0.50 ] 
olevelorunderdum2000 0.79 [ 0.41 ] 0.46 [ 0.50 ] 
aleveldum1995 0.10 [ 0.30 ] 0.34 [ 0.47 ] 
aleveldum2000 0.10 [ 0.30 ] 0.35 [ 0.48 ] 
degreedum1995 0.11 [ 0.31 ] 0.17 [ 0.37 ] 
degreedum2000 0.11 [ 0.31 ] 0.19 [ 0.39 ] 
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pensiondum1995 0.64 [ 0.48 ] 0.75 [ 0.43 ] 
pensiondum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0.79 [ 0.41 ] 
employeedum1995 1 [ 0 ] 1 [ 0 ] 
employeedum2000 0 [ 0 ] 1 [ 0 ] 
selfemployeddum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
selfemployeddum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
retireddum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
retireddum2000 1 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
unemployeddum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
unemployeddum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
sexdum1995 0.56 [ 0.50 ] 0.52 [ 0.50 ] 
sexdum2000 0.56 [ 0.50 ] 0.52 [ 0.50 ] 
maritaldum1995 0.75 [ 0.43 ] 0.69 [ 0.46 ] 
maritaldum2000 0.74 [ 0.44 ] 0.72 [ 0.45 ] 
childdum1995 0.03 [ 0.16 ] 0.31 [ 0.46 ] 
childdum2000 0.01 [ 0.12 ] 0.31 [ 0.46 ] 
londondum1995 0.10 [ 0.30 ] 0.11 [ 0.31 ] 
londondum2000 0.07 [ 0.25 ] 0.10 [ 0.30 ] 
                  
No. of observations 73       812       
Note: standard errors are in square brackets. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage are measured in £1,000 in the 
above regression, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms 
for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £1,000 respectively.   
 
Table (C): 
  Treatment group   Control group   
Variable Mean   Std. Dev.   Mean   Std. Dev.   
allocation1995 0.19 [ 0.31 ] 0.22 [ 0.37 ] 
allocation2000 0.41 [ 0.43 ] 0.20 [ 0.35 ] 
netliquidwealth1995 
          
8.34 [ 
     
14.37 ] 3.57 [ 8.85 ] 
netliquidwealth2000 6.25 [ 5.58 ] 4.88 [ 12.64 ] 
personaldebt1995 0.02 [ 0.06 ] 0.61 [ 1.42 ] 
personaldebt2000 0 [ 0 ] 1.39 [ 3.38 ] 
housing1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
housing2000 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
outstandingmortgage1995 0 [ 0 ] 0.57 [ 5.54 ] 
outstandingmortgage2000 2.46 [ 8.88 ] 1.09 [ 7.12 ] 
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grossincome1995 6.59 [ 4.01 ] 10.50 [ 7.15 ] 
grossincome2000 0.00 [ 0.00 ] 12.10 [ 7.87 ] 
incomenlw1995 68.79 [ 237.14 ] 38.37 [ 307.09 ] 
incomenlw2000 0.00 [ 0.00 ] 210.45 [ 1564.17 ] 
age1995 60.85 [ 3.93 ] 37.45 [ 13.21 ] 
age2000 66.08 [ 3.93 ] 42.73 [ 13.17 ] 
olevelorunderdum1995 0.85 [ 0.38 ] 0.71 [ 0.46 ] 
olevelorunderdum2000 0.85 [ 0.38 ] 0.67 [ 0.47 ] 
aleveldum1995 0.15 [ 0.38 ] 0.19 [ 0.39 ] 
aleveldum2000 0.15 [ 0.38 ] 0.21 [ 0.41 ] 
degreedum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0.11 [ 0.31 ] 
degreedum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0.12 [ 0.32 ] 
pensiondum1995 0.38 [ 0.51 ] 0.49 [ 0.50 ] 
pensiondum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0.61 [ 0.49 ] 
employeedum1995 1 [ 0 ] 1 [ 0 ] 
employeedum2000 0 [ 0 ] 1 [ 0 ] 
selfemployeddum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
selfemployeddum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
retireddum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
retireddum2000 1 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
unemployeddum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
unemployeddum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0 [ 0 ] 
sexdum1995 0.38 [ 0.51 ] 0.39 [ 0.49 ] 
sexdum2000 0.38 [ 0.51 ] 0.39 [ 0.49 ] 
maritaldum1995 0.54 [ 0.52 ] 0.38 [ 0.49 ] 
maritaldum2000 0.54 [ 0.52 ] 0.35 [ 0.48 ] 
childdum1995 0.00 [ 0.00 ] 0.21 [ 0.41 ] 
childdum2000 0.08 [ 0.28 ] 0.17 [ 0.38 ] 
londondum1995 0 [ 0 ] 0.13 [ 0.33 ] 
londondum2000 0 [ 0 ] 0.12 [ 0.32 ] 
                  
No. of observations 13       95       
Note: standard errors are in square brackets. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage are measured in £1,000 in the 
above regression, whereas  Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared 
terms for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £1,000 respectively.  
 234 
 
Table (D): models with interaction terms and marginal effect for 
2000 
  Model 1 Model 2 marginal effect for model 
2   
  
Varibles     dy/dx X 
Dumearlyretirement 0.214 0.197 0.088 0.041  
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.10) 
 
Dumnormalretirement 0.193 0.180 0.078 0.267  
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.06) 
 
Netliquidwealth 1.612*** 1.592*** 0.659*** 0.104  
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.10) 
 
Netliquidwealthsquared -0.353*** -0.347*** -0.144*** 0.107  
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) 
 
Personaldebt 1.975** 2.147** 0.889** 0.016  
  (1.00) (1.01) (0.42) 
 
Housing 0.170*** 0.168*** 0.069*** 0.786  
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
 
Housingsquared -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.011*** 1.219  
  (0.01) (0.01) (3.08E-03) 
 
Outstandingmortgage 0.359 0.343 0.142 0.220  
  (0.28) (0.29) (0.12) 
 
Grosslabourincome 0.135 0.050 0.021 0.121  
  (0.52) (0.53) (0.22) 
 
Incomenlw 1.97E-06 9.32E-06 3.86E-06 78.515  
  (2.17E-05) (2.20E-05) (1.00E-05) 
 
Age 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.011*** 48.775  
  (0.01) (0.01) (2.34E-03) 
 
Agesquared -2.22E-04*** 
-2.54E-04**
* -1.05E-04*** 
2730.680  
  (6.10E-05) (6.33E-05) (3.00E-05) 
 
Aleveldum 0.219*** 0.210*** 0.091*** 0.260  
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) 
 
Degreedum 0.111 0.094 0.040 0.148  
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) 
 
Pensiondum 0.170** 0.162** 0.067** 0.455  
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) 
 
Sexdum 0.098* 0.083 0.034 0.480  
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) 
 
Maritaldum -0.007 0.001 3.00E-04 0.563  
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) 
 
Childdum 0.097 0.306*** 0.137** 0.193  
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  (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) 
 
Numberofkids 
 
-0.129** -0.053** 0.451  
  
 
(0.05) (0.02) 
 
Londondum 0.165* 0.153* 0.067 0.063  
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) 
 
Healthstatus 
 
-0.047 -0.019 2.148  
  
 
(0.03) (0.01) 
 
Dumearlyretirementdumhousin
g 0.082** 0.063* 0.025* 
0.036  
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
 
Dumnorretirementdumhousing -0.110 -0.098 -0.039 0.182  
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.05) 
 
Netliquidwealthdumhousing -0.660** -0.649** -0.269** 0.095  
  (0.26) (0.26) (0.11) 
 
Nlwsquareddumhousing 0.144* 0.140* 0.058* 0.100  
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) 
 
Personaldebtdumhousing -0.297 -0.472 -0.196 0.013  
  (1.03) (1.03) (0.43) 
 
Outstandingmdumhousing -0.275 -0.257 -0.106 0.217  
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.12) 
 
Grosslabourincomedumhousing -0.070 0.005 0.002 0.103  
  (0.54) (0.54) (0.23) 
 
Incomenlwdumhousing -7.02E-05 -7.76E-05* -3.22E-05* 45.695  
  (4.65E-05) (4.67E-05) (2.00E-05) 
 
Agedumhousing 0.006 0.002 0.001 37.320  
  (4.22E-03) (0.01) (2.07E-03) 
 
Agesquareddumhousing -9.75E-06 2.75E-05 1.14E-05 2039.250  
  (5.95E-05) (6.40E-05) (3.00E-05) 
 
Aleveldumdumhousing -0.185** -0.179** -0.070** 0.221  
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) 
 
Degreedumdumhousing -0.069 -0.056 -0.023 0.124  
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) 
 
Pensiondumdumhousing -0.049 -0.044 -0.018 0.392  
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) 
 
Sexdumdumhousing -0.034 -0.021 -0.008 0.381  
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) 
 
Maritaldumdumhousing 0.019 0.012 0.005 0.489  
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) 
 
Childdumdumhousing -0.044 -0.198 -0.077* 0.161  
  (0.09) (0.13) (0.05) 
 
Numberofkidsdumhousing 
 
0.093 0.039 0.358  
  
 
(0.06) (0.02) 
 
Londondumdumhousing -0.171 -0.159 -0.061* 0.042  
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) 
 
 236 
 
Healthstatusdumhousing 
 
0.023 0.010 1.625  
  
 
(0.03) (0.01) 
 
Constant -1.164*** -1.090*** 
  
  (0.11) (0.11)     
Log likelihood -4053.46  -4046.65  
  
LR chi2 840.98 854.59 
  
Pro>chi2 0 0 
  
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.0955     
No. of observations 4927 4927 
  
left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 
2505 2505 
  
uncensored observations 2036 2036 
  
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 
386 386     
Note:*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, 
Housing, Outstandingmortgage and Grosslabourincome are measured in £100,000 in the above 
regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms for  
Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £100,000 respectively. 
Table (E): Table (D) continued 
  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  regress on pincome, 
pincomenlw 
compared 
with model 3 
probit 
Varibles   
Dumearlyretirement 0.137 0.107 0.235 
  (0.20) (0.21) (0.33) 
Dumnormalretirement 0.286 0.282 0.328 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) 
Netliquidwealth 3.222*** 3.290*** 2.947*** 
  (0.72) (0.72) (0.50) 
Netliquidwealthsquared -2.894*** -2.968*** -0.621*** 
  (1.05) (1.05) (0.18) 
Personaldebt 4.443*** 4.674*** 2.524 
  (1.33) (1.35) (1.70) 
Housing 0.124*** 0.135*** 0.467*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) 
Housingsquared -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.068*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Outstandingmortgage 0.243 0.291 0.887 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.54) 
Grosslabourincome 
 
-0.396 0.619 
  
 
(0.57) (0.85) 
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Incomenlw 
 
1.50E-05 -3.40E-07 
  
 
(2.19E-05) (3.79E-05) 
Permanentincome 0.427 
    (0.83) 
  Permanetincomenlw 1.81E-05 
    (3.81E-05) 
  Age 0.023* 0.030** 0.047*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Agesquared -2.14E-04 -2.98E-04* -4.22E-04*** 
  (1.69E-04) (1.62E-04) (1.03E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.238** 0.272*** 0.419*** 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) 
Degreedum 0.041 0.102 0.221 
  (0.13) (0.10) (0.16) 
Pensiondum 0.104 0.124 0.252** 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) 
Sexdum 0.137** 0.158** 0.080 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
Maritaldum -0.004 -0.006 0.006 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 
Childdum 0.234* 0.239* 0.262 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.19) 
Numberofkids -0.129** -0.133** -0.151* 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Londondum 0.200* 0.225** 0.183 
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) 
Healthstatus -0.047 -0.046 -0.097** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Dumearlyretirementdumhousing 0.021* 0.012* 0.191* 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) 
Dumnorretirementdumhousing -0.162 -0.144 -0.213 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.23) 
Netliquidwealthdumhousing -2.202*** -2.262*** 1.031* 
  (0.72) (0.72) (0.55) 
Nlwsquareddumhousing 2.672** 2.745*** -0.137 
  (1.05) (1.05) (0.19) 
Personaldebtdumhousing -2.709** -2.941** 2.626 
  (1.36) (1.37) (1.83) 
Outstandingmdumhousing -0.140 -0.178 -0.934* 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.55) 
Grosslabourincomedumhousing 
 
0.400 -0.188 
  
 
(0.59) (0.90) 
Incomenlwdumhousing 
 
-6.78E-05 -9.43E-05 
  
 
(4.24E-05) (7.71E-05) 
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Permanentincomedumhousing 0.322 
    (0.89) 
  Permanetincomenlwdumhousing -6.14E-05 
    (5.24E-05) 
  Agedumhousing 0.003 0.003 0.002 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Agesquareddumhousing 1.68E-05 1.73E-05 2.87E-05 
  (1.33E-04) (1.25E-04) (1.07E-04) 
Aleveldumdumhousing -0.264*** -0.256*** -0.291** 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.13) 
Degreedumdumhousing -0.093 -0.069 -0.007 
  (0.14) (0.11) (0.17) 
Pensiondumdumhousing -2.94E-04 -0.014 -0.081 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) 
Sexdumdumhousing -0.054 -0.063 -0.027 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) 
Maritaldumdumhousing 0.016 0.016 0.097 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) 
Childdumdumhousing -0.156 -0.160 -0.131 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) 
Numberofkidsdumhousing 0.105* 0.108* 0.078 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) 
Londondumdumhousing -0.207* -0.236* -0.186 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) 
Healthstatusdumhousing 0.036 0.034 -0.001 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Constant -1.087*** -1.148*** -1.996*** 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) 
Log likelihood -2973.19  -2974.14  -2718.28  
LR chi2 610.82 608.91 1392.31 
Pro>chi2 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.0932 0.0929 0.2039 
No. of observations 3599 3599 4927 
left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 
1782 1782 
 
uncensored observations 1544 1544 
 
right-censored observations at 
α2000>=1 
273 273   
Note:*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, 
Housing, Outstandingmortgage,Grosslabourincome, and Permanentincome are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are 
the squared terms for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £100,000 
respectively. 
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5:The Impact of Taxation on the Household 
Risky Asset Choice 
5.1 Introduction 
 
   The impact of taxation on household portfolio allocation has long been an important 
issue which attracts attention from academics and policymakers (Alan et al, 2010, p1). 
The tax rates in the UK changed considerably during 1999 and 2001. In the tax year 
1999-2000, the lower rate of personal income tax was reduced from 23% to 10% while 
the basic rate and higher rate remained the same at 23% and 40% respectively. In the 
tax year 2000-2001, the basic rate of personal income tax fell slightly from 23% to 22% 
whereas the lower rate of capital gain tax was reduced from 20% to 10%. Although this 
cut in personal income tax and capital gain tax was dramatic, the effects of this taxation 
reform in the UK on household portfolio choice have not been widely studied. In 
comparison, several papers studied the US household portfolio structure and examined 
the effect of taxation on portfolio allocation using household level datasets including 
Feldstein (1976), King and Leape (1998), Hubbard (1985), Scholz (1994),  Samwick 
(2000) and Poterba and Samwick (2002). Partly due to the limitation of “reliable 
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information on the asset holdings of the high-wealth households who hold a significant 
share of financial assets” (Poterba and Samwick, 2003, p6), limited work has been 
implemented on this topic in other countries. The exceptions are Agell and Edin (1990) 
on marginal taxation and asset portfolios in Sweden, Hochguertel et al (1997) on 
households‟ portfolio choices in the Netherlands, Alan et al. (2010) on Canadian‟s 
taxation and portfolio allocation, and Stephens and Ward-Batts‟s (2004) research which 
explores the effect of separate taxation on the intra-household portfolio allocation in the 
UK.  
  This chapter will examine the impact of this tax reforms on portfolio shares in 
risky assets. The specific issue on which we focus is the effect of the tax change on the 
proportion of risky assets which individual investors hold. In this context we are asking 
the extent to which tax changes affect households‟ optimal portfolio risk. Clearly there 
are two opposing forces. A tax change will have both substitution and wealth effects. 
The substitution effect is defined as the effect of a tax change on risky asset holding 
arising from the individual switching to or from risk-free asset holding. The wealth 
effect is defined as the effect of a tax change on risky asset holding arising from the 
individual becoming better or worse off due to the tax change. If the substitution effect 
dominates we expect to see the fall in tax would lead to higher risky assets holdings. If 
the wealth effect dominates then households would move to safer assets. The 
substitution effect is defined as the effect of a tax change on risky asset holding arising 
from the individual switching to or from risk-free asset holding. The wealth effect is 
defined as the effect of a tax change on risky asset holding arising from the individual 
becoming better or worse off due to the tax change. 
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     The main empirical technique applied in this chapter is the 
Difference-in-Difference estimator. We will examine the effect of changes in tax (tax 
allowance and tax rate) using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) since we 
have substantial information on the risky and the risk-free asset holdings of the 
respondents and we can identify the tax bracket which should apply to each respondent. 
Furthermore, we will model portfolio selection controlling for taxation, which will give 
some insights into the effect of tax rates on asset choice. The policy implications of this 
analysis will also be highlighted. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section 5.2 presents 
a brief review of the related literature on the topic of taxation and portfolio choice. 
Section 5.3 looks at Tax reform in the UK during 1999 and 2001. In section 5.4 we 
discuss the impact of taxation on an individual‟s asset allocation from a theoretical 
perspective. Section 5.5 provides further details on our BHPS dataset and research 
methods, and Section 5.6 reports our results. The conclusion is finally drawn in Section 
5.7.  
 
5.2 Literature Review 
As mentioned before, several papers studied the US household portfolio structure 
and examined the effect of taxation on the portfolio allocation using the household level 
datasets. For example, Feldstein (1976), King and Leape (1998), Hubbard (1985), 
Poterba and Samwick (2003) used different methods to simulate and calculate the 
marginal tax rate, and they found taxation to have a “strong effect” on household asset 
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allocations (Alan et al., 2010, p813). Other researchers, such as Scholz (1994) and 
Samwick (2000), adopted Difference-in-Differences method to study how changes in 
tax have an impact on asset allocation.   
Feldstein (1976) provided “the first systematic econometric analysis of taxation 
and portfolio choice” (Poterba, 2002b, p1127). He used household level data from the 
1962 Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers. In his model, there were seven 
asset classes including common stock, preferred stock, bonds, municipal bonds, savings 
bonds, bank accounts and interest in trust. To overcome a potential endogeneity 
problem, instead of actual income, adjusted income was used. The adjusted income 
equals actual income plus five percent multiplied by the individual‟s financial portfolio 
wealth. Based on the value of adjusted income, an individual‟s tax class and marginal 
tax rate was determined and calculated. Feldstein (1976, p631) found that “the personal 
income tax has a very powerful effect on individual‟s demands for portfolio assets after 
adjusting for the effects of net worth, age, sex and the ratio of human to nonhuman 
capital”. Individuals with a higher marginal tax rate invested a higher proportion of 
wealth in common stocks and a lower proportion of wealth in bank accounts. 
Furthermore, Feldstein (1976) also pointed out that this positive relationship between 
marginal tax rate and risky asset share should be interpreted in the way that it was the 
tax structure which “encourages individuals with high tax rates to hold common stocks” 
(Feldstein, 1976, p641), since the highest rate for capital gain was 25 percentage in the 
US in 1962, compared with a maximum marginal income tax rate of 91%.   
Later King and Leape (1998) carried out research on the impact of marginal tax 
rates on portfolio allocation of US households. They use a special high-net-wealth 
survey which was conducted in 1978 by the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) and had a 
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sample of 6010 households. The way in which they calculated the marginal tax rate for 
each household is more reliable than other methods used in previous studies, since they 
used a program named TAXSIM which was developed by the National Bureau of 
Economics Research (NBER) and it “generated tax liabilities for each household using 
both the federal and state tax code relevant for the appropriate tax year
36” (King and 
Leape, 1998, p160-p161). In their model, a households‟ portfolio was defined as 
households‟ net worth which consists of all kinds of assets, mortgages and debts, such 
as checking accounts, less liquid savings, contractual liquid savings, corporate equity, 
taxable bonds, municipal bonds, owner-occupied housing, other assets, home mortgages 
and other liabilities. In order to deal with the problem that “most households owned 
incomplete portfolios” (King and Leape, 1998, p161), they adopted a two-stage 
estimation methods. They first estimated probit model for ownership of each assets as 
well as mortgage and other debts, then they estimated an asset demand equation for 
each assets, mortgage and other debts. The main finding of their empirical study was 
that taxation had significant impact on the ownership for different categories of assets, 
mortgage and debts, whereas conditional on the ownership, it had limited impact on the 
proportion of investment in different classes of assets, mortgage and debts. 
Hubbard‟s (1985, p57) work provided strong support for the conclusion drawn in 
Feldstein‟s (1976) empirical study that “under the special features of the U.S. tax 
system, higher marginal tax rates increase the demand for equities”. The dataset he used 
in the research was uniquely collected by the US President‟s Commission on Pension 
Policy in 1979 and 1980. He first estimated probit models to examine the effect of 
marginal tax rates on the discrete portfolio choice of individuals, followed by estimating 
                                                          
36
 Feenberg (1982), and Feenberg and Rosen (1983) provided much detailed information on TAXSIM 
program.  
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asset demand equations to examine the effect of marginal tax rates on the continuous 
portfolio choice. In both estimation stages, marginal tax rates were estimated by using 
the NBER TAXSIM programme and the following assets were analyzed, namely, 
“market value of the home, U.S. savings bonds, deposits, annuities, bonds, equity, and 
passenger cars” (Hubbard, 1985, p56). Furthermore, total debts, including mortgage and 
consumer debts, were also considered as a part of individual‟s portfolio and it was 
analysed in the way as other assets. After controlling for “present value of anticipated 
social security and private pension benefits” and other demographic and economic 
factors, Hubbard concluded that “marginal tax rates are quite important for asset choice 
as well as for the allocation of wealth across assets given the choice of which assets to 
hold” (Hubbard, 1985, p59).  
Scholz (1994) examined the potential impact of taxation on the changes in portfolio 
patterns around tax reforms in 1986 in the US. Under The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(TRA), the top marginal income tax rate was significantly cut from 50% to 28%, while 
the personal tax base was broadened
37
. By using the data from Surveys of Consumer 
Finances conducted in 1983 and 1989, Scholz (1994) carried out an inter-temporal 
analysis and found some evidence that households shiftted toward mortgage borrowing 
and away from other type of debts, there were only relatively small shifts among other 
asset categories. It seems that the TRA did not significantly affect household portfolio 
decisions even though the marginal tax rates facing many households were affected. 
The possible explanation could be that it takes time for the households to adjust their 
portfolios. A three-year period after the tax reform took place may not be sufficient for 
                                                          
37
 “for example, TRA eliminated the reduction for state and local sales taxes, eliminated the exclusion 
for realized capital gains, and restricted eligibility for tax-deductible Individual Retirement Account 
contributions” (Scholz, 1994, p219-p220).  
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considerable changes in portfolio structures to be observable (Gordon, 1994; Poterba, 
2002b).  However, taxes itself “may be an important factor shaping the structure of 
household portfolios” (Scholz, 1994, p239), because in both years it was found that 
households facing high marginal tax rates were more likely to hold Tax-exempt bonds 
and IRAs and Keoghs which were tax preferred.   
Samwick (2000) also examined how taxation affects the portfolio structure, 
concentrating particularly on the change in the ownership of the assets over the last two 
decades in the US. He studied the series of tax reforms over that period and concluded it 
was not clear that one could attribute the time-series changes in household portfolio 
allocation to the series of changes in marginal tax rates.  
Poterba and Samwick (2003) used time-series changes in tax rates as well as 
cross-sectional variations in tax rates to explore the relationship between taxation and 
portfolio choices in the Surveys of Consumer Finances over 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995 
and 1998. They used Probit and Tobit models to estimate the ownership of eight 
different assets and portfolio shares respectively. Similar covariates were included in the 
estimation as those in Feldstein (1976).  While controlling for income and wealth, 
Poterba and Samwick (2003, p5) found marginal tax rates had “important effects on 
asset allocation decisions”, and the effects were substantial on the probability of owning 
ordinary stocks, tax-exempt bonds or allocating assets in a tax-deferred account.  
Compared with their findings on the asset ownership, their studies suggested that the 
impact of taxation on the proportion of wealth invested in different categories of assets 
is weaker. 
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Partly due to the shortage of valuable information on the household portfolio 
composition in countries other than the US, not much work has been implemented 
interntionally on the relationship between taxation and portfolio allocation. One 
exception is Agell and Edin (1990) on marginal taxation and asset portfolios in Sweden. 
They used the household data from the annual Swedish income distribution survey and 
found significant impact of taxation on portfolio decisions. One policy implication of 
this study was also explored in the way that an increase of one percentage point in the 
marginal tax rate on interest and dividend income could boost the proportion of net 
wealth invested in common stocks by two percentage, in other words, increasing from 
20 percentage to 20.4 percentage.  
Stephens and Ward-Batts (2004) explored the effect of separate taxation on the 
intra-household portfolio allocation in the UK, where the switch to individual taxation 
from joint taxation took place in 1990. After 1990 UK households had the opportunity 
to reallocate their capital income to their partner with lower earnings in order to reduce 
the tax burden. They found some significant impact of this decision as households took 
advantage to reduce their tax burden. 
Very recently, Alan et al. (2010) carried out similar studies related to the Canadian‟s 
individual taxation and portfolio allocation, using individual dataset from the Canadian 
Survey of Financial Security. As for the UK, Canadian couples “with the same 
household income can face different effective tax rates on capital income when labour 
income is distributed differently within households” (Alan et al., 2010, p19).  They 
were able to estimate the impact of taxation on portfolio allocations under the Canadian 
individual taxation system. They found “statistically significant but economically 
modest responses to differential taxation” (Alan et al., 2010, p19). 
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Other work includes Hochguertel et al. (1997) paper which used Netherlands data to 
explore the effect of taxation on portfolio choice. They concluded that the marginal tax 
rate and individual wealth were the key determinants of household portfolio allocations.  
In sum, there has been a good deal of research which examines the impact of 
taxation on portfolio choices, especially in the US. These empirical studies suggested 
that taxation had a significant impact on the ownership for different categories of assets, 
whereas conditional on the ownership, it had limited impact on the proportion of 
investment in different classes of assets. Our research differs from the existing literature 
in the way that we only focus on two classes of assets, namely the risk-free assets and 
the risky assets
38
, and concentrate on examine the effect of changes in tax on household 
risky assets choice in the UK.  
5.3 Tax reform in the UK during 1999 and 2001  
The following Table 5.1 presents the income tax rates and capital gain tax rates 
before, during and after the 1999-2001 tax reform in the UK. 
Before the tax reform took place, capital gain tax rates and the labour income tax 
rates are exactly the same (the lower rate, basic rate and higher rate are 20%, around 
24%, 40% respectively from 1995 to1999). While saving income and dividends income 
are taxed at the exactly same rate during 1996 and 1999 (the lower rate, basic rate and 
                                                          
38
   In this research, the liquid financial wealth is defined to include both risky assets and risk free 
assets. According to classification in BHPS,  the former consist of National Savings Certificates, 
Premium Bonds, Unit Trusts/Investment Trusts, Personal Equity Plan, Shares (UK or foreign), National 
Savings bonds (Capital, Income or Deposit), and other investments (government or company securities). 
The risk free assets include saving or deposit account (with a bank, post office or building society), 
National Savings Bank (Post Office), TESSA or ISA. Income Tax Personal Allowances and Reliefs 
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higher rate are 20%, 20%, 40% respectively).  As can be seen, saving income and 
dividends income are slightly less taxed before the 1999-2001 tax reform.  
During the first year of the tax reform, the starting income tax rate, which was 
previously named as lower income tax rate, were dropped from 20% to 10% for labour 
income, saving income and dividends. Furthermore, for dividends income, not only the 
starting tax rate was reduced but also the basic tax rate was dropped from 20% to 10%, 
as well as the higher tax rate which was dropped from 40% to 32.5%. In comparison, 
for capital gain tax, just the basic rate was cut slightly from 23% to 20%, and for 
income the starting and the higher remained at 20% and 40% respectively. Hence, in 
1999-2000, the tax reform focused on cutting the income tax rate. 
In 2000-2001, the capital gain tax reform took place. The starting rate for capital 
gain tax was cut dramatically from 20 percentage to 10 percentage, while the basic and 
the higher rate was kept unchanged at 20% and 40% respectively.  In contrast, all the 
rates for income tax on labour income, saving income and dividends income remained 
unchanged, except the basic rate for labour income was reduced slightly from 23 
percentage to 22 percentage.  
After this tax reform on income tax and capital gain tax in 1999-2001, all the tax 
rates remained exactly the same during 2001 and 2008.
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Table 5. 1:Income tax rates and capital gain tax rates before, during and after the 1999-2001 tax reform 
  
 
Income Tax Capital Gain Tax 
  
financial 
year 
IncomeTa
x Personal 
Allowance
s and 
Reliefs (£) 
Bands of 
taxable 
income (£) 
 
rate of income tax (%) 
Annual 
exemp
t 
amoun
t (£) 
 
rate of capital gain 
tax 
 
    
labour 
income 
saving 
income 
dividend
s 
  (%) 
P
re
-r
ef
o
rm
 
1995-1996                   
 
3,525 1-3,200 lower rate 20 20 20 6,000 lower rate 20 
  
3,201-24,30
0 
basic rate 25 25 20 
 
basic rate 25 
  
over 24,300 
higher 
rate 
40 40 40 
 
higher 
rate 
40 
      
  
   
1996-1997 
     
  
   
 
3,765 1-3,900 lower rate 20 20 20 6,300 lower rate 20 
  
3,901-25,50
0 
basic rate 24 20 20 
 
basic rate 24 
  
over 25,500 
higher 
rate 
40 40 40 
 
higher 
rate 
40 
      
  
   
1997-1998 
     
  
   
 
4,045 1-4,100 lower rate 20 20 20 6,500 lower rate 20 
  
4,101-26,10
0 
basic rate 23 20 20 
 
basic rate 23 
  
over 26,100 higher 40 40 40 
 
higher 40 
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rate rate 
      
  
   
1998-1999 
     
  
   
 
4,195 1-4,300 lower rate 20 20 20 6,800 lower rate 20 
  
4,301-27,10
0 
basic rate 23 20 20 
 
basic rate 23 
    over 27,100 
higher 
rate 
40 40 40   
higher 
rate 
40 
 
  
 
Income Tax Capital Gain Tax 
  
Financial 
year 
IncomeTax 
Personal 
Allowances 
and Reliefs 
(£) 
Bands of 
taxable 
income (£) 
 
rate of income tax (%) 
Annual 
exempt 
amount (£) 
 
rate of capital gain 
tax 
 
    
labour 
income 
saving income 
divid
ends 
  (%) 
Ta
x 
re
fo
rm
 
1999-2000 
     
  
   
 
4,335 1-1,500 starting rate 10 10 10 7,100 starting rate 20 
  
1,501-28,000 basic rate 23 20 10 
 
basic rate 20 
  
over 28,000 higher rate 40 40 32.5 
 
higher rate 40 
      
  
   
2000-2001 
     
  
   
 
4,385 1-1,520 starting rate 10 10 10 7,200 starting rate 10 
  
1,521-28,400 basic rate 22 20 10 
 
basic rate 20 
    over 28,400 higher rate 40 40 32.5   higher rate 40 
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Income Tax Capital Gain Tax 
  financial year IncomeTax 
Personal 
Allowances 
and Reliefs 
(£) 
Bands of 
taxable 
income (£) 
 
rate of income tax (%) 
Annual 
exempt 
amount 
(£) 
 
rate of capital gain tax 
 
    labour income saving income dividends   (%) 
P
o
st
-r
ef
o
rm
 
2001-2002                   
 
4,535 1-1,880 starting rate 10 10 10 7,500 starting rate 10 
  
1,881-29,400 basic rate 22 20 10 
 
basic rate 20 
  
over 29,400 higher rate 40 40 32.5 
 
higher rate 40 
      
  
   
2002-2003 
     
  
   
 
4,615 1-1,920 starting rate 10 10 10 7,700 starting rate 10 
  
1,921-29,900 basic rate 22 20 10 
 
basic rate 20 
  
over 29,900 higher rate 40 40 32.5 
 
higher rate 40 
      
  
   
2003-2004 
     
  
   
 
4,615 1-1,960 starting rate 10 10 10 7,900 starting rate 10 
  
1,961-30,500 basic rate 22 20 10 
 
basic rate 20 
  
over 30,500 higher rate 40 40 32.5 
 
higher rate 40 
      
  
   
 
 
2004-2005 
     
  
   
 
4,745 1-2,020 starting rate 10 10 10 8,200 starting rate 10 
  
2,021-31,400 basic rate 22 20 10 
 
basic rate 20 
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over 31,400 higher rate 40 40 32.5 
 
higher rate 40 
      
  
   
2005-2006 
     
  
   
 
4,895 1-2,090 starting rate 10 10 10 8,500 starting rate 10 
  
2,091-32,400 basic rate 22 20 10 
 
basic rate 20 
    over 32,400 higher rate 40 40 32.5   higher rate 40 
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5.4 Impact of taxation on individual’s risky asset choice: 
theoretical considerations  
Taxation can have an impact on an individual‟s asset allocations by two 
approaches (King and Leape, 1998). The first approach is that among different asset 
classes with different tax preference, individuals who have different effective tax rates 
can choose to invest in those assets which can maximise their post-tax income. 
Empirical studies (e.g.:King and Leape, 1998, p176) suggest that individuals who have 
to pay high marginal tax rates tend to hold tax-exempt assets and/or tax preferred assets, 
such as municipal bonds and corporate equity, whereas the holders of taxed assets, for 
example, the holders of “liquid and less liquid savings” are found to be the individuals 
who face low marginal tax rates. The second approach is that the tax will have an 
impact on the demand for risky assets, but this impact is theoretically ambiguous (King 
and Leape, 1998, p177).  Tobin (1958, p81) explained that if an risk averse individual 
could only invest in two assets, a risk-free asset with no yield and a risky asset whose 
return was normally distributed, then introducing a tax on “interest income and capital 
gains alike, with complete loss offset provisions” would cause the individual to invest a 
higher proportion of wealth in risky asset. Later, Mossin (1968) found that as long as 
the individual had a concave utility function and the risk-free asset with no yield, the 
impact of tax on risky asset allocations would be positive, no matter whether the risky 
asset‟s return followed a normal distribution or not. However, this impact of a 
proportional taxation on risky asset allocation would be ambiguous if the assumption 
that a risk-free asset had no yield does not hold (Feldstein, 1976, p633). 
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      The following section provides a modified theoretical framework to analyse the 
effect caused by a change in tax rates. We separate this effect into two sub-effects, 
namely, the substitution effect and the wealth effect. These two effects will work 
together to determine the overall impact of taxation on an individual‟s portfolio 
allocation.   
The following Figure 5.1 is used to illustrate the impact of tax reforms from a 
theoretical perspective. Suppose that we have a rational, risk-averse individual who 
wants to maximize his utility over wealth. He can choose to invest in two assets, namely 
the risk-free asset and the risky asset. The after-tax net return from risk-free asset is 
denoted as      . The after-tax net return on risky asset is denoted as      which is 
the sum of after tax net return on capital gains,        and after-tax net return on 
dividends,      . Suppose the individual has an initial wealth of    at time t and after 
he invests all the initial wealth in risk-free asset and risky asset, his total wealth at time 
t+1 is plotted in the diagram at     . The    axis represents his risky asset share. So 
if he invests all of his initial wealth in risk-free asset (  =0), then his total wealth at 
time t+1 is   which is on the W axis, and the standard deviation of this portfolio‟s 
return is zero (              . As   increases, the expected total wealth at 
time t+1 will increase as well as the riskiness of the portfolio‟s return. As we can see the 
individual‟s indifference curves have been also drawn on the diagram. The tangent point 
   is the optimal point for this individual at time t+1 and the corresponding risky asset 
share is    .  
Now suppose the income tax rate on labour income, saving income and dividends 
are all reduced at time t, while the capital gain tax remains the same. Hence the after-tax 
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net return on the risk-free asset,      , will increase. The after tax net return on 
dividends,     , will also increase, as well as       . We keep the initial wealth    
unchanged. So the opportunity locus will shift upwards from      to      and the 
line      is steeper and the investor will shift from point     to point   . The line 
   will rotate to    . As we mentioned above, there are two effects involved in this 
process, namely, the substitution effect and the wealth effect. The substitution effect 
suggests that if the return from the risky asset increases, the investor‟s portfolio will be 
tilted towards the risky asset. Since at time t, the dividend income tax is reduced, so the 
after-tax net return on the risky asset,     ,which is the sum of       and       
will increase. Hence, the substitution effect will induce the investor shift from     to  
    and    will increase to    , whereas the wealth effect will have the reverse impact. 
The increase in      will induce the investor to hold a relatively conservative 
portfolio, in other words, the investor will shift from     to     and     will be 
reduced to   . Since these two effects on risky asset holdings are in opposite directions, 
the overall effect is ambiguous. The diagram below just presents one scenario where the 
wealth effect dominates.   
Now suppose not only the income tax rates are all reduced at time t, but also the 
capital gain tax is dropped. If we still keep the initial wealth    unchanged, then the 
effect of the capital gain tax change will move the opportunity locus upwards from 
     to     . The investor will shift from point    to point   . The line    will 
shift to    . Similarly, this effect of the capital gain tax can also be broken down into 
the substitution effect and the wealth effect. If the substitution effect dominates, then 
this decrease in capital gain tax will result in an increase in the risky asset share,  . The 
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diagram below presents the second scenario when the wealth effect dominates. Hence, 
as we can see that this decrease in capital gain tax leads to a decrease in  .  
To sum up, from the theoretical perspective, the impact of an income tax change and 
a capital gain tax change on the risky asset share is ambiguous. The overall effect 
depends on which effect is in the dominant position, the substitution effect or the wealth 
effect. The following Table 5.2 summarize these effects. As we can see, if income tax 
falls and the substitution effect is greater than the wealth effect, risky asset share 
increases. If income tax falls and the substitution effect is less than the wealth effect, 
risky asset share decreases. Similarly, if capital gains tax falls and the substitution effect 
is greater than the wealth effect, risky asset share increases. If capital gains tax falls and 
the substitution effect is less than the wealth effect, risky asset share decreases.  
Table 5. 2: The overall effect of the fall in tax 
  Income tax falls capital gain tax falls 
α  
increases substitution effect>wealth effect substitution effect>wealth effect 
α  
decreases substitution effect<wealth effect substitution effect<wealth effect 
 
As mentioned before, this chapter is to examine the taxation effect of income tax 
changes and capital gain tax changes on the individual‟s asset allocation in the UK. In 
section 5.3, we discussed the income tax rates and capital gain tax rates before, during 
and after the 1999-2001 tax reform and we can simplify the tax policy changes during 
1999 and 2001 into two parts. The first part, tax year 1999-2000, can be regarded as the 
year in which income tax reform took place and the tax year 2000-2001 can be regarded 
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as the year in which capital gain tax reform took place. Later in section 5.6, we will 
explain our empirically results from the theoretically perspective. 
 
Figure 5. 1:Impact of taxation on individual's risky asset choice 
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5.5 Data and methods 
5.5.1 Control and treatment groups (Difference-in-Differences 
(DD) estimation) 
5.5.1.1: Definition of control and treatment groups under DD 
methods  
In this chapter, we use individual level data from the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) for years 1995 and 2000. Our data are constructed from both the 
household files as well as individual files of the BHPS. We will use this data to examine 
the impact of income tax and capital gain tax on portfolio shares in risky assets by using 
the Difference-in-Differences method.  
The simple case consists of two groups and two time period. The treatment group 
is exposed to a treatment in the second period only and the control group is not exposed 
to the treatment at either period.  DD method involves subtracting the average gain in 
the control group from the average gain in the treatment group across both periods. This 
method “removes biases in second period comparisons between the treatment and 
control group that could be the result from permanent differences between those groups, 
as well as biases from comparisons over time in the treatment group that could be the 
result of trends” (Wooldridge, 2007). 
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5.5.1.1.1: Definition of control and treatment groups when estimating 
the effect of income tax 
We firstly set up the DD estimation for the effect of income tax on an individual‟s 
risky asset shares. There are four DD estimations involved in this process. The first one 
is to examine the effect of paying income tax on an individual‟s risky asset shares in the 
short run (years 1995-2000), and the second one refers to the short-run effect of reduced 
marginal income tax due to the income tax reform in the tax year 1999-2000. The third 
one and the fourth one are similar to the first one and the second one respectively, but 
they look at the long-run effect from 1995 to 2005.  
For all these four DD estimations, we use individual total annual income which 
includes labour, interest and dividend income to select the treatment and control groups. 
For the first DD estimation, we select our control group as respondents who were not 
paying income tax in both years. Hence the control group is made up of respondents 
whose gross incomes were below £3525 and £4385 in 1995 and 2000 respectively. 
Whereas the treatment group consists of individuals whose gross incomes were below 
£3525 in 1995 and above £4385 in 2000. These are the thresholds for marginal tax rates 
which changed over the two periods. They are the income tax personal allowances for 
each of these two years. Hence our treatment group consists of individuals who were 
not paying income tax in 1995 and were paying income tax in 2000. Our final sample 
includes 1562 individuals (3124 observations) who responded to both surveys in 1995 
and 2000 and on which we have data on savings and investment. There are 1160 
individuals in the control group and 402 individuals in the treatment group.  
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The following Table 5.3 suggests that the average risky asset allocation for the 
treatment group is the same as the average risky asset allocation for the control group in 
1995, which is 14 percent. In 2000, the average risky asset allocation for the control 
group remains at 14 percent, whereas the average risky asset allocation for the treatment 
group falls to 11 percent. The average net liquid wealth decreases for both groups from 
1995 to 2000. The average personal debt increases for both groups from 1995 to 2000. 
Similarly, this pattern of change has been found in gross house value and gross labour 
income. The following Table also suggests that on average, respondents in the treatment 
group are much younger than respondents in the control group. The average age for the 
treatment group in 1995 is 27.45 and it increases to 32.65 in 2000. The average age for 
the control group in 1995 is 53.62 and it increases to 58.84 in 2000. In the treatment 
group, 38 percent of the respondents are male, whereas in the control group, 32 percent 
of the respondents are male. 
Table 5. 3:Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the effect 
of paying income tax, 1995-2000)  
  Treatment group Control group 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
allocation1995 0.14  (0.30) 0.14  (0.30) 
allocation2000 0.11  (0.27) 0.14  (0.30) 
netliquidwealth1995 2.44  (13.58) 6.78  (20.23) 
netliquidwealth2000 1.33  (14.92) 5.54  (16.31) 
personaldebt1995 0.55  (2.66) 0.19  (0.70) 
personaldebt2000 2.26  (4.06) 0.45  (1.98) 
housing1995 45.88  (50.59) 37.79  (44.13) 
housing2000 64.95  (78.03) 56.02  (77.29) 
grosslabourincome1995 0.61  (1.05) 0.22  (0.69) 
grosslabourincome2000 12.74  (6.74) 0.46  (0.98) 
age1995 27.45  (11.77) 53.62  (18.72) 
age2000 32.65  (11.76) 58.84  (18.72) 
sexdum1995 0.38  (0.49) 0.32  (0.47) 
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sexdum2000 0.38  (0.49) 0.32  (0.47) 
Note: Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Grosslabourincome are 
measured in £1,000 in the above table. 
For the second DD estimation which examine the short run effect of reduced 
marginal income tax due to the income tax reform in tax year 1999-2000. If the 
individual did not pay income tax in 1995 and 2000, then he/she is classified as in the 
control group. If the individual paid income tax in 1995 and 2000, then he/she is 
classified as in the treatment group. For the second estimation, there are 5018 
observations. In other words, there are 2509 individuals (5018 observations) who 
responded to both surveys in 1995 and 2000 and on which we have data on savings and 
investment. There are 1160 individuals in the control group and 1349 individuals in the 
treatment group. 
The following Table 5.4 suggests that from 1995 to 2000 the average risky asset 
allocation for the treatment group increases from 20 percent to 23 percent and the 
average risky asset allocation for the control group remains the same at 14 percent. The 
average net liquid wealth remains the same for treatment group and it decreases for 
control group from £6,780 to £5,540. The average personal debt increases for both 
groups from 1995 to 2000. Similarly, this pattern of change has been found in gross 
house value and gross labour income. The following Table also suggests that on average, 
respondents in the treatment group are younger than respondents in the control group. 
The average age for the treatment group in 1995 is 35.28 and it increases to 40.47 in 
2000. The average age for the control group in 1995 is 53.62 and it increases to 58.84 in 
2000. In the treatment group, 56 percent of the respondents are male, whereas in the 
control group, 32 percent of the respondents are male. 
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Table 5. 4: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of reduced marginal income tax, 1995-2000) 
  Treatment group Control group 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
allocation1995 0.20  (0.34) 0.14  (0.30) 
allocation2000 0.23  (0.35) 0.14  (0.30) 
netliquidwealth1995 5.99  (41.23) 6.78  (20.23) 
netliquidwealth2000 5.99  (27.55) 5.54  (16.31) 
personaldebt1995 1.41  (3.29) 0.19  (0.70) 
personaldebt2000 2.55  (5.47) 0.45  (1.98) 
housing1995 55.38  (44.16) 37.79  (44.13) 
housing2000 95.17  (86.55) 56.02  (77.29) 
grosslabourincome1995 15.46  (9.86) 0.22  (0.69) 
grosslabourincome2000 21.11  (13.37) 0.46  (0.98) 
age1995 35.28  (10.14) 53.62  (18.72) 
age2000 40.47  (10.14) 58.84  (18.72) 
sexdum1995 0.56  (0.50) 0.32  (0.47) 
sexdum2000 0.56  (0.50) 0.32  (0.47) 
Note: Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Grosslabourincome are 
measured in £1,000 in the above table. 
For the third DD estimation, we look at the long run effect of paying income tax 
from 1995 to 2005. Using the income allowances which are £3525 in 1995 and £4895 in 
2005, we define control group and treatment group. The control group refers to 
individuals whose gross incomes were less than income allowance in 1995 and 2005, 
and treatment group refers to individuals whose gross income was less than the income 
allowance in 1995 but was greater in 2005. And finally, we have 1766 individuals and 
3532 observations in that sample. There are 1258 individuals in the control group and 
508 individuals in the treatment group. 
The following Table 5.5 suggests that from 1995 to 2005 the average risky asset 
allocation for the treatment group increases from 12 percent to 15 percent and the 
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average risky asset allocation for the control group drops from 19 percent to 13 percent. 
The average net liquid wealth drops from £1,960 to £1,040 for treatment group and it 
decreases from £15,460 to £11,590 for control group. The average personal debt 
increases for both groups from 1995 to 2005. Similarly, this pattern of change has been 
found in gross house value and gross labour income. The following Table also suggests 
that on average, respondents in the treatment group are much younger than respondents 
in the control group. The average age for the treatment group in 1995 is 28.28 and it 
increases to 38.50 in 2005. The average age for the control group in 1995 is 54.93 and it 
increases to 65.15 in 2005. In the treatment group, 40 percent of the respondents are 
male, whereas in the control group, 33 percent of the respondents are male. 
Table 5. 5: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of paying income tax, 1995-2005) 
  Treatment group Control group 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
allocation1995 0.12  (0.28) 0.19  (0.33) 
allocation2005 0.15  (0.32) 0.13  (0.30) 
netliquidwealth1995 1.96  (11.21) 15.46  (45.91) 
netliquidwealth2005 1.04  (12.84) 11.59  (50.83) 
personaldebt1995 0.51  (1.71) 0.24  (1.08) 
personaldebt2005 3.13  (5.78) 0.44  (2.34) 
housing1995 49.55  (50.68) 50.71  (59.95) 
housing2005 147.15  (125.44) 136.03  (158.51) 
grosslabourincome1995 0.52  (1.00) 0.23  (0.72) 
grosslabourincome2005 18.52  (11.99) 0.25  (0.94) 
age1995 28.28  (10.22) 54.93  (16.64) 
age2005 38.50  (10.22) 65.15  (16.63) 
sexdum1995 0.40  (0.49) 0.33  (0.47) 
sexdum2005 0.40  (0.49) 0.33  (0.47) 
Note: Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Grosslabourincome are 
measured in £1,000 in the above table. 
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For the fourth DD estimation, we examine the long run effect of reduced marginal 
income tax due to income tax reform in tax year 1999-2000. By using income 
allowances which are £3525 and £4895 in 1995 and 2005 respectively, we define 
control group as a group of individuals who did not pay income tax in 1995 and 2005, 
and treatment group as a group of individuals who paid income tax in 1995 and 2005.  
We have 2497 individuals and 4994 observations in that sample. There are 1258 
individuals in the control group and 1239 individuals in the treatment group. 
The following Table 5.6 suggests that from 1995 to 2005 the average risky asset 
allocation for the treatment group drops from 19 percent to 18 percent and the average 
risky asset allocation for the control group drops from 19 percent to 13 percent. The 
average net liquid wealth increases from £4,570 to £6,060 for treatment group and it 
decreases from £15,460 to £11,590 for control group. The average personal debt 
increases for both groups from 1995 to 2005. Similarly, this pattern of change has been 
found in gross house value and gross labour income. The following Table also suggests 
that on average, respondents in the treatment group are younger than respondents in the 
control group. The average age for the treatment group in 1995 is 34.98 and it increases 
to 45.18 in 2005. The average age for the control group in 1995 is 54.93 and it increases 
to 65.15 in 2005. In the treatment group, 55 percent of the respondents are male, 
whereas in the control group, 33 percent of the respondents are male. 
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Table 5. 6: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of reduced marginal income tax, 1995-2005) 
  Treatment group Control group 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
allocation1995 0.19  (0.33) 0.19  (0.33) 
allocation2005 0.18  (0.33) 0.13  (0.30) 
netliquidwealth1995 4.57  (25.23) 15.46  (45.91) 
netliquidwealth2005 6.06  (32.93) 11.59  (50.83) 
personaldebt1995 1.36  (2.74) 0.24  (1.08) 
personaldebt2005 3.53  (15.36) 0.44  (2.34) 
housing1995 56.80  (47.04) 50.71  (59.95) 
housing2005 194.05  (137.36) 136.03  (158.51) 
grosslabourincome1995 15.14  (8.99) 0.23  (0.72) 
grosslabourincome2005 25.56  (18.82) 0.25  (0.94) 
age1995 34.98  (9.39) 54.93  (16.63) 
age2005 45.18  (9.39) 65.15  (16.63) 
sexdum1995 0.55  (0.50) 0.33  (0.47) 
sexdum2005 0.55  (0.50) 0.33  (0.47) 
Note: Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Grosslabourincome are 
measured in £1,000 in the above table. 
 
5.5.1.1.2: Definition of control and treatment groups when estimating 
the effect of capital gain tax 
Now we set up the DD estimation for the effect of the capital gain tax on an 
individual‟s risky asset shares. There are also four DD estimations involved in this 
process. The first one is to examine the effect of paying capital gain tax on individual‟s 
risky asset shares in the short run (1995-2000), and the second one refers to the 
short-run effect of reduced marginal capital gain tax due to the tax reform in the  tax 
year 2000-2001. The third one and the fourth one are similar to the first one and the 
second one respectively, but they look at the long-run effect from 1995 to 2005.  
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Because we use the BHPS data, we could not find direct information on individual‟s 
capital gains in the corresponding year, so in this research, we assume that the gross 
return on capital investment is 10 percent. Then the individual‟ “capital gain” equals to 
the product of 10 percent multiply by the amount of individual‟s total risky assets.  If 
the capital gain  exceeds the capital gain allowance in that year, this individual would 
be considered as a “capital gain tax payer” in that year in this research. 
Hence, for all these four DD estimations, we use this definition of “capital gains” 
and “capital gain tax payer” to select the treatment and control groups. For the first DD 
estimation, we select our control group as respondents who were not paying capital gain 
tax in both 1995 and 2000. Hence the control group is made up of respondents whose 
capital gain was below £6000 and £7200 in 1995 and 2000 respectively. Whereas the 
treatment group consists of individuals whose capital gain was below £6000 in 1995 
and above £7200 in 2000. The £6000 and £7200 are the capital gain allowances for 
1995 and 2000 respectively.  Hence our treatment group consists of individuals who 
were not paying capital gain tax in 1995 and were paying capital gain tax in 2000. Our 
final sample includes 3911 individuals who responded to both surveys in 1995 and 2000 
and on which we have data on savings and investment. There are 3885 individuals in 
the control group and 26 individuals in the treatment group. 
The following Table 5.7 suggests that from 1995 to 2000 the average risky asset 
allocation for the treatment group increases from 53 percent to 84 percent and the 
average risky asset allocation for the control group increases from 16 percent to 17 
percent. The average net liquid wealth increases from £41,480 to £144,070 for treatment 
group and it decreases from £4,380 to £3,840 for control group. From 1995 to 2000 the 
average personal debt decreases for the treatment group and it increases for the control 
 267 
 
group. Gross house value increases for both groups from 1995 to 2000 and a similar 
pattern of change can be found in gross labour income. The following Table also 
suggests that on average, respondents in the treatment group are older than respondents 
in the control group. The average age for the treatment group in 1995 is 53.24 and it 
increases to 57.85 in 2000. The average age for the control group in 1995 is 42.30 and it 
increases to 46.97 in 2000. In the treatment group, 50 percent of the respondents are 
male, whereas in the control group, 44 percent of the respondents are male. 
Table 5. 7: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of paying capital gains tax, 1995-2000) 
  Treatment group Control group 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
allocation1995 0.53 (0.37) 0.16 (0.31) 
allocation2000 0.84 (0.17) 0.17 (0.32) 
netliquidwealth1995 41.48 (36.31) 4.38 (13.88) 
netliquidwealth2000 144.07 (63.88) 3.84 (14.14) 
personaldebt1995 0.43 (1.00) 0.76 (2.25) 
personaldebt2000 0.29 (0.87) 1.57 (4.06) 
housing1995 120.88 (62.00) 47.49 (44.65) 
housing2000 232.69 (188.25) 72.27 (78.16) 
grosslabourincome1995 11.97 (15.99) 7.35 (9.52) 
grosslabourincome2000 14.35 (18.28) 10.53 (12.88) 
age1995 53.24 (15.27) 42.30 (17.74) 
age2000 57.85 (14.30) 46.97 (17.50) 
sexdum1995 0.50 (0.51) 0.44 (0.50) 
sexdum2000 0.50 (0.51) 0.44 (0.50) 
Note: Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Grosslabourincome are 
measured in £1,000 in the above table. 
For the second DD estimation which examine the short run effect of reduced 
marginal capital gain tax due to the tax reform in tax year 2000-2001. If the individual 
did not pay capital gain tax in 1995 and 2000, then he/she is classified as in the control 
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group. If the individual paid capital gain tax in 1995 and 2000, then he/she is classified 
as in the treatment group. For the second estimation, there are 7808 observations. In 
other words, there are 3904 individuals who responded to both surveys in 1995 and 
2000 and on which we have data on savings and investment. There are 3885 individuals 
in the control group and 19 individuals in the treatment group. 
The following Table 5.8 suggests that from 1995 to 2000 the average risky asset 
allocation for the treatment group increases from 82 percent to 84 percent and the 
average risky asset allocation for the control group increases from 16 percent to 17 
percent. The average net liquid wealth decreases from £285,830 to £223,400 for 
treatment group and it decreases from £4,380 to £3,840 for control group. The average 
personal debt increases for both groups from 1995 to 2000. Similarly, this pattern of 
change has been found in gross house value. The average gross labour income deceases 
from £20,650 to £17,990 for the treatment group while it increases for the control group 
from 1995 to 2000. The following Table also suggests that on average, respondents in 
the treatment group are older than respondents in the control group. The average age for 
the treatment group in 1995 is 56.22 and it increases to 61.24 in 2000. The average age 
for the control group in 1995 is 42.30 and it increases to 46.97 in 2000. In the treatment 
group, 67 percent of the respondents are male, whereas in the control group, 44 percent 
of the respondents are male. 
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Table 5. 8: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of reduced marginal capital gains tax, 1995-2000) 
  Treatment group Control group 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
allocation1995 0.82  (0.16) 0.16  (0.31) 
allocation2000 0.84  (0.14) 0.17  (0.32) 
netliquidwealth1995 285.83  (259.79) 4.38  (13.88) 
netliquidwealth2000 223.40  (139.02) 3.84  (14.14) 
personaldebt1995 0.78  (1.96) 0.76  (2.25) 
personaldebt2000 2.63  (11.47) 1.57  (4.06) 
housing1995 146.39  (76.21) 47.49  (44.65) 
housing2000 203.68  (123.69) 72.27  (78.16) 
grosslabourincome1995 20.65  (33.49) 7.35  (9.52) 
grosslabourincome2000 17.99  (25.94) 10.53  (12.88) 
age1995 56.22  (11.82) 42.30  (17.74) 
age2000 61.24  (11.40) 46.97  (17.50) 
sexdum1995 0.67  (0.50) 0.44  (0.50) 
sexdum2000 0.67  (0.50) 0.44  (0.50) 
Note: Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Grosslabourincome are 
measured in £1,000 in the above table. 
 
For the third DD estimation, we look at the long run effect of paying capital gain tax 
from 1995 to 2005. Using the capital gain allowances which are £6000 in 1995 and 
£8500 in 2005, we define control group and treatment group. The control group refers 
to individuals whose capital gain tax was less than capital gain allowance in 1995 and 
2005, and treatment group refers to individuals whose capital gain was less than the 
capital gain allowance in 1995 but was greater in 2005. And finally, we have 2989 
individuals and 5978 observations in that sample. There are 2828 individuals in the 
control group and 161 individuals in the treatment group. 
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The following Table 5.9 suggests that from 1995 to 2005 the average risky asset 
allocation for the treatment group increases from 71 percent to 73 percent and the 
average risky asset allocation for the control group drops from 11 percent to 10 percent. 
The average net liquid wealth increases from £82,780 to £101,570 for treatment group 
and it increases from £1,770 to £1,850 for control group. From 1995 to 2005 the 
average personal debt decreases for the treatment group and it increases for the control 
group. Gross house value increases for both groups from 1995 to 2005 and a similar 
pattern of change can be found in gross labour income. The following Table also 
suggests that on average, respondents in the treatment group are older than respondents 
in the control group. The average age for the treatment group in 1995 is 53.82 and it 
increases to 63.97 in 2005. The average age for the control group in 1995 is 40.89 and it 
increases to 51.11 in 2005. In the treatment group, 60 percent of the respondents are 
male, whereas in the control group, 41 percent of the respondents are male. 
Table 5. 9: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of paying capital gains tax, 1995-2005) 
  Treatment group Control group 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
allocation1995 0.21  (0.32) 0.11  (0.27) 
allocation2005 0.73  (0.26) 0.10  (0.27) 
netliquidwealth1995 5.84  (12.49) 1.77  (7.28) 
netliquidwealth2005 43.31  (48.46) 1.85  (14.37) 
personaldebt1995 1.48  (3.31) 0.74  (2.10) 
personaldebt2005 2.18  (9.40) 2.10  (9.74) 
housing1995 78.16  (66.21) 46.59  (44.85) 
housing2005 241.26  (142.32) 145.76  (133.09) 
grosslabourincome1995 13.09  (13.40) 6.72  (8.60) 
grosslabourincome2005 17.94  (21.83) 12.27  (16.24) 
age1995 44.10  (14.06) 40.89  (16.58) 
age2005 54.26  (14.03) 51.11  (16.57) 
sexdum1995 0.56  (0.50) 0.41  (0.49) 
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sexdum2005 0.56  (0.50) 0.41  (0.49) 
Note: Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Grosslabourincome are 
measured in £1,000 in the above table. 
 
For the fourth DD estimation, we examine the long run effect of reduced marginal 
capital gain tax due to tax reform in tax year 2000-2001. By using capital gain 
allowances which are £6000 and £8500 in 1995 and 2005 respectively, we define 
control group as a group of individuals who did not pay capital gain tax in 1995 and 
2005, and treatment group as a group of individuals who paid capital gain tax in 1995 
and 2005.  We have 2974 individuals and 5948 observations in that sample. There are 
2828 individuals in the control group and 146 individuals in the treatment group. 
The following Table 5.10 suggests that from 1995 to 2005 the average risky asset 
allocation for the treatment group increases from 21 percent to 73 percent and the 
average risky asset allocation for the control group drops from 11 percent to 10 percent. 
The average net liquid wealth increases from £5,840 to £43,310 for treatment group and 
it increases from £1,770 to £1,850 for control group. From 1995 to 2005 the average 
personal debt increases for both groups from 1995 to 2005. Similarly, this pattern of 
change has been found in gross house value and gross labour income. The following 
Table also suggests that on average, respondents in the treatment group are older than 
respondents in the control group. The average age for the treatment group in 1995 is 
44.10 and it increases to 54.26 in 2005. The average age for the control group in 1995 is 
40.89 and it increases to 51.11 in 2005. In the treatment group, 56 percent of the 
respondents are male, whereas in the control group, 41 percent of the respondents are 
male. 
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Table 5. 10: Descriptive statistics for treatment group and control group (DD for the 
effect of reduced marginal capital gains tax, 1995-2005) 
  Treatment group Control group 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
allocation1995 0.71  (0.23) 0.11  (0.27) 
allocation2005 0.73  (0.26) 0.10  (0.27) 
netliquidwealth1995 82.78  (93.67) 1.77  (7.28) 
netliquidwealth2005 101.57  (141.51) 1.85  (14.37) 
personaldebt1995 0.63  (2.71) 0.74  (2.10) 
personaldebt2005 0.50  (1.89) 2.10  (9.74) 
housing1995 108.86  (74.77) 46.59  (44.85) 
housing2005 290.41  (161.74) 145.76  (133.09) 
grosslabourincome1995 11.32  (14.73) 6.72  (8.60) 
grosslabourincome2005 11.73  (24.34) 12.27  (16.24) 
age1995 53.82  (12.46) 40.89  (16.58) 
age2005 63.97  (12.48) 51.11  (16.57) 
sexdum1995 0.60  (0.49) 0.41  (0.49) 
sexdum2005 0.60  (0.49) 0.41  (0.49) 
Note: Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Grosslabourincome are 
measured in £1,000 in the above table. 
 
5.5.1.2: The fundamental concept of DD estimation 
In order to explain the concept behind the difference-in-difference (DD) estimation, 
we use the DD estimation which aims to examine the short-run effect of reduced 
marginal income tax due to income tax reform in the tax year 1999-2000. Suppose PA1 
and PA2 represents the average portfolio share in risky assets for the control group in 
1995 and 2000 respectively, and PA3 and PA4 denotes the average portfolio share in 
risky assets for the treatment group in 1995 and 2000 respectively:  
 
 273 
 
Table 5. 11: Simple illlustration for DD methods 
 
Control group 
(dumtreatment=0) 
Treatment group 
(dumtreatment=1) 
1995 
PA1 PA3 (timedummy=0) 
2000 
PA2 PA4 (timedummy=1) 
 
The change in portfolio share for the treatment group over 1995 and 2000 is 
PA4-PA3. Some of this change may be attributed to the change in the marginal income 
tax rates and the other part is due to external factors. The assumption we made for 
estimating the DD estimator is that individuals in the control group reflect those 
external non-tax factors in the change in their portfolio share, which is denoted as 
PA2-PA1. This “common trends” assumption is a fundamental concept of DD 
estimation. Therefore, an estimate of the impact of taxation on the portfolio allocation in 
the treatment group is (PA4-PA3)-(PA2-PA1). In other words, basically we need to 
compare the portfolio share change of an individual who experienced large cut in 
taxation with that of individuals who faced no cut in taxation, under the assumption that 
they would have reallocated their portfolio share in the same way and same amount in 
the absence of the marginal income tax rate change in 1999.  
5.5.1.3 Regression-adjusted DD estimation 
However, the “common trends” assumption may not be satisfied, because the 
control group and treatment group may “differ in time trends of either observable or 
unobservable characteristics or both” (Crossley and Jeon, 2007, p355). This means that 
the observable or unobservable group characteristics or both can explain the difference 
between the changes in portfolio shares which refers to (PA4-PA3)-(PA2-PA1). A 
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possible remedy is to carry out a regression-adjusted DD estimation. By controlling for 
the relevant and observable factors, this remedy would reduce the bias that is caused by 
the different changes over time in the observable characteristics between control group 
and treatment group (Meyer, 1995; Crossley and Jeon, 2007). Meyer (1995) also points 
out that compared with a simple DD estimation approach, this regression-adjusted DD 
estimation method would lead to more efficient estimates. Therefore, besides running 
the following simple DD regression, 
*
it = 0 + 1 idumtreatment + 2 ttimedummy + 3( * )ittimedummy dumtreatment + it , 
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 we would also augment it with regression-adjusted DD estimation, which is specified as 
follows: 
*
it = 0 + 1 idumtreatment + 2 ttimedummy + 3( * )ittimedummy dumtreatment + 4 itX +
it , 
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Since our risky asset allocation data are left censored at zero if the respondent does 
not invest in the risky assets, and are right censored at one if the respondent invest all 
his/her wealth in the risky assets, we estimate the models via a Tobit regression which 
allows for data censoring both at zero and one. In this estimation, the portfolio share, *it , 
 275 
 
is  the latent variable which indicates the proportion of personal wealth that would 
notionally be invested in the risky assets. We control for a series of socioeconomic and 
demographic variables, such as net liquid wealth, personal debt, housing, gross labour 
income, age and gender
39
. 
      Note that Gross labour income (Gross labour income) refers to the households‟ 
annual labour income only. Income from savings and investments are not included in 
order to avoid potential endogeneity problem of the portfolio share and income variables; 
dumtreatment is a dummy variable which equals one if the respondent is in the treatment 
group. It captures “possible differences between the treatment and control groups prior to 
the policy change” (Wooldridge, 2007, p3). The dummy variable timedummy equals zero 
for 1995 and equals one otherwise. This dummy variable captures “aggregate factors that 
would cause changes in y even in the absence of a policy change” (Wooldridge, 2007, p3).  
Its coefficient, 2 , is expected to be negative in this case if the respondents foresee stock 
market crash and economics recession which starts from January of 2000. The coefficient, 
3 , for timedummy*dumtreatment would suggest whether the income tax or the capital 
gain tax had an positive, negative or no impact on the individuals‟ risky asset shares.  
 
 
                                                          
39
 , Please refer to chapter 3.3.2 for definitions of each variable. Note, Gross income (GROSSINCOME) 
refers to the households’ annual labour income only. Income from savings and investments are not 
included in order to avoid potential endogeneity problem of the portfolio share and income variables.  
 276 
 
5.5.2 Standard Tobit estimation with additional variable of 
marginal tax rate 
In this research, we will also develop another way to examine the effect of the 
marginal tax rate on household asset allocation. We modify the Tobit estimation as 
follows: 
*
2000i =( i19950 )1  + 1 2000imarginaltaxrate +   + i , ),0(~
2 Ni , 
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In this estimation, the portfolio share, *2000i , is the latent variable which indicates the 
proportion of personal wealth that would notionally be invested in the risky assets in 2000. 
We introduce an additional explanatory variable, the marginal tax rate in 2000 tocapture 
the impact of the marginal tax rate on household asset allocation. The variable X refers a 
series of control variable, such as net liquid wealth and age.  
We estimate the marginal tax rate on ordinary saving and investment income for each 
respondent in the corresponding BHPS survey. This tax rate is not just an important 
element of tax reform in year 1999, but it also varies across individuals. While we use the 
respondents‟ income information, we have to overcome a potential endogeneity problem, 
because the marginal tax rate on ordinary saving and investment income for each 
respondent may itself be influenced by his/her portfolio allocations. An individual who 
allocates all his/her wealth in risky assets, such as corporate stocks and bonds, receives 
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higher level of investment income and, consequently, he/she may face a higher marginal 
tax rate than an individual who saves the same value of wealth in a bank saving account. 
This is based on the assumption of risk-return trade-off theory which states that low level 
of risk is related to a low potential return, whereas a high level of risk is related to high 
potential return.  
To “avoid” this problem, we adopt the method introduced by Poterba and Samwick‟ 
(2003). We, firstly, calculate the total tax liability of the respondent‟s basic income T(Y), 
and then calculate the total tax liability of the respondent‟s artificially incremented 
income T (Y+∆), where ∆ denotes an increment. Hence the respondent‟s marginal tax 
rate on ordinary saving and investment income equals [T (Y+∆) - T(Y)]/ ∆, which is the 
difference between these two taxation liability over an increment. Because Poterba and 
Samwick (2003) point out that “the base amount and the increment must be unrelated to 
the households‟ portfolio allocation decision” so as to eliminate the endogeneity problem 
raised by marginal tax rate, we define the base level of income for a respondent, Y, as 
his/her labour income and artificially set his/her saving and investment income to zero. 
This choice of base level of income ensures it is unrelated to the portfolio allocation 
decision. 
  For the choice of the increment ∆, despite having relevant information and a dataset 
on respondent‟s income from dividends and interests, we have to adopt another method 
to ensure the increment to income is unrelated to the portfolio allocation decision. We 
take the greater value between 5% of the respondent‟s total savings and investments 
assets, and £100. This 5% is chosen for an approximation of the annual nominal return 
on total saving and investment assets. If the increment “moves the individual from one 
tax bracket to another” (Poterba and Samwick, 2003, p20), the marginal tax rate we 
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estimated here would be an average of the marginal tax rates for those two tax brackets. 
At the end, by using the basic level of income and the increment, we are able to 
calculate the marginal tax rate on any additional pound of ordinary savings and 
investment income. Specifically, the personal income allowance and reliefs we use for 
2000-2001 is £4,385. The bands of taxable income are £1-£1,520, £1,521-£28,400, over 
£28,400. The starting rate, basic rate and higher rate for labour income is 10 percent, 22 
percent and 40 percent respectively. We use these rates when calculating T(Y). When 
we calculate T (Y+∆), we use the same tax bracket, use the same tax rates for labour 
income, and use the average tax rates for saving income and dividends. The latter is 
calculated as follows. We know in 2000-2001 for saving income the starting rate, basic 
rate and higher rate is 10 percent, 20 percent and 40 percent, respectively. For dividends 
the starting rate, basic rate and higher rate is10 percent, 10 percent and 32.5 percent 
respectively. If we take the average, then we get the average starting rate, average basic 
rate and average higher rate for saving income and dividends is at 10 percent, 15 percent 
and 36 percent, respectively. Hence, we can calculate the total tax liability of the 
respondent‟s artificially incremented income T (Y+∆). 
In order to interpret the magnitude of the marginal tax rate effect on portfolio shares, 
we will calculate the marginal effects in the censored regression model. Greene (2000, 
p909) shows that the marginal effect of the explanatory variable x on the expected 
explained variable y is as follows: 
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where   represents the cumulative standard normal distribution function. 
kx  is the 
kth explanatory variable for individual i. The marginal effect of k
ix on the portfolio 
share of individual i is the product of the coefficient on k
ix and the probability “that the 
latent variable for a given observation falls between the upper and lower limits 
associated with the tobit” (Poterba and Samwick, 2003, p22). 
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5.6 Estimation Results 
In this section, we will first present and discuss the DD estimation results related to 
the short-run and long-run impact of the income tax reform on an individual‟s asset 
portfolio, followed by the impact of capital gain tax reform. Then we will estimate 
standard Tobit regression for 2000 to examine the marginal tax rate effect on the 
portfolio share in risky asset. 
5.6.1 Effect of income tax on individual’s asset allocation   
5.6.1.1 Simple DD estimations for effect of income tax on risky 
asset shares 
Table 5.12 presents the simple DD estimation results for the short run impact on 
the portfolio allocation of paying income tax and reduced marginal income tax due to 
tax reform in the tax year 1999-2000. The definition of the control group and treatment 
group for each DD estimation can be found in the section 5.5.1.1.1. As we can see, the 
coefficient of timedummydumtreatment is not statistically significant in the first model 
and the Chi-squared test for model specification has not been passed. We use 
likelihood-ratio chi-squared statistic to test the overall significance of our full model. As 
we can see from Table 5.12, the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic is 3.34 with a 
p-value of 0.3421, which suggests that we can not reject our null hypothesis that all 
coefficients are jointly equal to zero.  
The second DD estimation results in Table 5.12 implies that the difference between 
the changes in the average portfolio share of the two groups over 1995 and 2000 could 
be due to the income tax reforms in 1999, if the “common trend” assumption holds. The 
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reduced marginal income tax may have a positive impact on risky asset shares. However, 
typically the common trend would not hold and we have to augment this simple DD 
estimation with regression-adjusted DD estimation by controlling for relevant and 
observable factors. We will look at the augmented estimation later in section 5.6.1.2. 
Table 5. 12:The simple DD estimation in tobit for the effect of paying income tax and 
for the effect of reduced marginal income tax (1995-2000) 
Variables 
DD for the effect of paying 
income tax 
DD for the effect of reduced 
marginal income tax 
Dumtreatment -0.086 0.193*** 
  (0.08) (0.04) 
Timedummy  -0.033 -0.025 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment -0.009 0.140** 
  (0.11) (0.06) 
Constant -0.630*** -0.495*** 
  (0.05) (0.04) 
Log likelihood -2153.14 -3967.7579 
LR chi2 3.34 82.07 
Pro>chi2 0.3421 0 
Pseudo R2 0.0008 0.0102 
No. of observations 3124 5018 
Left-censored observations 
at α2000<=0 
2316 3295 
Uncensored observations 648 1428 
Right-censored observations 
at α2000>=1 
160 295 
Note:  
*,**,*** coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
Table 5.13 presents the simple DD estimation results for the long-run impact on the 
portfolio allocation of paying income tax and reduced marginal income tax due to tax 
reform in tax year 1999-2000.  The definition of the control group and the treatment 
group for each DD estimation can be found in the section 5.5.1.1.1. As we can see, the 
coefficient of timedummydumtreatment is statistically significant in the first model as 
 282 
 
well in the second model. Both two models have passed the LR Chi-squared test. Hence, 
if “common trend” holds, the simple DD estimation results suggest that the both paying 
income tax and the income tax reform in tax year 1999-2000 had a positive impact on 
the risky asset shares in the long run from 1995 to 2000.   
Table 5. 13: The simple DD estimation in tobit for the effect of paying income tax and 
for the effect of reduced marginal income tax (1995-2005) 
  Coefficients for simple DD estimation 
Variables 
DD for the effect of paying 
income tax 
DD for the effect of reduced 
marginal income tax 
Dumtreatment -0.319*** -0.005 
  (0.07) (0.04) 
Timedummy  -0.266*** -0.246*** 
  (0.05) (0.04) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment 0.352*** 0.242*** 
  (0.10) (0.06) 
Constant -0.393*** -0.333*** 
  (0.04) (0.03) 
Log likelihood -2574.921  -3884.549 
LR chi2 40.72 42.92 
Pro>chi2 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.0078 0.0055 
No. of observations 3532 4994 
Left-censored observations 
at α2000<=0 
2518 3332 
Uncensored observations 821 1375 
Right-censored observations 
at α2000>=1 
193 287 
Note:  
*,**,*** coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
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5.6.1.2 Regression-adjusted DD estimation: The effect of paying 
income tax and the effect of reduced marginal income tax due to 
the income tax reform in year 1999-2000 
       To overcome the possible misspecification of the DD estimation, we carry out 
regression-adjusted DD estimation. We use the DD estimation method to examine the 
effect of paying income tax on risky asset shares in the short run, which has also been 
reported as model 1 and model 2 in Table 5.14. The results for the short run impact of 
the income tax reform on an individual‟s asset portfolio are reported as model 3 and 
model 4 in Table 5.14. The results for the long-run impact of paying income tax and 
long-run impact of reduced marginal income tax due to the tax reform are reported in 
Table 5.15. 
The setting up of model 1 and model 2 has been discussed in section 5.5.1.1.1 and 
5.5.1.3.  The only difference between model 1 and model 2 is that in model 1 we 
regress the risky asset share on all variables, while in model 2, we exclude some of the 
control variables that are found insignificant in model 1.  
As we can see in Table 5.14, for model 2 the treatment dummy variable 
dumtreatment is significantly positive; the timedummy is significantly negative; the 
coefficient on the interaction of the treatment and time dummies is negative and 
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. Although the coefficients for 
these three dummy variables are not statistically significant in model 1, they have the 
same sign as in model 2. The negative sign for timedummy suggests that no matter 
whether the individual is in the control group or in the treatment group, he/she reduced 
the proportion of wealth invested in risky assets form 1995 to 2000. The negative sign 
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for timedummy*dumtreatment  indicates that,  after controlling for demographic 
factors,  paying income tax has an negative impact on an individual‟s risky asset shares. 
This is a situation where the substitution effect dominates. As we mentioned before, the 
substitution effect and the wealth effect work together to determine the overall impact 
on an  individual‟s portfolio allocation. In this case, when the individual starts facing 
to pay income tax, the return from risky asset would decrease due to the payment of 
dividend income tax, as a result, the individual‟s portfolio would be tilted away from 
the risky asset. This is named as the substitution effect, whereas the wealth effect would 
have an inverse impact. Paying income tax would induce the individual to hold a 
relatively aggressive portfolio. Based on the results of model 1 and model 2 in Table 
5.14, we suggest that the substitution effect dominates in this case and we find paying 
income tax would lead to lower risky assets holdings. 
In Table 5.14, model 3 and model 4 are used to examine the short-run effect of 
reduced marginal income tax due to the income tax reform in the tax year 1999-2000. 
The setup for model 3 and model 4 has been discussed in section 5.5.1.1.1 and 5.5.1.3. 
The difference between model 3 and model 4 is that in model 3 we regress the risky 
asset share on all variables, while in model 4, we exclude some of the control variables 
that are found insignificant in model 3. 
As we can in Table 5.14 model 4, after controlling for the demographic factors, the 
Dumtreatment has a positive coefficient of 0.265, which is statistically significant. The 
coefficient for Timedummy is -0.11 and it is also statistically significant, which suggests 
that keeping other variables unchanged, the average individual‟s risky asset share fell 11 
percentage point during 1995 to 2000.  However, the effect of the income tax reform 
seems not to have an impact on an individual‟s risky asset shares, because the 
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coefficient on Timedummy*Dumtreatment is not statistically different from zero. This 
null impact has also been found in model 3.  
In Table 5.14, we also found that in all four models, most of the control variables 
have expected sign for their coefficients. For example, it reveals an inversed-U shape 
impact of net liquid wealth on portfolio allocations. Similar patterns of the impact can 
be found on the effect of gross housing value and age. Both personal debt and gross 
labour income have impacts on risky asset shares, and the impacts are positive and 
statistically significant in model 4.  
In conclusion, in the short run from 1995 to 2000, we found a negative and 
significant impact of paying income tax on risky asset shares, whereas the impact of 
reduced marginal income tax due to the income tax reform in the tax year 1999-2000 
has not been found in this research.  In addition, from 1995 to 2000, it seems there was 
a time trend in holding less risky asset shares.  
Now we will look at Table 5.15 which reveals the long-run effect from 1995 to 2005. 
The four models in Table 5.15 are set up in the similar way as the previous four models 
in Table 5.14. For model 1 and model 2 in Table 5.15, the control group refers to 
individuals who did not pay income tax in 1995 and 2005, and treatment group refers to 
individuals who  did not pay income tax in 1995 but paid in 2005. For model 3 and 
model 4 in Table 5.15, the control group refers to individuals who did not pay income 
tax in 1995 and 2005, and treatment group refers to individuals who paid income tax in 
1995 and 2005. 
As we can see from the results of model 1 and model 2 in Table 5.15, in the long run 
from 1995 to 2005, the negative and significant impact of paying income tax on risky 
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asset shares, which we found in the short-time period (1995-2000), would no longer 
exist. The results of model 3 and model 4  in Table 5.15 suggests that the reduced 
marginal income tax due to the income tax reform in tax year 1999-2000 would remain 
having no impact. Lastly, from 1995 to 2005, it seems the time trend of holding less 
risky asset shares became more significant.  
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Table 5. 14: The DD estimation for the effect of paying income tax and for the effect of 
reduced marginal income tax (1995-2000) 
  Coefficients for DD estimation 
  
DD for the effect of paying 
income tax 
DD for the effect of reduced 
marginal income tax 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dumtreatment 0.134* 0.354*** 0.036 0.265*** 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) 
Timedummy  -0.032 -0.144*** -0.012 -0.110** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment -0.136 -0.363*** -0.025 -0.035 
  (0.11) (0.14) (0.05) (0.06) 
Net liquid wealth 0.882*** 2.823*** 0.803*** 0.917*** 
  (0.09) (0.22) (0.06) (0.07) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.197*** -1.337*** -0.148*** -0.101*** 
  (0.03) (0.15) (0.02) (0.01) 
Personaldebt 2.490*** 4.690*** 1.716*** 2.238*** 
  (0.74) (0.98) (0.36) (0.38) 
Housing 0.265*** 0.387*** 0.232*** 0.416*** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
Housing squared -0.026*** -0.040*** -0.035*** -0.055*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Outstanding mortgage loans -0.004 
 
0.177*** 
 
  (0.07) 
 
(0.05) 
 
Gross labour income 0.478 2.212*** -0.004 0.596*** 
  (0.56) (0.78) (0.15) (0.16) 
Incomenlw 0.001*** 
 
2.64E-05 
 
  (1.78E-04) 
 
(1.82E-05) 
 
Age 0.029*** 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (4.76E-03) (0.01) 
Agesquared -2.25E-04*** -7.38E-05 -2.16E-04*** -1.13E-04** 
  (5.33E-05) (6.06E-05) (4.52E-05) (4.91E-05) 
Aleveldum 0.041 
 
0.050 
 
  (0.05) 
 
(0.03) 
 
Degreedum -0.005 
 
0.060 
 
  (0.07) 
 
(0.04) 
 
Pensiondum 0.056 
 
0.052 
 
  (0.06) 
 
(0.04) 
 
Sexdum 0.050 0.055 0.081*** 0.078*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Maritaldum 0.039 
 
0.035 
 
  (0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
 
Childdum -0.025 
 
0.076** 
 
  (0.06) 
 
(0.03) 
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Londondum -0.055 
 
-0.026 
 
  (0.06) 
 
(0.04) 
 
constant -1.208*** -1.715*** -1.208*** -1.609*** 
  (0.15) (0.18) (0.12) (0.13) 
Log likelihood -1596.6122 -1836.4184 -2848.0813 -3532.0396 
LR chi2 426.91 636.78 606.14 953.50  
Pro>chi2 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1179 0.1478 0.0962 0.1189 
No. of observations 2044 3124 3516 5018 
Left-censored observations at 
α2000<=0 
1071 2316 1730 3295 
Uncensored observations 828 648 1544 1428 
Right-censored observations 
at α2000>=1 
145 160 242 295 
Note:  
*,**,*** coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Grosslabourincome are measured in £1,000 in 
the above regression, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the 
squared terms for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £1,000 
respectively.   
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Table 5. 15: The DD estimation for the effect of paying income tax and for the effect of 
reduced income tax (1995-2005) 
  Coefficients for DD estimation 
  
DD for the effect of paying 
income tax 
DD for the effect of reduced 
marginal income tax 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dumtreatment 0.045 0.264*** 0.130 0.273*** 
  (0.13) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) 
Timedummy  -0.663*** -0.501*** -0.479*** -0.413*** 
  (0.14) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment 0.114 -0.010 -0.018 -0.063 
  (0.19) (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) 
Net liquid wealth 0.748*** 1.030*** 0.891*** 1.010*** 
  (0.16) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.097*** -0.124*** -0.117*** -0.127*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Personaldebt 1.537 2.075*** 1.148*** 1.572*** 
  (0.99) (0.69) (0.33) (0.19) 
Housing 0.399*** 0.296*** 0.270*** 0.261*** 
  (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
Housing squared -0.031** -0.018*** -0.027*** -0.020*** 
  (0.01) (3.68E-03) (0.01) (3.40E-03) 
Outstanding mortgage loans -0.087 
 
0.011 
   (0.10) 
 
(0.05) 
 Gross labour income -0.064 0.564 0.038 0.110 
  (0.54) (0.38) (0.20) (0.13) 
Incomenlw -7.96E-06 
 
3.99E-05* 
   (3.73E-05) 
 
(2.05E-05) 
 Age 0.036*** 0.028*** 0.034*** 0.028*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Agesquared -2.64E-04* -1.58E-04*** -2.37E-04** -1.76E-04*** 
  (1.39E-04) (5.60E-05) (1.08E-04) (5.01E-05) 
Aleveldum 0.154* 
 
-0.024 
   (0.09) 
 
(0.05) 
 Degreedum 0.094 
 
0.099 
   (0.11) 
 
(0.06) 
 Pensiondum 0.139 
 
0.027 
   (0.11) 
 
(0.06) 
 Sexdum 0.061 0.045 0.089* 0.074** 
  (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Maritaldum 0.048 
 
0.098* 
   (0.10) 
 
(0.05) 
 Childdum -0.054 
 
0.158*** 
   (0.10) 
 
(0.05) 
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Londondum 0.007 
 
0.077 
   (0.14) 
 
(0.08) 
 constant -1.680*** -1.732*** -1.587*** -1.576*** 
  (0.33) (0.18) (0.25) (0.15) 
Log likelihood -631.1455  -2238.9498 -1428.5751 -3453.6783 
LR chi2 148.72 712.66 284.67 904.66 
Pro>chi2 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1054 0.1373 0.0906 0.1158 
No. of observations 864 3532 1834 4994 
Left-censored observations 
at α2000<=0 571 2518 1096 3332 
Uncensored observations 229 821 605 1375 
Right-censored observations 
at α2000>=1 64 193 133 287 
Note: *,**,*** coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Grosslabourincome are measured in £1,000 in 
the above regression, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the 
squared terms for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £1,000 
respectively.  
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5.6.2 Effect of a capital gain tax cut on an individual’s asset 
allocation   
5.6.2.1 Simple DD estimation 
Table 5.16 presents the simple DD estimation results for the short-run impact on 
the portfolio allocation of paying capital gain tax and reduced marginal capital gain tax 
due to tax reform in tax year 2000-2001. The definition of the control group and 
treatment group for each DD estimation can be found in section 5.5.1.1.2. As we can 
see, the coefficient of timedummydumtreatment is not statistically significant in the first 
model and in the second model, which suggests that the effect of paying capital gain tax 
and capital gain tax reform in tax year 2000-2001 had no impact on risky asset shares in 
the short run from 1995 to 2000, if the “common trend” assumption holds. However, 
normally the common trend would not hold and we have to augment this simple DD 
estimation with regression-adjusted DD estimation by controlling for relevant and 
observable factors. We will look at the augmented estimation later in section 5.6.2.2. 
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Table 5. 16: The simple DD estimation in tobit for the effect of paying capital gain tax 
and for the effect of reduced marginal capital gain tax (1995-2000) 
  Coefficients for simple DD estimation 
Variables 
DD for the effect of 
paying capital gain tax 
DD for the effect of reduced 
marginal capital gain tax 
Dumtreatment 0.916*** 1.275*** 
  (0.19) (0.21) 
Timedummy  0.035 0.035 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment 0.368 0.023 
  (0.26) (0.30) 
Constant -0.455*** -0.456*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Log likelihood -5951.1805  -5935.9163 
LR chi2 76.60 75.16 
Pro>chi2 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.0064 0.0063 
No. of observations 7822 7808 
Left-censored observations 
at α2000<=0 
5329 5324 
Uncensored observations 2063 2056 
Right-censored observations 
at α2000>=1 
430 428 
Note:  
*,**,*** coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 
Table 5.17 presents the simple DD estimation results for the long-run impact on 
the portfolio allocation of paying capital gain tax and reduced marginal capital gain tax 
due to tax reform in tax year 2000-2001. The definition of the control group and 
treatment group for each DD estimation can be found in section 5.5.1.1.2. As we can 
see, the coefficient of timedummydumtreatment is statistically significant in the first 
model but not in the second model. Both models have past Chi-squared test. Hence, if 
“common trend” holds, the simple DD estimation results suggest that paying the capital 
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gain tax had a positive impact on risky asset shares in the long run from 1995 to 2000, 
but the reduced marginal capital gain tax due to the income tax reform in tax year 
1999-2000 had no impact in the long run. 
Table 5. 17: The simple DD estimation in tobit for the effect of paying capital gain tax 
and for the effect of reduced marginal capital gain tax (1995-2005) 
  Coefficients for simple DD estimation 
Variables 
DD for the effect of paying 
capital gain tax 
DD for the effect of 
reduced marginal capital 
gain tax 
Dumtreatment 0.457*** 1.304*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) 
Timedummy  -0.084*** -0.081*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatmen
t 1.055*** 0.170 
  (0.11) (0.11) 
Constant -0.595*** -0.560*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Log likelihood -3958.8997  -3928.6518 
LR chi2 414.52 651.47 
Pro>chi2 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.0497 0.0766 
No. of observations 5978 5948 
Left-censored observations 
at α2000<=0 
4370 4292 
Uncensored observations 1263 1312 
Right-censored observations 
at α2000>=1 
345 344 
Note:  
*,**,*** coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
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5.6.2.2 Regression-adjusted DD estimation: The effect of paying 
capital gains tax and the effect of reduced marginal capital gain 
tax due to the tax reform in tax year 2000-2001 
Similar to what we did in section 5.6.1.2, in order to overcome the possible 
misspecification of the DD estimation, we carry out regression-adjusted DD estimation 
for the effect of the capital gains tax. The results for the short-run impact of paying 
capital gains tax on individual‟s asset portfolio are reported as model 1 and model 2 in 
Table 5.18. The short-run effects of the reduced marginal capital gains tax due to the tax 
reform in tax year 2000-2001 are also presented as model 3 and model 4 in Table 5.18. 
Table 5.19 reveals the long-run impact of capital gains tax from 1995 to 2005.  
The set up of model 1 and model 2 in Table 5.18 is similar to the set up of model 1 
and model 2 in Table 5.14, except that in Table 5.18 we look at the capital gains tax 
instead of income tax. The set up for model 1 and model 2 is discussed in section 
5.5.1.1.2 and 5.5.1.3. In model 1 we regress the risky asset share on all variables, while 
in model 2, we exclude some of the control variables that are found to be insignificant 
in model 1.  
As we can see from Table 5.18, the coefficients for timedummy*dumtreatment in 
model 1 and model 2 are both equal to 0.296 and statistically insignificant. This 
suggests that paying capital gains tax has no impact on an individual‟s risky asset share 
in the short run from 1995 to 2000. This could be a situation where the substitution 
effect and the wealth effect fully offset each other. The substitution effect, in this case, 
is a negative impact of paying capital gains tax on risky asset shares. When an 
individual starts paying capital gains tax, the return from the risky asset would decrease, 
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hence the individual‟s portfolio would be tilted away from the risky asset. On the 
contrary, the wealth has a positive effect. Paying the capital gains tax would prod the 
individual to hold a relatively aggressive portfolio. Based on the results of model 1and 
model 2 in Table 5.18, we may conclude that the substitution effect is fully offset by the 
wealth effect and paying the capital gains tax would not have an impact on risky assets 
shares in the short run. 
In Table 5.18, the coefficients for dumtreatment in model 1 and model 2 are also 
not statistically significant which implies that after control for the demographic factors 
the average risky asset shares held by individuals in the treatment group was more or 
less the same as the average risky asset shares held by individuals in the control group.  
Furthermore, if we look at the results of model 2 in Table 5.18, we find that the 
coefficient for timedummy has a negative sign and is significantly different from zero at 
the 1 percentage level in model 2, although it is statistically insignificant in model 1. 
This negative coefficient for timedummy suggests that no matter whether the individual 
is in the control group or in the treatment group, he/she would like to cut his/her risky 
asset shares from 1995 to 2000. 
In Table 5.18, model 3 and model 4 are used to examine the short-run effect of a 
reduced marginal capital gain tax due to the tax reform in the tax year 2000-2001.The 
set up for model 3 and model 4 is presented in section 5.5.1.1.2 and 5.5.1.3. Again, the 
difference between model 3 and model 4 is that in model 3 we regress the risky asset 
share on all variables, while in model 4, we exclude some of the control variables that 
are found to be insignificant in model 3. 
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As we can in Table 5.18 model 4, after controlling for the demographic factors, the 
Dumtreatment has a negative coefficient of -1.041, which is statistically significant. The 
coefficient for Timedummy is -0.122 and it is also statistically significant, which 
suggests that keeping other variables unchanged, the average individual‟s risky asset 
share fell 12 percentage point during 1995 to 2000.  However, the effect of the capital 
gain tax reform seems not to have an impact on individual‟s risky asset shares, because 
the coefficient for Timedummy*Dumtreatment is not statistically different from zero. 
This no impact has also been found in model 3. 
In Table 5.18, we also found that in all four models, most of the control variables 
have the expected sign for their coefficients. For example, it reveals an inversed-U 
shape impact of net liquid wealth on portfolio allocations. Similar patterns of the impact 
can be found on the effect of gross house value and age. Both personal debt and gross 
labour income have impacts on risky asset shares, and the impacts are positive and 
statistically significant in model 4.  
In conclusion, by using the DD estimation method, in the short run from 1995 to 
2000, we did not find an impact of paying the capital gains tax on risky asset shares. 
Similarly, the impact of the reduced marginal capital gains tax due to the tax reform in 
tax year 2000-2001 has also not been found in this research. In addition, from 1995 to 
2000, it seems there was a time trend in holding less risky asset shares.  
Finally we will look at Table 5.19 which reveals the long-run effect from 1995 to 
2005. The four models in Table 5.19 are set up in the similar way as the previous four 
models in Table 5.18. For model 1 and model 2 in Table 5.10, the control group refers 
to individuals who did not pay capital gain tax in 1995 and 2005, and the treatment 
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group refers to individuals who did not pay capital gains tax in 1995 but paid in 2005. 
For model 3 and model 4 in Table 5.19, the control group refers to individuals who did 
not pay capital gains tax in 1995 and 2005, and the treatment group refers to individuals 
who paid capital gains tax in 1995 and 2005. 
As we can see from the results of model 1 and model 2 in Table 5.19, in the long run 
from 1995 to 2005, there is a positive and significant impact of the paying capital gains 
tax on risky asset shares, which we did not find in the short time period (1995-2000) in 
Table 5.18. The possible reason is that capital gains are significantly bigger in the long 
run than in the short run. Hence the tax change is more important in the long run than in 
the short run. In comparison, labour income is steadier over the year, so the income tax 
change is more likely to have an impact in the short run than in the long run. That could 
be the reason why we find negative impact of paying income tax in the short run in the 
previous section 5.6.1.2. 
In contrast, the results of model 3 and model 4 in Table 5.19 suggests that the 
reduced marginal capital gain tax due to the tax reform in tax year 2000-2001 would 
have no impact. Lastly, from 1995 to 2005, it seems the time trend is that the average 
proportion of wealth invested in risky assets was dramatically reduced.  
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Table 5. 18: The DD estimation for the effect of paying capital gain tax and for the 
effect of reduced marginal capital gain tax (1995-2000) 
  Coefficents for DD estimation 
  
DD for the effect of paying 
capital gain tax 
DD for the effect of reduced 
marginal capital gain tax 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model3 Model 4 
Dumtreatment 0.084 -0.024 -0.307 -1.041*** 
  (0.14) (0.17) (0.19) (0.24) 
Timedummy  0.002 -0.108*** -0.010 -0.122*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment 0.296 0.296 -0.023 -0.101 
  (0.22) (0.26) (0.23) (0.28) 
Net liquid wealth 1.496*** 2.404*** 0.704*** 1.323*** 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.730*** -1.049*** -0.067*** -0.134*** 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) 
Personaldebt 2.229*** 4.228*** 1.254*** 2.871*** 
  (0.36) (0.38) (0.34) (0.36) 
Housing 0.190*** 0.359*** 0.247*** 0.468*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Housing squared -0.032*** -0.053*** -0.041*** -0.081*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Outstanding mortgage loans 0.159*** 
 
0.117** 
   (0.04) 
 
(0.05) 
 Gross labour income -0.044 0.781*** 0.045 0.914*** 
  (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) 
Incomenlw 3.49E-05* 
 
3.27E-05* 
   (1.83E-05) 
 
(1.86E-05) 
 Age 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 
  (4.28E-03) (3.83E-03) (4.36E-03) (3.90E-03) 
Agesquared -2.04E-04*** -1.64E-04*** -2.17E-04*** -1.60E-04*** 
  (4.17E-05) (3.84E-05) (4.26E-05) (3.92E-05) 
Aleveldum 0.037 
 
0.054* 
   (0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 Degreedum 0.064 
 
0.090** 
   (0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 Pensiondum 0.069** 
 
0.056* 
   (0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 Sexdum 0.078*** 0.046* 0.084*** 0.055** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Maritaldum 0.020 
 
0.028 
   (0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 Childdum 0.078** 
 
0.079** 
   (0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
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Londondum -0.021 
 
-0.033 
   (0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 constant -1.103*** -1.385*** -1.172*** -1.469*** 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
Log likelihood -3393.1970 -5283.3130 -3426.4464 -5354.3677 
LR chi2 667.07 1412.34 576.43 1238.25 
Pro>chi2 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.0895 0.1179 0.0776 0.1036 
No. of observations 4200 7822 4188 7808 
Left-censored observations 
at α2000<=0 2150 5329 2145 5324 
Uncensored observations 1756 2063 1751 2056 
Right-censored observations 
at α2000>=1 294 430 292 428 
Note:  
*,**,*** coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Grosslabourincome are measured in £1,000 in 
the above regression, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the 
squared terms for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £1,000 
respectively.   
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Table 5. 19: The DD estimation for the effect of paying capital gain tax and for the 
effect of reduced marginal capital gain tax (1995-2005) 
  Coefficents for DD estimation 
  
DD for the effect of paying 
capital gain tax 
DD for the effect of reduced 
marginal capital gain tax 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dumtreatment 0.187 0.266*** 0.710*** 0.956*** 
  (0.12) (0.08) (0.16) (0.09) 
Timedummy  -0.471*** -0.425*** -0.479*** -0.413*** 
  (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatment 0.721*** 0.813*** 0.247 0.172 
  (0.17) (0.12) (0.18) (0.11) 
Net liquid wealth 1.208*** 1.094*** 0.683*** 0.151* 
  (0.34) (0.18) (0.26) (0.08) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.787*** -0.536*** -0.316*** -0.030** 
  (0.23) (0.10) (0.11) (0.01) 
Personaldebt 2.427*** 2.372*** 1.641*** 0.567** 
  (0.66) (0.38) (0.60) (0.22) 
Housing 0.293*** 0.259*** 0.296*** 0.266*** 
  (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
Housing squared -0.027*** -0.017*** -0.025*** -0.018*** 
  (0.01) (3.87E-03) (0.01) (3.61E-03) 
Outstanding mortgage loans -0.027 
 
-0.021   
  (0.04) 
 
(0.04)   
Gross labour income -0.132 0.383*** -0.120 0.431*** 
  (0.20) (0.12) (0.20) (0.11) 
Incomenlw 2.38E-05 
 
2.29E-05   
  (2.12E-05) 
 
(2.09E-05)   
Age 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (4.87E-03) 
Agesquared -2.01E-04* -2.23E-04*** -2.03E-04* -1.97E-04*** 
  (1.18E-04) (5.08E-05) (1.12E-04) (4.82E-05) 
Aleveldum -0.029 
 
-0.026   
  (0.05) 
 
(0.05)   
Degreedum 0.007 
 
0.014   
  (0.07) 
 
(0.07)   
Pensiondum 0.129** 
 
0.132**   
  (0.05) 
 
(0.05)   
Sexdum 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.047 
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Maritaldum 0.044 
 
0.057   
  (0.06) 
 
(0.06)   
Childdum 0.087* 
 
0.079   
  (0.05) 
 
(0.05)   
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Londondum 0.068 
 
0.034   
  (0.08) 
 
(0.09)   
constant -1.427*** -1.485*** -1.429*** -1.399*** 
  (0.21) (0.12) (0.21) (0.12) 
Log likelihood -1668.6700 -3790.9707 -1624.1943 -3779.1636 
LR chi2 272.03 750.38 300.02 950.44 
Pro>chi2 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.0754 0.0901 0.0845 0.1117 
No. of observations 2296 5978 2246 5948 
Left-censored observations 
at α2000<=0 1535 4370 1499 4292 
Uncensored observations 601 1263 589 1312 
Right-censored observations 
at α2000>=1 160 345 158 344 
Note:  
*,**,*** coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Grosslabourincome are measured in £1,000 in 
the above regression, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the 
squared terms for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £1,000 
respectively.   
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5.6.3 Standard Tobit estimation with additional variable of 
marginal tax rate 
Table 5.20 shows the coefficients and standard errors on each explanatory variable 
for the Tobit estimation specified in section 5.5.2 of this chapter. As we can see, an 
increase in the marginal tax rate would lead to an increase in the proportion of wealth 
invested in risky assets, while this effect is not statistically significant from zero. The 
possible explanation for this positive correlation between the marginal tax rate and 
portfolio share in risky assets would be as follows. An increased marginal tax rate on 
ordinary income would reduce households‟ dispensable income. Because of habit 
persistence in consumption, households tend to find alternative means to make up those 
losses and keep their habit level of consumption. One possible way is to shift their 
portfolio towards risky assets and away from risk-free assets. Investment in common 
stocks would not only generate dividends which are taxed on ordinary income tax rate, 
but also generate capital gains. UK residents have “an annual tax-free allowance for 
each year and they only pay tax on total net gains above this amount, using the Capital 
Gains Tax rate for that tax year”(HMRC). Hence, it is reasonable and possible for 
household to invest in risky assets and earn tax-free capital gains.  
 Table 5.20 also presents the results for the effect of previous portfolio choice, net 
liquid wealth, personal debt, gross housing value, gross labour income, age and gender. 
It shows that the portfolio share invested in risky assets is increasing with the previous 
portfolio share in investment ( 1995  ), net liquid wealth (Netliquidwealth) if it is below 
£1,713,235, personal debt (Personaldebt), gross housing value (Housing) if it is below 
£358,079,  gross labour income (Grosslabourincome), age (Age) if age is under 62 and 
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being male. The portfolio share is decreasing with net liquid wealth (Netliquidwealth) if 
it is above £1,713,235, gross housing value (HOUSING) if it is above £358,079, and 
age (Age) if age is above 62. All coefficients in the regression, except for the ones on 
Marginaltaxrate2000 and Sexdum, are either significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent significant level. Furthermore, the model is also very significant because the 
p-value is approximately zero on the chi-squared statistics.  
Table 5.20 reveals an inversed-U shape impact of net liquid wealth on portfolio 
allocation. Keeping all the other factors constant, individuals with higher net liquid 
wealth are less risk averse and therefore allocate a higher proportion of their wealth to 
risky assets. In this case, cross-sectional variation in portfolio allocation is due to a 
different level of risk aversion that is influenced by different level of wealth.  This 
positive relationship between portfolio share and wealth is also found in the analysis of 
Wachter and Yogo (2010). 
The positive influence of personal debt on risky asset shares suggests that the 
financial sophistication of the household is a determinant of the extent to which they 
invest in risky assets. 
Gross house value can also affect individuals‟ risk attitude and hence influence their 
asset allocation decisions. In our dataset, nearly 96 percent of the respondents were 
living in a property that worth less than the threshold of £358,079. As their gross 
housing value rise up, their risky asset shares increase at a decreasing rate.  Investors 
may regard housing as a financial asset that act as insurance. It will encourage investors 
to take a more risky position. Only when the gross house value is over the threshold, the 
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negative house price risk and the negative housing consumption-commitment effect
40
 
would overwhelm the positive housing wealth effect. And then the household would 
invest less in risky assets.  
The age effect is a bit complicated. It has an invsered-U shape relationship with 
investment in risky assets. The positive relationship between age and risky asset share 
could be explained by risk aversion or through habit. In other words, as individuals age 
their habit level of consumption does not grow as quickly as their income and hence risk 
aversion declines. Also as people age they face different sorts of risks, for example, they 
may get ill and this health reason cause people to be more risk-averse. The combination 
of these two effects may explain the inversed-U shape effect of age.  Furthermore, this 
hump-shaped pattern in age is also consistent with findings in Ameriks and Zeldes 
(2004) and Wachter and Yogo (2010). 
The gross annual labour income has a positive impact on risky asset shares, as we  
can see in Table 5.20, and the coefficient of Grosslabourincome is statistically 
significant. The individual‟s risk attitude could vary with the gross labour income level. 
A Higher level of gross labour income could encourage individual to take higher risk in 
investment.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 For the details of these effects, please refer to Literature chapter 2.7.1 
 305 
 
 
Table 5. 20: Results for Tobit estimation with additional variable of marginal tax rate 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
α1995 0.732*** (0.05) 
Marginal tax rate 2000 0.187*** (0.25) 
Net liquid wealth 0.466*** (0.05) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.014*** (6.05E-03) 
Personaldebt 1.370*** (0.4) 
Housing 0.164*** (0.02) 
Housing squared -0.023 (0.02) 
Gross labour income 0.474** (0.2) 
Age  0.025*** (0.01) 
Agesquared -2.02E-04*** (5.13E-05) 
Sexdum 0.019 (0.03) 
Constant -1.469*** (0.14) 
  
  
Log likelihood -2613.942 
LR chi2 (11) 813.86 
Pro>chi2 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1347 
No. of observations 3762 
Left-censored observations at α2000<=0 2439 
Uncensored observations 1101 
Right-censored observations at α2000>=1 222 
  Note:  
*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 
1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. Netliquidwealth, 
Personaldebt, Housing and Outstandingmortgage are measured in £100,000 in the 
above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the 
squared terms for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £100,000 
respectively. 
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Table 5.21 reports the marginal effects in the above Tobit regression model for 2000. 
The results show the Tobit marginal effect of one unit increase in the average marginal 
tax rate on the expected portfolio shares in risky assets. An increase of ten percentage 
point in the marginal tax rate on interest and dividend income could boost the 
proportion of net wealth invested in risky assets by 0.54 percentage in point. In other 
words, the expected/predicted portfolio share would increase from 15percent to 15.54 
percentage. This 15 percentage of predicted portfolio share is not presented in the 
following Table 5.21. It is part of the results we obtain when estimating the marginal 
effects after Tobit. If we increase 15 percentage by 0.54 percentage point, we get 15.64 
percent. However, since we did not find a marginal tax rate effect in Table 5.20, and the 
marginal effect of income tax on risky asset shares is statistically insignificant based on 
the results in Table 5.21, we need to interpret these results with caution. 
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Table 5. 21: Marginal effect of income taxation on risky asset shares 
Variables dy/dx   Standard error X 
α1995 0.212 *** (0.01) 0.17 
Marginal tax rate 2000 0.054 
 
(0.07) 0.125 
Net liquid wealth 0.149 *** (0.04) 0.071 
Net liquid wealth squared -3.94E-03 *** (9.10E-04) 0.121 
Personaldebt 0. 413 *** (0.15) 0.015 
Housing 0.047 *** (0.01) 0.783 
Housing squared -6.62E-03 
 
(0.01) 0.483 
Gross labour income 0.112 ** (0.06) 0.102 
Age  0.007 *** (1.42E-03) 47.75 
Agesquared -5.85E-05 *** (1.10E-05) 2127.44 
Sexdum
(a)
 0.005 
  
0.441 
  
    
No. of observations 3762 
left-censored observations at α2000<=0 2439 
uncensored observations 1101 
right-censored observations at α2000>=1 222 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Outstandingmortgage are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for  Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
(a):
 dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 308 
 
The following Table 5.22 is set up for testing the robustness of our previous 
results that marginal tax rate has no impact on risky asset holdings. By running these 
additional specifications, we still do not find the impact of marginal tax rate on risky 
asset holdings. 
 In model 1 of Table 5.22, we still follow Poterba and Samwick‟(2003) approach 
to calculate the marginal tax rate for each individuals in 2000, and we regress on all the 
regressors including variables on the number of children aged below 15 in the family 
(numberofkids) and variables on the health of the individual (youngunhealthdum, 
oldhealthdum, oldunhealthdum, healthstatus). The marginal effects after Tobit 
regression are also reported in Table 5.22. The marginal effects measure the expected 
change in risky asset share as a function of one unit increase in the explanatory variable. 
The second column presents the value of dy/dx and the third column presents the 
average value of the explanatory variable.  
As we can see in model 1, previous risky asset share (α1995) has a positive impact 
on risky asset holdings in 2000. In addition, the second column suggests that an increase 
of ten percentage point in previous risky asset share (α1995) implies an increase in the 
proportion of net wealth invested in risky assets by 2.46 percentage point in 2000. In 
other words, the expected/predicted portfolio share would increase from 25.95 percent
41
 
to 28.41 percent. The net liquid wealth has an inverse U-shape of impact. If average net 
liquid wealth increases by £100,000, the expected/predicted risky asset share would 
increase by 20.9 percentage point. Personal debt has a positive impact. An increase of 
£100,000in personal debt would result in an increase of 60.2 percentage point in 
                                                          
41
 Please note this predicted portfolio share is not presented in the Table 5.13. It is part of the results 
we obtain when estimating the marginal effects after Tobit 
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expected risky asset share. Gross house value has an inverse U-shape of impact. An 
increase of £100,000 in gross house value would result in an increase of 4.9 percentage 
point in expected risky asset share. Outstanding mortgage has a positive impact. If the 
average outstanding mortgage increases by £100,000, the expected portfolio share in 
risky asset would increase by 5.4 percentage point. The impact of incomenlw on risky 
asset holdings is positive, and the marginal effect of incomenlw is close to zero. Age has 
an inverse U-shape of impact. An increase of 10 years in average age would increase the 
expected risky asset share by 16.36 percentage point. Because the marginal effect of the 
dummy variables is measured in terms of discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 
1, the results in Table 5.22 suggest that an individual whose highest education level is 
first degree or higher would invest 3.9 percentage point higher than an individual with 
whose highest education is an O-level or under. Compared with the retirees‟ risky asset 
share, the risky asset share of employees is 5 percentage point less; the risky asset share 
of self-employed people is 7.8 percentage point less; the risky asset share of 
unemployed people is 8.9 percentage point less. The presence of chid/children increases 
the risky asset share by 7.5 percentage point. Compared with individuals who are young 
and have good health, individuals who are old and unhealthy would invest 14.2 
percentage point less in risky asset share.     
In order to test the robustness of our results, we also regress on lagged marginal 
income tax rate in 1999 and report the results in model 2 of the following Table 5.22. 
As we can see, the impact of marginal tax rate on risky asset holdings still has not been 
found in model 2. The effects of other regressors are similar to what we find in model 1. 
We recognise that some of the explanatory variables are potentially endogenous, 
and this could lead to inconsistent estimators. Therefore, we carry out a two-step 
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procedure (Wooldridge, 2002, p532) to test the exogeneity, and we find that there is 
evidence that grosslabourincome and incomenlw are endogenous in the specification.  
Hence, we regress on permanent income
42
 and permanentincomenlw to test the 
robustness of our results, and we present the results in the model 3 of the following 
Table 5.22. For comparison, we also regress on gross labour income and incomenlw in 
model 4 using the same sample data as in model 3. 
As we can see, in terms of sign and significance level, there is no much difference 
between model 3 and model 4 except that in model 3 the coefficients of Degreedum and 
Sexdum are not statistically significant.   
In conclusion, the impact of marginal tax rate on risky asset holdings has not been 
found from model 1 to model 4, which shows the robustness of the results.    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42
 The way we construct Permanentincome and Permanentincomenlw is similar to the way we 
construct them in Chapter 3. We follow Guariglia’s (2001) approach to obtain the value of permanent 
income for individuals whose age is between 21 and 65. We use the BHPS data in 1995 and 2000, and 
we, firstly, run a random effect model by regressing individuals’ gross labour income on “age, age 
squared, education dummies, occupational dummies, and interactions of the latter two groups of 
dummies with age and age squared” (Guariglia, 2001, p627). Then we use the estimated coefficients to 
predict the permanent income for individuals in 1995 and 2000 respectively. Finally, we divide 
permanent income by net liquid wealth to get the ratio. The reason why we regress on 
Permanentincome and Permanentincomenlw is that we recognise gross labour income is potentially 
endogenous which may lead to inconsistent estimators. 
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Table 5. 22: Robustness tests for the null effect of marginal tax rate on risky asset holdings in 2000 
  
Model 1 
Marginal effect for model 
1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables   dy/dx X 
regress on 
mtr1999 
regress on 
Pincome, 
Pincomenlw 
compare 
with model 
3 
Allocation1995 0.491*** 0.246*** 0.278  0.493*** 0.444*** 0.442*** 
  (0.04) (0.02)   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Marginal tax rate 2000 -0.230 -0.115 0.130  
 
-0.204 -0.162 
  (0.26) (0.13)   
 
(0.19) (0.27) 
Lagged marginal tax rate 
 
    -0.234 
    
 
    (0.20) 
  Netliquidwealth 0.526*** 0.264*** 0.134  0.521*** 0.587*** 0.589*** 
  (0.08) (0.04)   (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Netliquidwealthsquared -0.109*** -0.055*** 0.143  -0.107*** -0.122*** -0.123*** 
  (0.02) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Personaldebt 1.202*** 0.602*** 0.015  1.126*** 1.209*** 1.191*** 
  (0.33) (0.17)   (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) 
Housing 0.121*** 0.060*** 0.997  0.136*** 0.054 0.061 
  (0.04) (0.02)   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Housingsquared -0.021*** -0.011*** 1.844  -0.022*** -0.011 -0.012 
  (0.01) (3.95E-03)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Outstandingmortgage 0.107*** 0.054*** 0.251  0.102** 0.132*** 0.134*** 
  (0.04) (0.02)   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Grosslabourincome 0.077 0.039 0.112  0.062 
 
0.037 
  (0.19) (0.10)   (0.16) 
 
(0.19) 
Incomenlw 1.10E-04*** 5.51E-05*** 28.482  1.11E-04*** 
 
1.04E-04*** 
  (4.03E-05) (2.00E-05)   (4.01E-05) 
 
(3.99E-05) 
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Permanentincome  
 
    
 
0.678 
   
 
    
 
(0.41) 
 Permanentincomenlw 
 
    
 
8.14E-05*** 
   
 
    
 
(2.88E-05) 
 Age 0.036*** 0.018*** 49.988  0.035*** 0.033** 0.044*** 
  (0.01) (3.33E-03)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Agesquared -3.28E-04*** -1.64E-04*** 2806.470  -3.27E-04*** -2.81E-04* -4.27E-04*** 
  (7.05E-05) (4.00E-05)   (7.21E-05) (1.62E-04) (1.40E-04) 
Aleveldum 0.044 0.022 0.272  0.052 -0.002 0.033 
  (0.03) (0.02)   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Degreedum 0.076* 0.039* 0.150  0.072 0.011 0.078* 
  (0.04) (0.02)   (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Pensiondum 0.039 0.020 0.473  0.029 0.030 0.023 
  (0.04) (0.02)   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Employeedum -0.069 -0.035 0.609  -0.076 -0.070 -0.083 
  (0.07) (0.03)   (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
Selfemployeddum -0.169** -0.078*** 0.076  -0.168** -0.178** -0.161* 
  (0.07) (0.03)   (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Unemployeddum -0.195** -0.089*** 0.047  -0.182** -0.235** -0.235** 
  (0.08) (0.03)   (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Sexdum 0.033 0.016 0.497  0.021 0.054 0.059* 
  (0.03) (0.01)   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Maritaldum -0.009 -0.004 0.619  -0.013 0.007 0.002 
  (0.03) (0.02)   (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Childdum 0.145** 0.075** 0.200  0.178*** 0.130** 0.134** 
  (0.06) (0.03)   (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Numberofkids -0.043 -0.021 0.431  -0.051 -0.047 -0.047 
  (0.03) (0.02)   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
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Londondum -0.018 -0.009 0.097  -0.022 0.013 0.009 
  (0.05) (0.02)   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Youngunhealthdum 0.007 0.003 0.012  0.042 
    (0.14) (0.07)   (0.15) 
  Oldhealthdum 0.050 0.025 0.170  0.057 
    (0.07) (0.04)   (0.08) 
  Oldunhealthdum -0.349 -0.142** 0.006  -0.349 
    (0.23) (0.07)   (0.23) 
  Healthstatus -0.003 -0.001 2.161  -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.02) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -1.089***     -1.062*** -1.057*** -1.204*** 
  (0.16)     (0.17) (0.24) (0.23) 
Log likelihood -1745.65    
 
-1646.49  -1348.41  -1349.46  
LR chi2 516.30    
 
488.89 386.27 384.15 
Pro>chi2 0 
  
0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1288   0.1293 0.1253 0.1246 
No. of observations 2203 
  
2074 1708 1708 
left-censored observations at α2000<=0 957   897 737 737 
uncensored observations 1072 
  
1010 846 846 
right-censored observations at α2000>=1 174     167 125 125 
Note:*,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is 
presented in parentheses. Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing, Outstandingmortgage,Grosslabourincome, and Permanentincome are 
measured in £100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and Housingsquared are the squared terms for  
Netliquidwealth and Housing which are measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has explored and examined the impact of taxation on 
portfolio shares in risky assets. We considered how taxation can impact on the 
individual‟s desire to take on risk. We use individual level data from the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for 1995, 2000 and 2005. We used simple DD 
estimations first to examine the impact of taxation. We then augment the simple model 
with Regression-adjusted DD estimation by controlling for relevant demographic 
factors and we have found that in the short run paying income tax has a negative impact 
on risky asset shares, but this effect has not been found in the long run from 1995 to 
2005. In addition, the reduced marginal income tax due to the income tax reforms in the 
tax year 1999-2000 may not have an impact on risky asset shares both in the short run 
and in the long run. Although we have not found any significant impact of paying 
capital gain tax on risky asset shares in the short run, we have found a significantly 
positive impact of paying capital gain tax in the long run from 1995 to 2005. 
Furthermore, we have not found any significant effect on risky asset shares from a fall 
in the marginal capital gains tax rate in the tax year 2000-2001, neither in the short run 
or in the long run. Finally, we found the time trend in risky asset shares is falling 
overtime. 
Additionally, we then estimate a standard Tobit regression for 2000 to examine the 
marginal tax rate effect on the portfolio share in risky asset. The marginal tax rate on 
ordinary saving and investment income for each respondent in the corresponding BHPS 
survey is calculated using the method introduced by Poterba and Samwick (2003). By 
controlling for a series of socioeconomic and demographic variables, we find a positive 
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relationship between the marginal tax rate and the proportion of wealth invested in risky 
assets, but that this effect is not statistically significant from zero.  
The main results we obtain are robust to using a heteroscedastic Tobit estimator 
and for the CQR model. The robustness tests for the first result (the negative impact of 
paying income tax in the short run) are presented in Table (A) of Appendix. The 
robustness tests for the second result (the positive impact of paying capital gain tax in 
the long run) are presented in Table (B) of Appendix. The robustness tests for the third 
result (no impact of marginal income tax rate) are presented in Table (C) of Appendix.   
The policy implication of this research can be found in the following conclusion 
chapter 6.2.2. 
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Appendix: 
Table (A): robustness tests for the negative impact of paying 
income tax in the short run 
  
Tobit 
Heteroscedastic 
Tobit 
Quantile 
0.6 
Quantile 
0.8 
Variables 
  
coefficien
t  
      
Dumtreatment 0.354*** 0.221* 0.43** 0.031 0.150** 
  (0.08) (0.12) (0.20) (0.02) (0.06) 
Timedummy  -0.144*** -0.233*** 0.314*** -0.021 -0.028 
  (0.05) (0.06)  (0.12) (0.01) (0.04) 
Timedummy*Dumtreatmen
t 
-0.363*** -0.258* -0.448* -0.228*** -0.480*** 
  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.26) (0.04) (0.13) 
Net liquid wealth 2.823*** 3.717*** -4.084*** 2.001*** 2.531*** 
  (0.22)  (0.34)  (0.52) (0.05) (0.17) 
Net liquid wealth squared -1.337*** -2.892*** 3.082*** -0.979*** -1.352*** 
  (0.15)  (0.42)  (0.44) (0.04) (0.18) 
Personaldebt 4.690*** 4.331** 1.945 1.991*** 3.454*** 
  (0.98)  (2.02)  (3.37) (0.30) (0.67) 
Housing 0.387*** 0.535*** -0.172 0.016 0.132*** 
  (0.05) (0.09)  (0.13) (0.01) (0.04) 
Housing squared -0.040*** -0.092*** 0.043 0.002 -0.009 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (1.54E-03) (0.01) 
Gross labour income 2.212*** 3.25*** -2.076 1.212*** 2.406*** 
  (0.78) (0.95)  (1.72) (0.21) (0.67) 
Age 0.019*** 0.044*** -0.031 0.004** 0.007 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (1.72) (2.12E-03) (4.97E-03) 
Agesquared 
-7.38E-05 2.76E-04 2.40E-04* 
-4.44E-05*
* 
-3.39E-05 
  
(6.06E-05
) 
(2.11E-04) 
(1.45E-04
) 
(1.95E-05) (4.47E-05) 
Sexdum 0.055 0.005 0.123 0.020 0.014 
  (0.04)  (0.05) (0.10) (0.01) (0.03) 
constant -1.715*** -2.485*** 
 
-0.162*** -0.331** 
  (0.18) (0.34)   (0.06) (0.15) 
Pseudo R2 0.1478 
  
0.1990 0.1942 
No. of observations 3124 3124  
844 1813 
log likelihood -1836.42  -1774.00        

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Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Grosslabourincome are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
 
 
Table (B): robustness tests for the positive impact of paying 
capital gain tax in the long run 
  
Tobit  
Heteroscedastic 
Tobit 
Quantile 
0.6 
Quantile 
0.8   
Variables   coefficient        
Dumtreatment 0.266*** 0.173*** -0.098 0.085*** 0.325*** 
  (0.08) (0.06) (0.18) (0.01) (0.04) 
Timedummy  -0.425*** -0.39*** 0.214* -0.027*** -0.249*** 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.11) (0.01) (0.03) 
Timedummy*Dumtreat
ment 0.813*** 0.673*** 0.392 0.796*** 0.552*** 
  (0.12) (0.08) (0.26) (0.01) (0.06) 
Net liquid wealth 1.094*** 1.862*** -7.835*** 0.109*** 0.298*** 
  (0.18) (0.19) (0.64) (0.01) (0.07) 
Net liquid wealth squared -0.536*** -1.684*** 5.023*** -0.103*** -0.245*** 
  (0.10) (0.25) (0.55) (0.01) (0.04) 
Personaldebt 2.372*** 1.226** -3.205** 0.208*** 1.681*** 
  (0.38) (0.64) (1.33) (0.03) (0.19) 
Housing 0.259*** 0.313*** -0.101 0.004 0.125*** 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.09) (3.13E-03) (0.02) 
Housing squared -0.017*** -0.039*** 0.03** 0.002*** -0.003 
  (3.87E-03) (0.01) (0.01) (3.33E-04) (1.88E-03) 
Grosslabourincome 0.383*** 0.282*** -0.074 0.021** 0.292*** 
  (0.12) (0.09) (0.27) (0.01) (0.06) 
Age 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.001 0.002** 0.012*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (7.81E-04) (3.67E-03) 
Agesquared 
-2.23E-04*
** 
1.65E-04*
** 
4.06E-05*
** 
-1.69E-05
** 
-1.10E-04*
** 

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  (5.08E-05) (3.98E-05) (1.21E-05) (7.73E-06) (3.80E-05) 
Sexdum 0.045 -0.008 0.166** -0.003 0.013 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (3.27E-03) (0.02) 
constant -1.485*** -1.357*** 
 
-0.045** -0.306*** 
  (0.12) (0.16) 
 
(0.02) (0.09) 
Pseudo R2 0.0901     0.2497 0.1610  
No. of observations 5978 5978 
 
1604 3813 
Log likelihood -3790.97 -3625.00       
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Grosslabourincome are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
 
 
Table (C): Additional robustness tests for the null effect of 
marginal tax rate 
  
Tobit  
Heteroscedastic 
Tobit Quantile 0.6 Quantile 0.8 
  
Variables   coefficient        
Allocation1995 0.491*** 0.45*** -0.115 0.544*** 0.489*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.03) (0.04) 
Marginal tax rate 
2000 
-0.230 0.265 -1.991** 0.323 -0.489* 
  (0.26) (0.26) (0.92) (0.20) (0.27) 
Netliquidwealth 
0.526*** 0.764*** 
-1.735**
* 
0.543*** 0.281*** 
  (0.08) (0.11) (0.27) (0.06) (0.08) 
Netliquidwealth 
squared -0.109*** -0.321*** 0.703*** -0.128*** -0.056*** 
  (0.02) (0.07) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02) 
Personaldebt 1.202*** 1.303*** -1.629 1.149*** 0.834*** 
  (0.33) (0.30) (1.31) (0.23) (0.29) 
Housing 
0.121*** 0.161*** 
-0.444**
* 
0.125*** 0.033 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.03) (0.04) 
Housingsquared -0.021*** -0.029*** 0.064** -0.024*** -0.011 

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  (0.01) (0.17) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Outstanding 
mortgage 
0.107*** 0.139*** 0.231* 0.114*** 0.173*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.03) (0.04) 
Grossincome 0.077 -0.267 0.402 -0.442*** 0.198 
  (0.19) (0.17) (0.69) (0.14) (0.18) 
Incomenlw 1.10E-04*** 2.04E-04*** 3.13E-04 5.19E-05*** 9.95E-05*** 
  
(4.03E-05) (5.37E-05) 
(3.23E-04
) 
(1.43E-05) (2.45E-05) 
Age 0.036*** 0.047*** -0.053** 0.029*** 0.036*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Agesquared 
-3.28E-04**
* 
-4.38E-04**
* 
0.001** 
-2.96E-04**
* 
-3.35E-04**
* 
  
(7.05E-05) (5.12E-05) 
(2.65E-04
) 
(6.58E-05) (7.38E-05) 
Aleveldum 0.044 0.027 -0.013 0.013 0.050 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.04) 
Degreedum 0.076* 0.087** -0.241* 0.054* 0.016 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.03) (0.05) 
Pensiondum 0.039 0.079* -0.161 0.033 0.009 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.03) (0.04) 
Employeedum -0.069 -0.144** 0.413* -0.061 -0.039 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.23) (0.05) (0.07) 
Selfemployeddum -0.169** -0.177*** -0.233 -0.141*** -0.199** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.23) (0.05) (0.08) 
Unemployeddum -0.195** -0.206** 0.01 -0.159* -0.195** 
  (0.08) (0.10) (0.32) (0.08) (0.09) 
Sexdum 0.033 0.003 0.238** 0.063*** 0.051 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.03) 
Maritaldum -0.009 -0.030 0.075 -0.029 0.028 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.04) 
Childdum 0.145** 0.129** 0.135 0.164*** 0.124* 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.23) (0.05) (0.07) 
Numberofkids -0.043 -0.047 -0.022 -0.065*** -0.021 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.02) (0.03) 
Londondum -0.018 -0.033 -0.053 -0.059 0.028 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.16) (0.04) (0.05) 
Youngunhealthdum 0.007 -0.013 0.236 -0.014 0.084 
  (0.14) (0.22) (0.63) (0.12) (0.14) 
Oldhealthdum 0.050 0.134* -0.31 0.093 0.044 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.24) (0.06) (0.08) 
Oldunhealthdum -0.349 0.142 -2.211 0.197 -0.122 
  (0.23) (0.19) (1.54) (0.17) (0.20) 
Healthstatus -0.003 -0.012 0.135** 0.005 -0.003 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) 
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Constant -1.089*** -1.339*** 
 
-0.760*** -0.551*** 
  (0.16) (0.20) 
 
(0.15) (0.16) 
Pseudo R2 0.1288     0.1663 0.149 
No. of observations 2203 2203 
 
1558 2175 
Log likelihood -1745.65  -1666.00        
Note: *,**,*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10%,5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. 
Netliquidwealth, Personaldebt, Housing and Grosslabourincome are measured in 
£100,000 in the above regressions, whereas Netliquidwealthsquared and 
Housingsquared are the squared terms for Netliquidwealth and Housing which are 
measured in £100,000 respectively. 
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6.Conclusion 
6.1 Summary of Results  
In conclusion, by using the BHPS data we have carried out three empirical studies 
to investigate the household risky asset choice in the UK. The first study in Chapter 3 
identifies variables or factors that can be observed to influence a household‟s asset 
choice through parameters of their objective function such as risk aversion and habit. 
The second study in Chapter four finds that retirement has positive effect on risky asset 
shares for house owners while it has no effect on non house owners. The third study in 
Chapter five find in the short run paying income tax has negative impact on individual‟s 
risky asset shares and in the long run paying capital gain tax has positive effect on 
individual‟s risky asset shares. 
In Chapter three, we have analysed empirically household-specific factors that 
influence the extent to which household hold risky assets. Using a typical model of asset 
choice our empirical specification identifies variables that can be observed to influence 
a household‟s asset choice through parameters of their objective function such as risk 
aversion and habit. Net liquid wealth, personal debt, housing wealth, outstanding 
mortgage, the ratio of income to net liquid wealth, age and employment status are 
observed to influence a household‟s risk aversion. Factors such as education, pension, 
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gender, marital status, number of children and location are found to be insignificant 
variables. Specifically, except for the very wealthy, net liquid wealth has a positive 
impact on households‟ risky asset shares. This result is consistent with decreasing risk 
aversion as individual become wealthier. The inversed-U shape impact of housing 
wealth on risky asset shares can be explained by the overall effect from three sub-effects, 
namely, the negative house price risk, the negative housing consumption commitment 
effect and positive housing wealth effect, which we have detailed in the Literature 
survey of chapter 2.7.1. The positive influence of debt (personal debt and outstanding 
mortgage) suggests that the financial sophistication of the household is a determinant to 
the extent to which they invest in risky assets. The positive effect of the ratio of annual 
labour income to net liquid wealth implies that as households have more income relative 
to their wealth they are in a better position to meet habit level consumption or respond 
to really bad economic shocks. Hence they can hold a more risky portfolio. In addition, 
this study confirms the response of asset choice to age. Specifically, as individuals age 
they increase their share of risky asset although above a certain age, 56 in this study, the 
risky asset share declines. The positive relationship between age and risky asset share 
could be explained by risk aversion or through habit. In other words as individuals age 
their habit level of consumption does not grow as quickly as their income and hence risk 
aversion declines.  Finally, employment status is seen to be important in the context of 
a negative influence of unemployment and being self-employed. It seems likely that 
such an effect comes from the effect that these two employment states have on the 
probability of falling close to habit level of consumption with the consequent rise in risk 
aversion. 
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In Chapter Four, by carrying out an analysis including cross-sectional regression 
and DD estimation, we find that retirement has a positive effect on risky asset shares for 
house owners while it has no effect on non-house owners. Furthermore, by 
implementing a short panel study on the joint impact of retirement and housing 
ownership, we find that on average, retired house owners hold the highest proportion of 
risky assets among the four categories of households defined in the paper, followed by 
employed house owners who hold the second highest proportion of risky assets. The 
average risky asset shares of the other two categories of households, namely, retired non 
house owners and employed non house owners are relatively the same and are the 
lowest among all.  These results are statistically significant.    
In Chapter Five, the impact of taxation is considered in detail using household 
level datasets. Firstly, from a theoretical perspective, we examine the impact of taxation 
on households‟ asset allocation. Two sub-effects, namely, substitution effect and wealth 
effect, will work together to determine the overall impact of taxation.  We then use 
BHPS data to carry out an empirical study. We examine the impact of tax allowances 
and marginal tax rates on portfolio shares in risky assets by using the 
Difference-in-Difference method. After controlling for demographic factors, we found 
in the short run paying income tax has negative impact on individual‟s risky asset shares, 
which is significantly different from zero at the 1 percentage level. We also found in the 
long run paying capital gains tax has a positive effect on an individual‟s risky asset 
shares, which is also significantly different from zero at the 1 percentage level. In 
contrast, by using DD estimation methods, we found neither marginal income tax rate 
nor marginal capital gains tax has effect on risky asset shares. Furthermore, this null 
effect of marginal tax on risky asset shares has also been found in the standard Tobit 
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regression for 2000 when we followed Poterba and Samwick (2003) and calculated the 
marginal tax rate for each individual.    
6.2 Policy Implication 
The purpose of the thesis is to look at social factors and how they influence 
portfolio selection. Hence much of the policy implications come from considering the 
household specific factors that are found to have an empirically significant effect on 
risky asset choice. 
Firstly, we find that age has a non linear impact with risky asset share increasing 
up to the mid 50‟s and then falling after that. This gives us insights into the impact of an 
ageing population on risky-asset choice and suggests that as the average age of an 
economy increases we shall see greater holdings of risky assets while as the proportion 
of people over 60 rises the holding of risky assets will fall. 
Secondly, we have observed that housing is also an influence on risky asset 
holdings. Many households see housing as part of their wealth portfolio and our results 
indicate that this may well be the case. Note that capital gains on housing is not taxed if 
it is an individual‟s main home. Hence individuals may have an incentive to invest in 
housing rather than financial assets which distorts the housing and share markets. 
Thirdly, education level is also found to have a significant influence on asset 
holding. This suggests that the higher the education level you have achieved the more 
sophisticated your investment decisions are. If policy is to increase the spread of share 
ownership then enhancing financial sophistication through targetted training 
programmes may be helpful. 
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Fourthly, we find that after controlling for demographic factors, paying income tax 
has negative impact on individual‟s risky asset shares, which is significantly different 
from zero at 1 percent level. In contrast, we do not find the effect of marginal tax rate on 
risky asset shares. This leads us to draw a possible policy impaction on increasing 
income tax allowances which would provide tax incentive to encourage low income 
households to save and save in a more balanced portfolio of low and high risky assets. 
We explain the last two policy implications in more detail in the following 
sub-section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, respectively.  
6.2.1 financial education and ensure low income households 
have a minimum safety net 
There are clearly some policy implications that can be drawn about the way in 
which portfolios are structured and the extent to which incentives to hold a diversified 
portfolio are constrained by various household characteristics. If we would like to 
promote wealth holding among the lower income groups of society then the results of 
this thesis suggest that we need to provide more support to such households in terms of 
financial education and in ensuring that they have a minimum safety net which will 
protect them should stock returns be low or negative. The reason is that low income 
households as well as many other households tend to be unsophisticated and are likely 
to hold unwell diversified portfolio, Providing targettted training programmes and 
possible educations on financial capacity may enhance individuals‟ financial 
sophistication and help them to understand the financial markets, take advantage of 
stock markets, make wise financial investment decisions and manage their asset 
portfolio more efficiently. On the other hand, providing the minimum safety net can 
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also encourage low income households to participate in stock market. The possible 
channels could be, for example, no capital gains tax, complete “offset privileges for 
capital losses” (Tobin, 1958, p82), and no tax on dividends and saving income.   
6.2.2 Income tax personal allowances matter for household 
portfolio choice43 (Kong and Dickinson, 2011) 
Except the direct action such as social security benefits and housing subsidies, a 
long-term policy to help those on low incomes become better off is likely to require a 
more financially sustainable approach. One way of achieving this is to provide 
incentives for people on low incomes to save, and to save in a balanced portfolio of low 
and high risky assets. Providing tax incentives is one potential policy tool in this area. 
Current policy initiatives such as ISAs are designed to increase incentives to save. We 
are interested in the structure of savings. 
 Tax incentives can be provided in different ways. For example, the government 
could reduce the marginal income tax rates and/or increase the income tax allowances
44
. 
If the marginal income tax rate is reduced and the Capital Gains Tax rates remain the 
same, then on the one hand, the increased after tax return on investments would 
encourage individuals to invest more in risky assets.  On the other hand, the increased 
wealth could lead the investor to hold a relatively conservative portfolio. Both 
substitution effects and wealth effects will work together to determine the overall 
impact of taxation on an individual‟s portfolio allocation. Similar effects would be 
                                                          
43
 This section has been published as a briefing paper for CHASM, and is available at 
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/activity/social-policy/chasm/publications/briefing-papers.aspx 
 
44
 Note that government policy proposals are consistent with an increase in tax thresholds. 
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found by increasing the income tax allowances. However, the latter will have a 
relatively large quantitative impact on low-income households since they have low 
wealth. Compared with facing a reduced marginal income tax, increasing tax 
allowances will take low-income households out of paying tax or, equivalently, a 
zero-tax regime.  
According to our research
45
 , tax allowances affect an individual‟s asset allocation 
more than the marginal tax rates. We find that increasing income tax allowances will 
encourage those on low incomes to save in a more balanced portfolio (ie: they increase 
their risky asset proportion). All financial markets will provide a long-term basis for the 
low-income households to build wealth and develop long-term financial security. We 
find that taxation can encourage a more balanced saving approach. 
Of course, such a change would need to be funded, for example, through a 
relatively small tax on the more wealthy in the short term. The key aspect is that by 
encouraging such behaviour the long term consequences for the economy will be that 
low-income households will substantially benefit from having more assets and greater 
income and that they will pay more tax in the future as a consequence. 
 
 
 
                                                          
45
 We used individual level data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to examine the impact 
of tax allowances and marginal tax rates on portfolio shares in risky assets by using the 
Difference-in-Difference method. After controlling for demographic factors, we found paying income tax 
has negative impact on individual’s risky asset shares, which is significantly different from zero at 1 
percent level. In contrast, we found the effect of marginal tax rate on risky asset shares is statistically 
insignificant. 
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6.3 Limitation and future research 
Firstly, all the empirical work, interpretation and analysis carried out in this thesis 
are based on assumptions that the behaviour of individuals is rational. However, 
irrational behaviour of individuals could take place. For example, irrational investors 
would “increase their portfolios as the stock market was rising and then liquidate stock 
as the market collapsed” 46(Farhi and Panageas, 2007, pp89). This irrational behaviour 
of noise trader would have impact on the asset prices and may also help to explain the 
cross sectional variations in risky asset holdings.  
Secondly, although BHPS survey contains microdata on financial wealth and asset 
holdings, it is only suitable for an analysis based on two classification of household 
asset choice, namely, risk-free assets and risky assets. We now propose to carry out an 
analysis on British households‟ asset choices by using a new dataset from The Wealth 
and Assets Survey which has been available since last year.   
Compared with current research dataset which is from BHPS, Wealth and Assets 
Survey provides much more detailed information on British Households‟ different asset 
class holdings, financial and private pension wealth, property, and savings, debt and 
borrowings. Its sample size is about 70,000 people, which is quite large. Demographic 
data will also be collected including “sex, age, employment status, socio-economic 
classification, geography and education” (ONS, 2010). This will allow us to consider 
                                                          
46
 This irrational behaviour is consistent with the observations in China which experienced a 
dramatically increase in risky asset holdings during the last ten years and there is a high proportion of 
the middle aged individuals and old population participating in the stock market boom. These 
individuals have accumulated a vast amount of wealth over their working life. The rapid rising in stock 
market and the easy access to it encourage them to participate in stock market and allocate a high 
proportion of wealth in it. The retirement would have a larger impact on Chinese’s asset allocation 
behaviour than households in other developed countries since the Chinese need to accumulate 
relatively more wealth for later consumption due to the not-well-developed health insurance and social 
security system. 
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such factors as financial exclusion in a more detailed way than previously. Typically 
this is portrayed as a two state variable – either you participate in financial markets or 
not. But we can extend our understanding of this by relating socio-economic factors to 
the decision that individual‟s make about multiple asset choice. Including transaction 
costs, taxation as well will provide us with a very rich story to understand what is 
driving financial market participation and multiple asset choice. 
Furthermore, based on our current study which is using BHPS data, we identify 
that net liquid wealth, personal debt, housing wealth, outstanding mortgage, the ratio of 
income to net liquid wealth, age and employment status are observed to influence a 
households‟ risk aversion.  Factors such as education, pension, gender, marital status, 
number of children and location are found to be insignificant variables by using the 
BHPS dataset. However these factors are supposed to be correlated with risk aversion. 
Maybe by applying this idea on a larger dataset from Wealth and Assets Survey, we will 
be able to provide a more reliable examination of factors that determine risk aversion 
and explain the cross sectional variation in households‟ risky asset choices.  
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